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ABSTRACT 
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Director: Dr. Jennifer N. Fish 
 
 
As forced migrants linger at the borders of the world’s conflicts, refugees from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in Rwanda remain in camps where they have waited for ‘durable solutions’ to their 
geographic and political existence for nearly two decades. Protracted displacement such as this results 
from processes at the local, state, regional, and international levels, with consequences reverberating 
each of these levels, including insecurity, expenditure of already limited resources, and strained interstate 
political relationships. As refugees’ stays extend to increasingly long periods of time, situations once 
assumed to be temporary take on a semblance of permanence. Forced displacement increasingly 
transitions to relatively durable living instances of conflict spillover, articulating the wider human impacts 
of such patterns of vital, and often understudied, outcomes of conflict and power struggles. Using a 
qualitative approach within a specific site of displacement in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, this study 
engages in dialog with notions of sovereignty, post-colonialism, social constructivism, burden-sharing, 
and social stratification to uncover the possible motivations for making refugee situations permanent.  
Home to approximately 16,000 Congolese refugees, Kiziba Camp in western Rwanda serves as 
a microcosm through which one can observe these multi-layered humanitarian aid and refugee hosting 
processes. By analyzing semi-structured interview and ethnographic data collected from Kiziba Camp in 
2011, 2013, and 2014, interviews with key Rwandan government representatives, and existing media 
sources and nongovernmental organization reports, this research links the pursuit and maintenance of 
state sovereignty, as well as aspects of social construction at the local-level, with processes that 
contribute to protracted displacement. Analyses of this original data reveal intentional and unintentional 
factors emanating from state foreign and domestic policies, NGO disaster and humanitarian assistance 
rhetoric, as well as refugees’ own conceptualization of citizenship, identity, and belonging that contribute 
to the durability refugee displacement. Through the personal narratives of community leaders of Kiziba 
Camp, this study begins to reveal a theory about state dependency on refugee hosting and the agency of 
refugees to imagine and define themselves, and how these factors contribute to a form of displacement 
that becomes increasingly durable over time.   
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always home. I can prefer going home than anywhere in the world. But for now I can’t see any 
stability in my country. Then for my future or my hope, I would like to go abroad.  
Jennifer: Where would you like to go? Where abroad? 
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student traveling with her professor. It shows the value that you are giving to your people. So, in 
here, I’ve never seen any teacher walking with one student because there [are] hundreds of 
students. He can’t get even one moment to take care of one student. So, you are a good 
example.  
Jennifer: Thank you. We are very lucky though. We have a very special relationship. Not every teacher 
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We are asking you who have power, who can make 
something…If you can make this happen for us, in general—not 
only me, all the refugees around the world or the refugees 
here—to return back home because it’s where we feel happy. 
Everyone needs to live where he feels it’s his home. But here, 
it’s somewhere else—in a foreign country. 




Nearly 43 million people make up a global “population of concern” under the watchful eye of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This number includes refugees, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), asylum-seekers, and stateless persons. As the most macro-level systems of 
international governance establish humanitarian relief efforts, a network of INGO support structures, and 
“durable solutions” to the refugee crisis, the long-term prospects for lasting solutions—that would restore 
“home” as a place to live without fear of death or persecution—are little more than a dream for the vast 
majority of the world’s displaced. In 2013, only 414,600 refugees returned to their countries of origins; just 
98,400 refugees resettled in 21 countries to start new lives (UNHCR, 2015e). That amounts to just a little 
over one percent of UNHCR’s population of concern. What happens to the rest?  
Protracted refugee situations refer to those in which populations of more than 25,000, originating 
from the same country of origin, live as refugees in another country for more than five years (Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Standing Committee, 2004). Forced migrants usually 
leave their homes believing their separation from home will be short. Ongoing conflict, political instability, 
and questions of legal citizenship claims in the country of origin increasingly lengthen the time spent in 
exile. In the meantime, these forced migrants bear the weight of the label “refugee” and are most often 
relegated to particular geographically contained spaces and the protection of the international system. By 
some estimates, protracted refugees who linger under this system for more than five years account for 
nearly two-thirds of all cases in the world (US Department of State, 2011), with the average at around 20 
years in protraction (Loescher & Milner, 2009). They represent a global phenomenon of refugee 
“warehousing” and “wasted lives” of human potential (Bauman, 2004; M. Smith, 2004). The enduring 
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nature of these protracted situations motivated this study to explore ideas about durability in 
displacement.1  
Long-staying refugee scenarios often result from “chronic regional insecurity” and political 
impasses (Loescher & Milner, 2009). Complicated by the complex relationship between refugee 
producing and receiving countries, intervention by humanitarian aid organizations and a number of 
political, cultural, and economic factors further entrenches populations in intractable situations (Lischer, 
2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005b). Many reviews of protracted displacement focus on security 
implications, political responses, and humanitarian strategies. These analyses delve into the role of state 
and non-state actors (Betts, 2008; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2009; Salehyan & 
Gleditsch, 2006), with some even considering the agency and experiences of refugees themselves 
(Milner, 2011; S. Turner, 2010). This study seeks to examine the interplay between different actors and 
levels of analysis through the close study of a refugee camp location in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. 
Kiziba Camp encapsulates core complexities of displacement within the wider political context and the 
vital role forced migrants play in larger conflicts of land, identity, ethnicity, and social-economic-political 
power struggles. In order to uncover relationships that may contribute to protracted displacement. I move 
beyond identifying actors and focus on the processes as experienced by refugees themselves, who are 
paradoxically relegated to a distinctly marginal status within the global system that structures their 
displacement, while being active agents of both change and the reproduction of a distinctly “outsider-
within” status. By exploring the systems and processes of a protracted existence, I uncover evidence that 
these situations are more than lengthy; they are in fact becoming durable forms of displacement.  
BACKGROUND 
Kiziba Camp, on the western border of Rwanda, serves as a case study for exploring the 
relationship between state, non-state, and refugee motivations for potentially maintaining displacement. 
This camp is one of five in Rwanda and houses over 16,000 refugees, mostly from the Democratic 
1 Throughout this study, I use the term “protracted displacement” to refer to long-staying or long-term 
refugees. Protraction here refers specifically to length and duration, and most commonly implies that the 
refugee context is still temporary. In contrast, I use the term “durable displacement” to refer to the 
transition from temporary (the traditional understanding of refugee situations) to permanent. Durability, 
then, refers to the changes in process, mentality, and treatment of camp residents in protracted situations 
that implies “no return and no road forward” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77).  
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Republic of Congo (DRC) (UNHCR, 2014c). The majority of camp residents arrived over 18 years ago 
and faces an extremely low likelihood of a near-term solution. This camp reflects broader regional political 
relationships that ultimately prevent safe return to the residents’ home villages. Refugees in Kiziba 
originate from several of the DRC’s easternmost provinces, with deep historical ties to Rwanda and a 
shared cultural and colonial past (Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2001, 2002; Prunier, 2009). The tense 
political relationship between host and sending countries and the notion that the DRC is a weak or failed 
state (Kraxberger, 2012; Reyntjens, 2007) illustrate the political intractability of so many protracted 
scenarios around the world. Political and security conditions in eastern DRC threaten not only Kiziba 
refugees’ plans for return, but also the very rights of citizenship and civic participation if repatriation 
became an option (Adelman & Barkan, 2011; Hovil, 2011; Makombo, 1997). On the surface, the high 
level of coordination among humanitarian assistance international nongovernmental organizations 
(INGOs) and the Rwandan host government exemplifies the caretaking role of these refugees. Delving 
deeper into the daily experiences of elected camp leaders, however, reveals that these systems may in 
fact contribute to enduring protraction.  
This research draws upon original data collected over the course of three field visits to Kiziba 
Camp2 to situate this distinct case within five interlocking theories that address the motivations of states 
and INGOs in relation to protracted displacement. It considers how refugees fit into a larger system of 
state sovereignty in order to exacerbate displacement duration. This study assumes that states are 
motivated to preserve sovereignty and physical territory in order to access resources, recognition, and 
power, even in an ever-globalizing and flattening world (Friedman, 2005). The meaning and relevance of 
“sovereignty,” particularly in relation to territory and citizenship, is central to the growth of International 
Relations (IR) as the field strives to comprehend the realities of the complex flows of people who 
accompany political, economic, and technological flows across national borders. Analyses of forced 
migration throw into focus the tangible effects of such shifting patterns of global restructuring, at once 
challenging and reinforcing the territorial grounding of state sovereignty. By stripping refugees, IDPs, and 
2 The official name of the camp is Kiziba Refugee Camp. Local residents and INGO workers refer to this 
site as Kiziba or Kiziba Camp. Throughout this study, I employ the term Kiziba Camp to refer to this 
location.  
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stateless persons of physical place, or home, as well as political space to perform as citizens, the act of 
forced migration emphasizes the contemporary relevance of territory, space, and belonging (Agamben, 
1998; Betts, 2009a; Mbembe, 2000). Set in the bucolic oasis of Rwanda’s “land of 1,000 hills,” these 
overarching IR theories manifest in Kiziba refugees’ conceptualizations of ‘home’ and the larger meaning 
of place within the particular borderland conflict that lingers across the lake.  
This study is a significant contribution to the field of forced migration in that it begins to connect 
the actors of the global refugee regime and implicate them in the maintenance of durable, rather than 
temporary, displacement. It fills a gap in the literature that fails to connect systems of displacement across 
levels of analysis at the local, state, regional, and international levels. Furthermore, by delving into the 
particular dimensions of Kiziba Camp as a microcosm of the larger refugee situation, I offer the most 
comprehensive analysis to date on this exemplar location and its surrounding socio-political dynamics. 
Knowledge of these connections may help all actors in the global refugee regime, including refugees 
themselves, better engage in the peacemaking, peace-building, and durable solution finding processes 
that can lead to resolution of at least some contemporary protracted political refugee situations. By 
understanding how each actor intentionally or unintentionally contributes to protracted displacement, 
refugees, states, and INGOs can more mindfully approach policy and individual livelihood decisions that 
potentially reduce the wasted human lives accumulating in refugee warehousing situations throughout the 
world. One participant in this study captured the tragedy of refugees’ contained existence, as he reflected 
on the prospects of his future,   
The other problem of refugees is just they spend all their time sitting just doing nothing. 
As I told you we are here since 1996…We just wake up every morning and wait [until] the 
end of the day, and this is the activity…I don’t think there will be any improvement…But 
the thing which makes me tell you that there is no hope is that if you see for example [the 
DRC] president, he never does anything to secure our region and to let us come back 
home…And it’s like even the international community is doing nothing to change the 
situation to stop the war so we can go back home and work on our farm and live a normal 
life. Yeah, we feel abandoned because we never heard them [the political leadership of 
the DRC] or see any sign from them to see that we are human beings like others who 
need their rights. So it’s like we’re abandoned. (Village leader, personal communication, 
5 June 2014) 
This project confronts the larger human loss central to refugee displacement, idleness in protracted camp 
contexts like Kiziba, and the core dimensions of maintaining human life at its bare essence. Through 
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direct accounts of life at the borderlands of existence, the data center the notion of “wasted lives” as a 
core priority for IR theory on forced migration and point to processes that make these temporary 
situations more durable. Any consideration of peace, human rights, and development requires 
contemplation of the human potential locked away in durably displaced populations who wait for solutions 
from the international community.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In the Methodology chapter, I begin by describing the research context for this study. Conducting 
interviews in a refugee camp presents a particularly sensitive fieldwork location nuanced by political 
conditions in the DRC/Rwanda borderlands. To convey the challenges of researching in this particular 
camp, the methodology chapter describes in detail the camp layout and organizational structure. This 
explanation demonstrates the barriers to entry, difficulty in conducting truly private interviews, and ethical 
considerations of the study. While not specifically studying women’s issues within the camp, the research 
design follows feminist methodologies in data collection practices and motivation for applying study 
results to improve human rights, equality, and justice for the Congolese refugees in Rwanda.  
The data comes mainly from interviews conducted over the course of three years in Kiziba Camp. 
More than just a survey, these interviews involved speaking with elected camp representatives at length 
about a variety of semi-structured topics. The interviewers encouraged the respondents to ask questions 
and actively participate in the interview process, shaping the dialog as they saw fit. The university’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved all interview questions used in the study. Given 
access limitations to the camp imposed by the host government, additional data used to illustrate the 
case of durable displacement in Kiziba included published accounts and INGO reports. Photographs 
included as part of observational fieldwork within the camp also serve to reinforce analytic points about 
life within the camp.  
 I structured the qualitative analysis of these interview data around a phenomenological research 
methodology (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008). This allowed me to emphasize Kiziba refugees’ lived experiences as 
a way to interpret my intended subject of inquiry, namely durable displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
Unlike quantitative analyses that tend towards aggregation, this research methodology allowed for a 
creative exploration of the interview data in order to inform an exercise in theory building about the 
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durability of displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Here, grounded theory and 
content analysis allow one to more freely explore the data space and begin drawing connections between 
micro and macro-level processes that may contribute to protraction. This approach represents a mix of 
qualitative research methodologies in order make the fullest use of the limited available data from 
interviews and other INGO reports.  
OVERVIEW 
This study starts with one case study to begin theory building about the interdependent actions 
and policies of refugees, states, and INGOs participating in the global refugee regime. It begins with a 
chapter to explain the context of flight for this particular case study, as well as the challenges for lasting 
solutions to these refugees’ protracted displacement. By setting up the historical context, we begin to see 
how the complexities of the DRC/Rwanda border translate to a sense of intractability, which illustrates 
how these refugees’ situation exceeds the limits of the term ‘protraction’ and becomes a more permanent, 
durable displacement. Chapter 3 then frames this cultural and political history in the broader IR and 
sociological literature. Focusing on how and why protracted refugee cases take on aspects of durability, 
the literature review examines five themes that traverse global, regional, state, and local levels of 
analysis. At the macro-level, I argue that aspects of collective action and burden-sharing, as well as 
institutions and practices of sovereignty, perpetuate displacement. The context of the African Great Lakes 
Region also ties this case to ideas of post-colonialism and state-building in Africa. At the local level, I then 
turn to social stratification to illustrate social structures that make displacement more durable. Finally, the 
review turns to the theme of social construction as a vehicle for uncovering underlying processes that 
perpetuate refugee status. This theme bridges the analytic gap across all levels of analysis and leads into 
the data-driven core of this study. I choose to situate these very macro-level systems by focusing on 
Kiziba Camp in western Rwanda, home to thousands of Congolese refugees who arrived around 1996. 
This camp, as I argue in more detail later, serves as a microcosm of the regional conflict that continues to 
displace thousands of people in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.   
Chapter 4 looks at durability enforcing processes from the macro-level down to the micro-level. 
Specifically, I investigate how states and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) reinforce 
displacement in ways that imply permanence. The study employs the voices of Kiziba Camp elected 
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leaders and youth to demonstrate that state and state-like INGOs interact with encamped refugees to 
reproduce durable forms of displacement. These interactions, I argue, revolve around state and INGO 
motivations to attain resources, recognition, and power in an international system. Theories around 
sovereignty, power, and social stratification serve as a framework for understanding the connection 
between seeking these three goals and exerting Foucaultian biopower and governance over the refugees 
in camps. Elected camp leaders and camp youth articulate the connection between state and INGO 
policy choices and the experience of protraction in Kiziba Camp. Chapter 4 looks at how states, INGOs, 
and refugees contribute to establishing borders within borders—socially and politically constructed lines 
that keep the alien/noncitizen/refugee/other separated from the Rwandan citizens. States and INGOs 
reinforce these boundaries through a number of policies and protocols including aspects of security, 
education, economics, values, and norms. These intentional or unintentional characterizations, I argue, 
contribute to durable displacement and protracted situations.  
Chapter 5 then turns to processes that occur at the micro, local level to understand what forces 
might arise from individuals in camp contexts that contribute to a sense of permanent, durable 
displacement. The study explores abstract ideas of home and belonging as expressed by the refugee 
leaders. How do these imaginings of “home” further entrench refugees in durable displacement? Drawing 
upon the work of Malkki (1992, 1994), I analyze how refugees envision their relationship with the larger 
international community by examining their requests for change and durable solutions. In particular, this 
work looks at how refugees in camps directly engage the international community while drawing a distinct 
line between themselves and the local community. I move beyond Malkki’s work by tying these 
experiences to the broader system of displacement. Looking at the refugees’ “outsider within” (P. H. 
Collins, 1986) construction of social boundaries from their ethnolinguistically similar host communities 
illuminates the ways that refugees participate in protracting displacement. These two analytic chapters 
focus heavily on interview data and INGO reports from the field to convey the lived experiences of 
refugees in Kiziba Camp. Together, they point to the processes that lead to durability of displacement, 
situating lasting solutions beyond the reach of refugees and contributing to a sense of wasted lives.  
In the chapters that follow, broad theoretical claims come out of a particular case study, that of 
Kiziba Camp. While Kiziba Camp exhibits characteristics that make it particularly useful for this study—
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namely regional diversity within the DRC and extreme length of protracted state—it does only constitute 
one instance of a global phenomenon at one particular moment in time. This is a deliberate limitation. For 
this study, I choose to focus on the depth of understanding life in Kiziba Camp by spending time collecting 
narratives of elected camp leaders at the expense of analyzing a large breadth of life across all refugee 
camps. This in-depth study provides space for developing theories about systems of durable 
displacement that I anticipate applying to other camps or even urban scenarios in the future. The scope of 
the current study, therefore, concerns the population of Kiziba Camp between 2011 and 2014. As such, 
the resulting analysis cannot necessarily be applied to other camps within Rwanda, the Great Lakes 
Region, or Africa as a whole. I feel that this does not necessarily restrict the theoretical value of this 
research; rather, the Kiziba Camp case study serves as a starting point for future research efforts to apply 
the theory of systems of durable displacement more broadly to other contexts. It is also worth noting that 
the theoretic contribution of this dissertation focuses on political refugees. Climate change refugees face 
an entirely different set of challenges, particularly regarding international coordination and the potential to 
return home. The conclusions of this research likely will not extend to non-political refugees. Future 
research should explore the particular case of climate change or other refugees in more detail.  
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CONTEXT: THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA 
 
As you can see if you look at Congo, there is no peace; there is 
no security for us. And again, to live in the refugee camp is not 
something you can wish for someone you love. So my wish 
would be to live in the place where I feel safe. Where I will be 
living [a] normal life. 




The unrest in the Great Lakes Region encompasses a complex ethnic and political web of players 
and an intricate conflict that stems from historical power struggles, colonial relations, and access to 
resources. While the scope of the region’s conflicts expands far beyond this dissertation, the particular 
contribution of this work focuses upon the case of the Banyarwanda refugees—Kinyarwanda-speaking 
peoples forced from the eastern Kivu Provinces and southeastern Katanga Province in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) to neighboring countries in waves beginning in 1996. This ethnic group 
remains in protracted limbo in Rwandan refugee camps today, nearly 20 years later. The Banyarwanda 
refugees represent a particular intersection of local, state, and regional politics that manifest as conflict, 
statelessness, and protracted refugee situations. Understanding the historical and political context of this 
region sheds light on the political processes that led to protracted displacement and frames the analysis 
of refugees’ experience in Rwandan camps presented later in this study.  
Land and citizenship are tightly bound in Rwanda and the DRC (Autesserre, 2008; Hovil, 2011; 
Jackson, 2006; Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2001, 2002). The Banyarwanda population instantiates a 
critical yet understudied land/citizenship dimension of the human crisis in the DRC. Largely the result of 
iterations of restrictive citizenship laws, prolonged conflict, political instability, lack of state intervention by 
the government in Kinshasa, spillover conflicts, and state intervention from neighboring countries 
(Prunier, 2009, pp. 46-58), the last two decades witnessed hundreds of thousands of people displaced 
from eastern DRC. In January 2014, UNHCR estimated that 499,541 people from the DRC took refuge in 
other African countries, with nearly three million internally displaced in the country (UNHCR, 2014b). By 
January 2015, an estimated 84,640 of those forced migrants were living in Rwanda (UNHCR, 2014c). 
While they do not garner much international attention, the Banyarwanda refugees of both Kivus (North 
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and South) and Katanga exist in a state of limbo where host countries and the sending country lack the 
authority or willingness to officially grant citizenship.  
Push and pull factors at the state level between Rwanda and the DRC exacerbate the conflicts 
that continue to uproot populations along the geographical border of Lake Kivu. As one member of the 
Banyamulenge ethnic group, originating from the Mulenge region of South Kivu, observed, "For long, the 
Banyamulenge have borne the brunt of Rwanda's forays into Congo" (IRIN, 2007). On the surface, by 
applying the “genuine and effective link” clause of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Banyarwanda are entitled to Congolese citizenship for two key reasons. First, the longevity of 
family ties to DRC territory, where most have lived for many generations, serves as the primary 
qualification. Second, the premise that they no longer have any ties to another nation-state, specifically 
Rwanda, Uganda, or Burundi merits a strong case for DRC citizenship. Yet, the vital relationship between 
local and state power struggles and regional ethnic tensions complicate what should be a simple 
interpretation of international conventions. Not only are Banyarwanda populations forcibly excluded from 
protections, potential repatriation to the DRC constitutes serious concern for their very livelihoods and 
safety. Ultimately, bureaucratic ambiguity and the pressing threat of safety leaves these forcibly displaced 
persons waiting for regional power to shift in their favor and grant them a place to call home (Batchelor, 
1998; Makombo, 1997, p. 60; Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). In the meantime, the population exists in long-
term refugee communities serving as permanent residences for nearly twenty years. 
This chapter sets the stage for a larger discussion of protracted displacement as experienced by 
the Banyarwanda people themselves, throughout the process of forced migration from the DRC into 
camps in Rwanda. From complex domestic and regional histories arises a political system in which 
refugee crises become enduring processes that uphold state pursuits beyond the immediate crisis. In the 
spirit of Zygmunt Bauman (2004), I consider the “wasted lives” that result from human beings left in 
ongoing limbo as insight into larger socio-economic and political dynamics that stem from pursuit of 
resources, recognition, and power. Focusing on the DRC/Rwanda border as an instance of a political 
system that produces and reproduces forced displacement, this chapter outlines a brief history of conflict 
in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  
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STATE CRISIS IN THE DRC 
King Leopold II of Belgium first carved out the DRC as a territory that he designated as his own 
personal colony, the Congo Free State.1 The colonial power immediately made use of abundant natural 
resources such as rubber and ivory by enforcing a tax system on the local population to outsource labor. 
With severe punishment, including death, for failure to meet harvesting quotas, competition and tension 
grew between neighboring communities. Abuse of resources and indigenous populations during that time 
resulted in the Belgian state taking over authority from King Leopold II, after which it took on the name 
Belgian Congo. The colonizers created hierarchical systems of social power and control through which 
they managed the extraction of vast amounts of resources (T. Turner, 2007). In the years between 
colonization and independence in 1960, uprisings and revolts of various groups including peasants and 
workers moved the country towards liberation from the colonial system (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). The 
election that marked independence, however, propelled the state into crisis as Western governments 
intervened to unseat the newly elected, “militantly nationalist” prime minister (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 
94).  
As Western powers struggled to manage their economic interests in eastern DRC’s natural 
resources, a five-year post-independence crisis evolved in which the country became ripe for a 
succession of leadership that shaped the decades that followed. During the crisis, a weak central 
government could not adequately respond to political struggles and fracturing alliances compounded by a 
collapsing economic system. In 1965, Mobutu Sese-Seko took the country in a coup d’état beginning 
what culminated in a thirty-two year reign (McCalpin, 2002). Mobutu’s initial years saw some economic 
improvement and received popular support; in the 1970s, however, poor financial and economic 
decisions pushed the country deeper into debt and institutionalized the rampant corruption that plagues 
the country even today. By the 1990s, the DRC (then Zaire) had made little progress in the realm of 
development, but had enormous debts caused by Mobutu’s kleptocratic regime, where government 
1 The territory now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo has changed names over the course of 
colonial occupation, independence, and other political shifts. For simplicity throughout this research, I 
choose to call it the DRC regardless of the time period referenced. I acknowledge that this is a 
simplification of the historical changes undergone by the DRC, but choose to use just one name to avoid 
confusion. 
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officials reaped personal benefits from international aid and investment to the point of state collapse 
(McCalpin, 2002; T. Turner, 2007).  
Foreign aid and investment eventually came to an end and Mobutu had no choice but to make 
political sacrifices. Hyperinflation in the country influenced the President’s decision to decentralize the 
military, leading to competition for resources between the newly divided units. This system ultimately 
devolved into one of warlords controlling territories and forcing out ethnic minorities or outsiders 
(McCalpin, 2002). Just as the state was imploding into chaos, and Mobutu’s grip on power quickly fading, 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994 pushed over one million refugees and a state-in-exile across the border 
into eastern DRC. A later section describes the role of the Banyarwanda in the subsequent political 
turmoil of the DRC. For now, one of the most salient aspects of the DRC’s history that continues to impact 
the country today resides in the country’s reigning presidents. Since the time of Mobutu, the Kabilas—
father then son—ruled the DRC in turn, yet little has improved in terms of strengthening the central 
government, managing or reducing the civil strife in outlying areas, or developing a plan to economically 
rebuild a country so abundant in natural resources. Laurent Kabila oversaw increased weakening of state 
institutions and rampant corruption (Reyntjens, 2001). During Desire Kabila’s reign, the DRC has seen 
little improvement in response to government transition initiatives and internationally supervised peace 
processes. This is largely due to his inability to establish a strong central government and gain control 
over territory, citizenry, and armed factions (Reyntjens, 2007).  
BRIEF HISTORY OF RWANDA 
In stark contrast to the political chaos of the DRC, neighboring Rwanda stands as an example of 
successful post-conflict development in the eyes of many Western states (Campioni & Noack, 2012, pp. 
3-5; Crisafulli & Redmond, 2012; "Zakaria: Africa's biggest success story," 2009). Rwanda’s steady 
progress in terms of development indicators following the 1994 genocide places its geographic and socio-
political circumstance in sharp contrast to the DRC. This relative stability, however, attracts the attention 
of fans as well as critics, with some suggesting that such external markers of peace hinge upon high 
levels of government control and an avoidance of discussions of ethnic divides (Reyntjens, 2011). 
Ironically, the tight political control that enabled its ascension to the title of “donor darling” also contributed 
to the institutionalization of racial tensions that led to the 1994 genocide and accusations of human rights 
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abuses that continue today (Human Rights Watch, 2014). African Studies expert Gérard Prunier (1995) 
describes the makings of genocide as stemming from the relationship between population density and 
Rwanda’s predisposition for tight governmental control. These factors mingled with early European 
explorers’ “almost obsessive preoccupation” with race in the nineteenth century resulting in explosive 
social outcomes (Prunier, 1995, p. 5). Interactions with Westerners fed into a mythology of a superior race 
and Tutsi origins from abroad, which Prunier (1995) discounts as devoid of evidence. Salient to the 
Banyarwanda, the seeds of ethnic obsession sown in Rwanda continue to fuel xenophobic rhetoric in 
eastern DRC where autochthonous leadership frames the Banyarwanda—and the Tutsi groups more 
specifically—as outsiders/invaders.  
Recently nominated to the UN Security Council, Rwanda has moved to publicly represent itself as 
the epitome of development, having risen from the devastation of its 1994 genocide to a state of 
economic growth, technological capacity, and a regional hub for international military operations 
(Gettleman, 2013; Kagame, 2011; Republic of Rwanda, 2012; "Rwanda voted onto UN Security Council," 
2012). As the first President following the genocide, Paul Kagame has framed Rwanda as an exemplar 
African state free from political conflict and corruption. This overhaul of public perception is often realized 
by contrasting the small nation with its surrounding conflict-ridden neighbors, namely through distinction 
from the DRC. In repeated political discourse, Rwandan officials publicly encourage the DRC to search 
for a resolution to the ongoing violence (Besheer, 2013; News of Rwanda, 2013). The power to evoke 
such a moral stance against political chaos stems from Rwanda’s international reputation for effective 
development and the government’s public affairs campaign. The image of Rwanda as the “donor darling” 
of the West and a model of post-conflict reconciliation is set against the UN reports implicating Rwanda in 
regional destabilization through support of the brutal M23 rebel groups operating in the eastern Kivu 
provinces (Hege, 27 November 2012; Hege et al., 15 November 2012), which the government of Rwanda 
fervently denies (Kagame, 2012). Some scholars even warn of brewing instability within the country tied 
directly to the regime’s discourse on racial/ethnic difference (Hintjens, 2008; Pottier, 2002; Reyntjens, 
2011; Waldorf, 2011).  
This study is concerned with the spillover effect of this lingering conflict in the DRC as it exists 
with refugee populations. I posit that the flow of refugees, as well as their existence in “human 
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warehouse” camps captures a vital dimension of the political relationships at the borders of such 
contested historical and contemporary terrains. As the following section describes, a close investigation of 
the Banyarwanda population provides a nuanced and original analysis of the complexities, human costs, 
and political implications of the larger regional conflicts and paths to socio-political stability. In this sense, 
I place the data collected among Banyarwanda populations within Kiziba Camp as an instance of the 
macro structures within this contested region.  
THE BANYARWANDA 
The descendants of Rwandan immigrants in the DRC hold a particular symbolic place and 
terminology. Banyarwanda, translated as “people of Rwanda,” broadly refers to an ethno-linguistic 
diaspora, regardless of nationality, with ancestry linked to Rwandan immigrants who continue to speak 
some dialect of Kinyarwanda, the national language of Rwanda (Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2002). The 
history of citizenship and ethnic identity of the Banyarwanda in eastern DRC is an important component 
of understanding the regional conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Fofana, 2009; Makombo, 1997; 
Mamdani, 2001, 2002; Prunier, 2009, pp. 48-58). As Deng (2001) succinctly states, while there are 
multiple contributing factors to the ongoing violence, “…the dispute over the citizenship rights of the 
Banyarwanda…is both a contributing factor and a consequence of the crisis” (p. 184). This section 
provides a brief history of the Banyarwanda in the DRC in order to demonstrate the citizenship crisis that 
impedes any access to long-term, durable solutions for those displaced from the eastern Kivus and 
Katanga provinces.  
A sub-group of the Banyarwanda is the Banyamulenge, a term that originally referred to people of 
the Mulenge region of South Kivu, but is now often used as a blanket term for people identified as 
Congolese Tutsi (Deng, 2001). As residents of a country where citizenship rights are tightly bound to 
ethnic affiliation, all Banyarwanda have experienced political and juridical exclusion to some degree; 
though Banyamulenge have faced a very particular impact because of their stateless status during the 
last few decades (Deng, 2001; Lindquist, 28 November 2012). This subgroup traces its origins to one of 
the earliest migrations into South Kivu and reportedly adopted the name Banyamulenge in order to 
emphasize this difference with the other Kinyarwanda speakers in eastern DRC (Jackson, 2006; 
Mamdani, 2002; Vlassenroot, 2008). Arriving in the late 19th century—possibly even as early as 
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seventeenth century (Prunier, 2009, p. 51)–before the colonial Congo Free State established in 1885, 
Banyamulenge have often avoided revocation of citizenship due to ancestral ties to the land before the 
colonial powers settled and thus before independence (T. Turner, 2007, pp. 78-79). The exact history of 
the South Kivu Banyamulenge is unknown; however, various pre-colonial migrations throughout the 19th 
century likely coalesced in the area around a common Tutsi identity that now represents the 
Banyamulenge community of South Kivu (T. Turner, 2007). Despite the Banyamulenge’s long-standing 
history in South Kivu, T. Turner (2007) attributes the ongoing conflict and citizenship crises in that region 
to “incoherent, self-serving Belgian policy” (p. 80). Though unique in its origin, the Banyamulenge share 
with the Congolese Kinyarwanda speakers a history of migration and subsequent discrimination. For that 
reason, further reference to Banyarwanda includes those who identify as Banyamulenge unless otherwise 
specified. 
The Banyarwanda diaspora represents waves of migrations from Rwanda dating back before the 
Belgian colony. Jackson (2006) demonstrates through historical tracings of this “Rwandaphone” 
population that their struggle with citizenship and right to belong go back to the 1960s as political 
structures adapted to the country’s new independence. Using linguistic and historical evidence, he also 
shows that a separation exists within the Banyarwanda; at the local level, they are all outsiders, but at the 
regional “megaethnic” level, Tutsis are collectively considered the outsiders/invaders while Hutu are 
linked to other “indigenous” groups. He argues that this multilevel dichotomy of insider/outsider 
contributes to the triggers of regional conflict. The stereotypes Jackson (2006) describes that emanate 
from megaethnic identities is important for later discussions about how the refugees in this study 
conceptualize the conflict. He explains,  
Nilotes [Tutsi and Hima, the allochthons] are supposed to be pastoralists; Bantu [Nanda, 
Nyanga, Hunde, and Hutu, the autochthons] are agriculturalists. This typecasting flies in 
the face of recent practice; until war destroyed the Kivus’ rich cattle industry, people from 
all groups raised animals if they could afford to. However, the stereotype remains. 
Economic resentment against the Kivus’ richest ranchers was easily converted to ethnic 
animus against all “Tutsi.” If pastoralism then became a code for “foreignness,” 
agriculture, by contrast, became closely associated with “autochthony.” (Jackson, 2006, 
p. 107) 
As Jackson (2006) demonstrates through his ethnographic research in the DRC, these ethnic and 
megaethnic discourses continue to fuel conflict even today. He argues it is through these ambiguous 
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delineations of who belongs and who does not that makes the conflict in the DRC so deep-seated and 
intractable (Jackson, 2006). These multi-tiered divisions of insider/outsider contribute further to what 
Mamdani (2001) argues is a crisis of citizenship that keeps the DRC embroiled in domestic and regional 
conflict. Together, these two scholars point to the critical ways in which identity and belonging are 
formalized into mechanisms of state sovereignty, namely legal acknowledgement of citizenship within a 
given territory. When these relationships remain unresolved and disputed by all levels of membership 
within the citizenry, they contribute—among other features of state collapse such as resource 
exploitation—to enduring political unrest and insecurity. Citizenship crises, then, derive from sovereignty 
crises and instigate forced migration.  
The experience of attaining citizenship only to have it withdrawn time and time again from the 
state (Deng, 2001; Makombo, 1997, p. 54), coupled with logistic financial and administrative barriers to 
actually attaining citizenship documentation, contribute to scholars categorizing Banyarwanda as 
stateless (International Observatory on Statelessness, 2013; Lindquist, 28 November 2012; Makombo, 
1997, p. 57; Redclift, 2013, p. 3). Despite similar experiences with discriminatory national citizenship laws, 
the NGOs highlighting Banyamulenge statelessness generally reference only South Kivu province and fail 
to mention that those from North Kivu are often denied the same rights. Historical circumstances of 
power, economics, and governance have also led to different outcomes at times, granting citizenship 
rights to some in North Kivu while the South has suffered. The long-term result of these conflicts and 
circumstances is that most Banyarwanda do not have guaranteed access to citizenship in the DRC they 
call home.2 Importantly, Rwanda does not consider these Banyarwanda as its own citizens (Deng, 2001, 
p. 201), leaving a massive human gulf that reflects so many unsettled macro political relationships within 
this contested region.  
THE GREAT LAKES REGIONAL CONFLICT 
The Great Lakes Region shares a history of migration, colonial domination, and subsequent 
independence, many of the same features that define the Africa’s legacy. The region saw multiple waves 
2 In this case, citizenship is based mainly on the presumed year of immigration for the various groups, 
with some groups immigrating much earlier and thus maintaining citizenship, specifically voting rights, 
through more iterations of nationality law than other Banyarwanda regional subgroups. 
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of ethnic violence leading up to the well-known genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the ripple effects of which 
carry on today. The mass migration of over one million refugees fleeing as a state-in-exile in the 
aftermath of the 1994 genocide marks a critical moment in most current studies of the DRC, where issues 
of citizenship, identity, and belonging define the political landscape at the micro and macro levels. In 
accordance with the ways most modern analyses of the ongoing conflict in the DRC begin, the following 
section divides the citizenship turmoil of the Banyarwanda into pre- and post-1994 events.  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of North Kivu (Nord-Kivu) and South Kivu (Sud-Kivu) in relation to Rwanda 
(“Zaire 97 Kivus” by BanyanTree is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0) 
 
PRE-1994 
In the early 1900s, during colonial rule, waves of Rwandan labor migrants entered the DRC and 
Uganda to work on plantations and mine the vast resources in the area. Rwanda’s dense population 
provided a pool of workers that the colonial powers used to their advantage, creating pockets of 
Kinyarwanda-speaking groups throughout the region (Jackson, 2006; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 2009; 
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Stearns, 2011). These economic migrants, facilitated by the Belgians’ Mission d’Immigration des 
Banyarwanda (MIB), numbered around 85,000 in the late 1930s and populated mainly the Masisi and 
Walikale regions of North Kivu as well as Katanga province in the south. As populations grew, often far 
outnumbering indigenous ethnic groups in the Kivus, tensions grew among the Banyarwanda and local 
autochthones, who were local land-owning tribes (Prunier, 2009). Effectively endorsed by the Belgian 
colonial powers, Banyarwanda in the Kivus took advantage of civic laws to acquire land, which subverted 
the traditional lineage- and chief-based system of land administration in those areas. These actions 
created hostilities among indigenous groups and the foreigner-Banyarwanda (Prunier, 2009).   
During the civil war in the DRC between 1960-5, indigenous groups often took advantage of the 
fighting and ensuing chaos to take out their aggressions on Banyarwanda, thus fueling the friction 
between ethnic groups. President Mobutu saw in this an opportunity to align with the local Banyarwanda 
militia with very little local power so that he could support his own political agenda. With population 
numbers that put Banyarwanda in the majority or near-majority in some provinces, providing them with 
political power, voting rights, and supporting their militias supplied Mobutu with the backing he needed to 
pursue his political objectives. In the post-civil war years, for their support of Mobutu’s rise to power, 
Banyarwanda rose through the government ranks to occupy positions of power. Mobutu manipulated the 
Banyarwanda’s ostracized local status to propel himself into power, only to cast them aside later when 
they no longer suited his needs (Prunier, 2009).  
In neighboring Rwanda, the years leading up to independence saw race relations becoming 
increasingly tense between Hutu and Tutsi elite fighting to shape the national narrative of race during the 
Belgian administration (Kiwuwa, 2012; Prunier, 1995). Known as the “social revolution” of 1959, Hutu elite 
drawing power from Westernized education and gaining rankings within religious institutions staged the 
strategic replacement of hundreds of Tutsi who had occupied positions of power throughout the 
government (Mamdani, 2001). What started as a “peasant revolt,” with local government leaders being 
replaced by new Hutu representatives spiraled into a massive upheaval in which up to 150,000 Tutsis 
were displaced throughout the region. Different scholars and organizations provide a wide range of 
estimates for the number of Tutsi killed during the social revolution, ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 people 
(Mamdani, 2001). Prunier (2009) points to this event as the actual seed that started the violence in the 
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DRC today. While these years served as critical indicators of future outbreaks of ethnic violence, no one 
specific event marks the precipitating point that led to genocide. Rather, “The fact is that it was not the 
revolution, but attempted restoration and the repression that followed, that opened the gateway to a 
blood-soaked political future for Rwanda” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 130). Spillover into surrounding areas 
spread the ethnic tension across national borders to neighboring countries and contributed to a larger 
regional conflict. Thus, the DRC and Rwanda remain vitally connected through these historical 
circumstances and their enduring expression as refugee crises.  
Exiles from Rwanda’s 1959-1961 social revolution gained momentum from the nearby countries 
to which they fled. Current Rwanda president, Paul Kagame, was among those to take refuge in Uganda; 
a move that profoundly shaped the trajectory of his career as a result of political movements taking place 
among the exiles (Kinzer, 2008). Pushing Tutsi elites out of power in Rwanda and into the DRC further 
upset the tense relationships between Banyarwanda and local autochthones. Rwandan Tutsi migrants 
joined the ranks of Banyarwanda outsiders in the DRC, thereby sparking an already politically and 
socially tense situation. Further migrations into eastern DRC also occurred in 1964 in response to political 
movements that sought to push ever more Tutsi from power in Rwanda (Prunier, 2009).  
 In the 1970s, a Hutu-led government in Rwanda—buttressed by the Belgians during the 
transition to independence—strictly enforced hierarchical ethnic representation in education, business, 
and civil service. According to this government-sanctioned racialized ideology, any portion of the Tutsi 
population exceeding the 9% limit would be evicted from their respective institution or even killed in some 
cases. These evictions resulted in another mass emigration of Tutsi refugees from the country between 
1972-3 (Prunier, 1995). At the same time, such a systematic reinforcement of ethnic ‘quotas’ set the 
stage for ideologies that would later incite genocide. This period also set in motion a series of waves of 
refugees from Rwanda, many of whom fled to the DRC. At the same time, the foundation of governance 
based on ethnicity formulated a migration pattern that remains central to the political relationship between 
Rwanda and the DRC discussed later. 
In 1972, DRC President Mobutu, presumably under pressure from his head of the Bureau of the 
President—and a Banyarwanda—Bisengimana Rwema, signed into effect the most generous of all DRC 
nationality laws (Mamdani, 2001). The “Decree Law No. 71-020 of 26 March 1971 “effectively granted 
20 
citizenship and voting rights to all, including those of tracing lineage to Rwanda or Burundi, as long as 
they were residents of the DRC before January 1, 1950” (Deng, 2001, p. 198; Makombo, 1997, pp. 54-
56). Followed the next year by the General Property Law, which granted land ownership privileges to 
citizens on a massive scale, economically advantaged Banyarwanda used their newly acquired 
citizenship to buy land and circumvent traditional means of leasing land from indigenous local chiefs. This 
fueled suspicions of a Rwanda/Burundi takeover of eastern DRC and exacerbated tensions between the 
Banyarwanda and other ethnic groups (Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 2009). Less than a decade later, the 
DRC government revoked these rights when, in 1981, an amendment to the 1971 law restricted 
citizenship to groups able to prove residence in the DRC prior to 1885, the year in which the nation 
became the Congo Free State (Makombo, 1997, pp. 55-56). This restriction remained in effect and left 
thousands stateless, despite various changes to the 1981 law, until the December 2005 approval of a 
new constitution for the DRC.  
By the early 1990s, the earlier waves of violence and political shifts in Rwanda had exiled about 
700,000 Rwandan refugees from the country, many of whom migrated to DRC (Prunier, 1995, p. 63). The 
swells in Banyarwanda populations across the border only served to fuel the tense political, social, and 
ethnic fires brewing in eastern DRC. Leading up to the 1994 genocide, some disenfranchised 
Banyarwanda from the Kivus began leaving to train and fight with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) 
(Mamdani, 2002). This continued throughout and even after the 1994 genocide, with strong 
representation from the Banyamulenge as a response to the political and social oppression experienced 
in South Kivu leading up to that time (Vlassenroot, 2008). With ongoing threats to citizenship rights in the 
DRC, Banyarwanda joined forces with cross-border RPF movements (Mamdani, 2001). This movement 
brought into question, even more than before, the political allegiance of the Banyarwanda to the DRC. 
Indigenous propaganda seized the opportunity to portray Banyarwanda as Rwandan, based on their 
apparent sympathy for the RPF cause, even though the majority never took part in any cross-border 
training or military efforts (Mamdani, 2001). When the 1994 genocide unfolded, this history and staging of 
particular allegiances, coupled with the ethnic divisions inscribed through years of colonial power 
relations, played central roles in the manifestation of violence and the most severe ethnic cleansing 
operation of the 20th century and the violence that continues today. 
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POST-1994 
The volumes of work dedicated to the study of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda point to three main 
initiating factors: 1) divisive social control mechanisms developed during colonialism, 2) constrained 
resources and population growth, 3) and the political and social climate of the country at that time. 
Collectively these factors ignited one of the greatest human catastrophes of the 20th century, when nearly 
one million people were killed in a short span of around 100 days (for more detailed historical accounts 
see Prunier (1995, 2009), Mamdani (2001), Chretien (2003) Gourevitch (1998)). Rwanda’s genocide 
marks a critical turning point—a culmination of a journey that began in the colonial era—in the modern 
history of the Great Lakes. On the one hand, the political turnaround of the country and its rise to ‘donor 
darling’ status has catapulted the Rwandan government into the public arena. Some even claim that the 
government exploits international guilt for the lack of assistance provided during the tragedy (French, 
2014). Ironically, however, as Rwanda models the post-conflict transition to peace, remnants of the 
genocide wreak havoc in close geographic proximity. The political fallout from this moment fueled the war 
and ongoing chaos in the DRC that has claimed the lives of millions of Congolese in the provinces 
bordering Rwanda and produced tens of thousands of refugees (T. Turner, 2007).   
In the wake of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, over one million people poured over the border into 
the DRC as an armed state-in-exile (Lischer, 2006). This alarming flow held disastrous consequences in 
the Kivu provinces, where Banyarwanda who migrated to the region for other reasons constituted the 
brunt of political and social marginalization. The génocidaires’ state-in-exile manipulated the vast number 
of refugees to become a tool of international affairs, both for resource extraction and intimidation of the 
governments in Kigali and Kinshasa. In addition to the political problems, as NGOs struggled to meet the 
basic needs of so many refugees resulting in health catastrophes, including a devastating cholera 
outbreak, and extreme strain on local environmental resources. Adding to the crisis, massive crime 
spread as large portions of the Interahamwe—the extremist Hutu paramilitary organizations that carried 
out the genocide—relocated to densely populated camps (Lischer, 2006; Prunier, 2009; Stedman & 
Tanner, 2003).  
This government in exile, its former military (ex-FAR, or former Forces armées rwandaises), and 
Interahamwe militia members, equipped with the majority of Rwanda’s arsenal, immediately began 
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strategizing to take back Rwanda from RPF. Violence between the ex-FAR and the new Rwandan 
government continued across the border. In the meantime, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe looked to the 
existing Kinyarwanda-speaking population in the Kivus and planned to carve out a territory without 
consent of the local autochthons but with the backing of President Mobutu of the DRC (Prunier, 2009). 
The eastern Kivus’ autochthon communities rebelled against these Rwandan-foreigners taking over land 
and power in the Kivus. The sudden influx of Banyarwanda also fueled national discourses on 
outsiders/foreigners and rumors of a Rwandan takeover of eastern DRC (T. Turner, 2007, p. 89). A body 
of the transitional parliament of the DRC sent a commission to review the state of affairs in the eastern 
provinces as a result of the recent refugee influx. “Stacked with anti-Banyarwanda extremists,” the 
commission determined that eviction of all Kinyarwanda-speakers was the only solution (Mamdani, 2001, 
p. 255). Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi were pushed out of North Kivu—representing mainly Masisi and 
Rutshuru territories—and into refugee camps in Rwanda. Taking advantage of the chaos, other ethnic 
groups, including the Bahunde were also forced out of the country as enemies of the armed Hutu groups 
in North Kivu (Mamdani, 2001). Resisting a similar fate in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge began allying 
with the RPF to acquire arms and defend land that the government tried to seize (International Crisis 
Group (ICG), August 13 1998; Mamdani, 2001). The effect of the arming and refugee-hosting complex 
crisis in the Kivus is best summarized by Mamdani (2001): 
The second effect of armed refugee camps [in addition to the “dollarization of the 
economy”] was to accelerate the tendency to militarize ordinary life. From Kivu, the 
genocide in Rwanda loomed like a volcanic eruption…Subjected to a regime of terror by 
armed Interahamwe based in refugee camps, more and more Congolese Tutsi crossed 
the border into Rwanda. In response, the RPF trained and armed Congolese Tutsi. As 
the Interahamwe roamed the countryside, they began collaborating with the Congolese 
army. In response, more and more Native Authorities created their own militia. (p. 256)  
In this self-reinforcing arms race, the Kivus became increasingly militarized and factionalized, 
creating the violent tapestry of warlordism and militia-based control along ethnic lines that exists today 
(Autesserre, 2008; IRIN, 2007; Okumu, Bonome, & Hovil, 2010). Throughout the ongoing conflict, the 
vulnerability of Banyarwanda’s citizenship status, and therefore land-ownership rights, have made them 
susceptible to manipulation by armed and/or political movements as well as forced displacement (Fofana, 
2009). In 1996, Mobutu’s government informed the UN Security Council that Banyarwanda are not 
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considered a Zairian ethnic group, precluding them from citizenship and associated indigenous rights 
(Deng, 2001, p. 200). 
That same year, soon-to-be President Laurent Kabila, backed by regional and foreign powers, 
initiated a rebellion by his AFDL (Alliance des forces pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire) forces to 
overthrow Mobutu. Part of his initial aim was purportedly to ally with the Rwandan government to disband 
the massive refugee camps in the Kivus along the border (Reyntjens, 2007). Some DRC analysts claim 
that this partnership sprung from Rwanda’s desire to unite the Tutsi diaspora under one nationalist state. 
The alliance would give Rwanda the ability to defend and stake out claims for the Banyarwanda abroad, 
namely in the DRC (Fofana, 2009; Mamdani, 2001). The consequences of this arms race in eastern DRC, 
combined with Kabila’s rise to power in 1997, resulted in the Second Congo War and the catastrophic 
implosion of state control in that part of the country (Fofana, 2009; Mamdani, 2001).  
Barely in power for over a year, Kabila’s regime saw a liberation war rise up against it out of the 
Kivus. Turning his back on former Ugandan and Rwanda allies, Kabila “sought to stimulate resentment 
against the Tutsi” and fueled militia armament through the expulsion of allied forces. Rwanda and Uganda 
continued involvement—some say to preserve economic interests in the Kivus—by backing militia groups 
opposed to Kabila’s alliances (Fofana, 2009). Diamonds, gold, and coltan—an important mineral in the 
international technology market—constituted a large part of the resource extraction by Rwanda and 
Uganda through from eastern DRC (Prunier, 2009, p. 244). As evidence of neighboring states’ economic 
draw to remain militarily involved in the eastern DRC, Samset (2002) observes in her economic analysis 
of resource extraction as a driver for conflict,  
While gold and coltan have dominated, diamonds have certainly made their mark in this 
phase of systematized exploitation. Diamonds cannot be found in the soils of Uganda 
and Rwanda, and the authorities of both countries confirm that they have no production 
of this mineral. Yet over the last few years, both countries have exported diamonds worth 
millions of US dollars. From 1997 to 1998 Uganda exports were multiplied by 12, and 
remained on a high level over the two ensuing years. By October 2000, Rwanda’s export 
of diamonds had reached a level 90 times higher than during the entire year of 1998. (p. 
471) 
This resource extraction reportedly funded both continued foreign efforts in DRC and other regional 
political campaigns (Prunier, 2009; Samset, 2002). Minerals serve as a particularly valuable wartime 
commodity as a tradable good that is less volatile than currency in the region. According to some 
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scholars, these resources, as well as timber and coffee, have indirectly funded Rwandan and Ugandan 
military expansion in the Great Lakes Region (Samset, 2002). This contributes to ongoing instability in 
eastern DRC and subsequently the availability of long-term repatriation solutions for Banyarwanda 
refugees abroad.   
The massive post-genocide refugee influx, and more importantly a combative state-in-exile, does 
not mark the start of violence in eastern DRC, but rather the tipping point that exacerbated tensions into 
the complicated conflict that it is today. Tutsi communities fled—and continue to flee—over the border to 
Rwanda as refugees of the Interahamwe/ex-FAR presence and subsequent violence. As early as 1995, 
Rwanda began receiving the Congolese refugees that still live there today. This displaced population 
represents 1959 Rwandan refugees to the DRC, as well as economic migrants from generations before. 
Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons also fled the violence in the Kivus, though never 
crossing international borders and encompassing a range of ethnic groups. Prunier (2009) observes:  
The situation was paradoxical because many of the expulsees had been thrown out of 
their own country, while many other “refugees” [from 1959] were citizens of their country 
of asylum. But the RPF government had no intention of letting these potentially useful 
refugees simply melt into Rwandese society…(p. 57) 
With this quote, Prunier (2009) touches on the notion that the Rwandan government was aware of the 
use of refugees as tools of international policy. The Interahamwe/ex-FAR pushed the refugees out for 
political reasons, and the RPF government kept them as refugees, rather than integrating as citizens, for 
equally political reasons.  
RWANDA/DRC RELATIONS 
The historical and political foundation discussed in this chapter demonstrates that the politics of 
the region and the experiences of Congolese Banyarwanda are tightly bound in a complex cross-border 
relationship between the DRC and Rwanda. Bending the limitations of sovereignty to influence the 
political outcomes of the DRC, Rwanda and other neighboring countries have historically intervened 
throughout the post-colonial years. In an interview in 2012, however, Rwanda President Paul Kagame 
summarized the violence in the Congo as fighting that is not “going on between Rwanda and DRC. It’s 
between one group that is Congolese and another group that is Congolese” (Kagame, 2012). The 
Rwandan government dismisses implications of its involvement in the violence that defines the eastern 
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Kivu region, and vehemently denies international accusations of backing guerilla movements in the Kivus 
to further its own agenda (Kagame, 2012). Herein lies a central conflict in the relationship between the 
DRC and Rwanda. Publicly, Rwanda supports initiatives to end the violence in the eastern provinces, 
presumably to prevent regional destabilization that would affect its own prosperity (Gettleman, 2013; 
News of Rwanda, 2013; Zetter, 2012). And yet, conflicting reports directly from Rwanda’s government 
representatives indicate that it harbors suspicions of sabotage and nefarious actions from its largely 
ungoverned neighbor (Beswick, 2014; D. Smith, 2013). What exactly would Rwanda’s motivation be for 
involvement in prolonging the conflict? This question points to longer-term objectives from Rwanda’s 
development as a sovereign nation with participation in the international political economy and the global 
development industry. I assert that these conditions are linked directly to its role as peace facilitator and 
refugee host.  
The Government of Rwanda sees, as part of its defining post-conflict develop strategy, Rwanda 
Vision 2020, a central move from an aid-dependent state to a middle income, “knowledge-based society” 
(K. Collins, 2013). Specifically, “Vision 2020 aspires for Rwanda to become a modern, strong and united 
nation, proud of its fundamental values, politically stable and without discrimination among its citizens” 
(Government of Rwanda, 2000). With this guiding ideology, Rwanda puts forth a development scheme 
that suggests it is a ‘special’ country within the region, with admirable measures of economic growth, the 
appearance of peaceful relations, and technological advancement. Ultimately, I believe, this public 
discourse and possibly clandestine military interventions and resource extraction in eastern DRC are part 
of a larger strategy for reaffirming international sovereignty and climbing the development ladder. Beswick 
(2014) similarly argues that Rwanda vies for military power and independence motivated by a “mistrust of 
external actors, stemming from the international failure to end the genocide…[that]…shapes their pursuit 
of relative military strength in the region and willingness to use force to achieve policy goals” (p. 221). 
This explains, she claims, Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC despite its “stated preference for a stable 
Congo” as well as the leadership role it has taken in African security issues (Beswick, 2014, p. 222). 
Speaking to Rwanda’s sovereignty-based motivations, Beswick (2014) observes, “By not acting as a 
passive or predictable puppet of key donors and security partners such as the US, Rwanda retains its 
credentials as an authentic and authoritative African voice in the international arena” (pp. 222-223). She 
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goes on to argue that Rwanda’s unique perspective on military intervention also explains its involvement 
in the DRC, specifically that it does not view sovereignty through a non-interventionist lens. Instead, 
Rwanda reinforces a public image as a competent international actor by selectively emphasizing the 
Responsibility to Protect discourses of recent UN policies. In the case of the DRC, this involves 
intervening to assist the Tutsi diaspora where UN interventions failed to get results (Beswick, 2014).  
THE M23  
As described earlier, a particular feature of the Congo war is the increasing number of rebel 
groups that splintered from former government troops, militias, or emerged from local areas’ needs for 
protection against encroaching combatants. While many rebel groups continue to cause instability in 
eastern DRC, the M23 is of particular international and domestic concern. At the local level, M23 has 
been accused of human rights abuses including rapes, mass executions, and child soldier recruitment 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013; IRIN, 2012). Internationally, the group’s activities have drawn 
attention to the possible involvement of neighboring countries in the destabilization of eastern Congo, 
namely Rwanda. Important for this study, reports from a group of experts on the DRC organized by the 
UN Security Council, as well as extensive reporting from Human Rights Watch, implicate Rwanda in 
backing the M23 and contributing to the destabilization of the eastern DRC (Hege, 27 November 2012; 
Hege et al., 15 November 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013). Delving into the role of M23 and the 
purported backing by the Rwandan government reveals underlying dynamics of intentional regional 
instability that contribute to the duration of Congolese refugees’ stay in camps abroad. In particular, a 
hotly contested UN document exposes these underlying tension and calls into question Rwanda’s stance 
as a ‘donor darling.’  
Integrated from a previous rebel movement, the M23 reportedly splintered from the Congolese 
national military (FARDC) in 2012 based on accusations that the government had not fulfilled the 
agreements of the 23 March 2009 peace accord, from which the rebel group derives its name. Demands 
in the agreement included specific military ranks and salaries, repatriation of refugees who had been in 
Rwanda for over a decade, governmental reforms, and reforms of local administrative practices—some of 
which continue to contribute to protracted displacement of refugees and IDPs and local-level violence 
(Arieff & Coen, 2013; Kavanagh & Ojambo, 2013).  
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Despite destabilization caused by other insurgent-like groups in North and South Kivu provinces, 
M23 gained international attention in November 2012 after it seized the strategic border town of Goma, 
situated between Rwanda and the DRC (Gouby & Callimachi, 2012). A 200-page report by the UN 
Security Council Committee’s appointed Group of Experts (GOE) on the DRC provided extensive 
evidence in the form of eye witness accounts, interviews, satellite footage, and email correspondence, 
among other data, that the Government of Rwanda violated the arms embargo to the DRC by aiding M23 
rebels (Hege et al., 15 November 2012). Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports substantiate these claims 
with hundreds of interviews in Rwanda and the DRC that implicate Rwanda’s involvement in the 
continued conflict of eastern DRC, adding to it the charges of forced recruitment and recruitment of child 
soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2012a). HRW reports,  
Field research conducted by Human Rights Watch in the region in May 2012 revealed 
that Rwandan army officials have provided weapons, ammunition, and an estimated 200 
to 300 recruits to support [Gen. Bosco] Ntaganda’s mutiny in Rutshuru territory, eastern 
Congo. The recruits include civilians forcibly recruited in Musanze and Rubavu districts in 
Rwanda, some of whom were children under 18. Witnesses said that some recruits were 
summarily executed on the orders of Ntaganda’s forces when they tried to escape 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012b). 
Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louise Mushikiwabo, fervently denies the accusations. Denouncing 
the Group of Experts’ report as “far-fetched but fact free assertions,” Mushikiwabo told reporters that 
Rwanda remains committed to finding a lasting solution for regional stabilization and peace.  
The Government of Rwanda claims that the GOE is furthering biased political objectives by 
producing the incriminating report and assert that none of it is factual ("UN Experts in political campaign 
against Rwanda," 2012). The Group of Experts’ lead investigator, Steve Hege, has come under targeted 
personal criticism by Rwanda’s government officials and the media (Hege, 2013). Mushikiwabo, in an 
interview with Metro-US, directly attributed the false claims of the report to political motivations of Hege 
("UN Experts in political campaign against Rwanda," 2012). Officially responding to the GOE interim 
report, Mushikiwabo released a 131-page document condemning the evidence collection methods of the 
investigation team and the public release of the interim report before representatives of the Government 
of Rwanda could properly respond. In the retort she states,  
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Beyond hearsay and anonymous witness testimonies, the physical evidence presented in 
the addendum is utterly unpersuasive…the allegations contained in the addendum rely 
almost exclusively on unreliable, anonymous or compromised sources. Many have 
obvious motivations to fabricate, manipulate or distort information about Rwanda—
FARDC intelligence and other DRC officials feature prominently—while others, such as 
deserters and captured rebels, have been interrogated under circumstances that raise 
severe questions (Mushikiwabo, 27 July 2012, p. 3). 
Mushikiwabo goes on to question what Rwanda would gain from assisting M23, particularly after the 
extensive efforts on the part of the Government of Rwanda to encourage peaceful solutions to the conflict 
in the DRC. She asks, “Why would Rwanda have invested so much over the last three years in 
consolidating its partnership with the DRC central government if it eventually aimed to undermine it? 
(Mushikiwabo, 27 July 2012, p. 3)” The open-ended question, however, does not account for the 
economic benefits gained from Rwanda’s forays into eastern DRC, which other scholars report as a 
source of wealth for funding regional political efforts (Samset, 2002). 
The partnership efforts that Rwanda publicly cites were renewed during a foreign-mediated 
diplomatic meeting in October 2013 between the leadership of the DRC and Rwanda. In this meeting, the 
respective presidents met one-on-one and the attending senators discussed moving forward with 
economic relations and security coordination (AWEPA, 2013). In a similar vein, the Minister of MIDIMAR 
commented in an interview that she coordinates as best she can with her DRC counterpart to keep the 
Congolese refugees informed about the situation in their homes. The DRC’s Minister has visited at least 
one of the camps (not Kiziba) to talk about the security situation in the Kivus, reportedly to allow the 
refugees to make informed choices about returning home. The cross-border minister relationship is not 
easy, given the many security concerns in the DRC, but Rwanda’s minister seemed hopeful that they 
were making steps in the right direction (Personal communication, Minister Séraphine Mukantabana, 13 
June 2014).  
In defense of the methodology of the UN GOE report, however, in a later interview Hege denied 
claims that his team relied only on human intelligence or that they neglected to give the Government of 
Rwanda opportunities to provide input before the report was released. During an email-based interview, 
Hege reflects on the irony of Rwanda claiming to be working to assist the DRC in peaceful resolutions 
when it points to conspiracies emanating from its neighbor as the reason this report is so negative. In his 
interview, he states,  
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Regarding the official Rwandan rebuttal you mentioned; it is a document that we studied 
and which we responded to exhaustively in Annex 3 of our final report, but the major 
premise of their argument was that the Group was the victim of a huge conspiracy 
orchestrated by the Congolese government. Not only as experienced investigators would 
this have been impossible, but the Congolese government could not have been capable 
of fabricating hundreds of false witnesses, documents, radio communications, emails 
scattered across three provinces, particularly when, at the outset of the M23 rebellion, it 
was not even cooperating with us. If true, that would have been the sign of a very 
effective state, not the “black hole” in need of radical governance reform that Rwanda has 
consistently tried to portray the Congo as (Hege, 2013).  
Hege and his team report that M23 recruitment, facilitated by the Rwandan armed forces, mainly comes 
from “demobilized Rwandan soldiers and civilians, in addition to Congolese refugees [in Rwanda and 
Uganda]” (Hege et al., 15 November 2012, p. 11). Mushikiwabo offers the following official rebuttal from 
the Government of Rwanda regarding refugee recruitment: 
Refugee camps in Rwanda are administered by the UNHCR. Claims that refugee camps 
in Rwanda were used for M23 recruitment ignore the fact that it is UNHCR, and not 
Rwandan civilian or military officials, who monitor and approve access and egress to the 
camps in question. There is no reliable evidence provided, that such recruitment activities 
ever took place (Mushikiwabo, 27 July 2012, p. 13).  
While logical in its approach, Hege points out that UNHCR administration does not disprove the ability of 
M23 collaborators to recruit from within refugee camps. Specifically, he states, “refugees and M23 
collaborators confirmed that recruitment has taken place in Nkamira camp outside Gisenyi, regardless of 
UNHCR’s presence” (Hege et al., 15 November 2012, pp. 72, 138). Indeed, to support Hege’s claim, 
recruitment of refugees from within UNHCR and other NGO-run camps is a well-documented 
phenomenon, even by UNHCR staff (Caux, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006, pp. 31-37, 113).  
In fact, older reports from Rwanda indicate that Congolese political groups were permitted by 
Rwandan forces to forcibly recruit in refugee camps in the early 2000s (Immigration and Refugee Board 
of Canada, 10 May 2006). Additionally, the early 2000s saw Rwandan government officials forcibly 
repatriating Congolese refugees before international outcry encouraged them to stop (US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants, 2002). More recently, US Department of State reports indicate that human 
trafficking of refugee children from the Rwandan camps is a recognized occurrence in the country. The 
recruitment of refugees by M23, however, as reported in Human Rights Watch and UN GOE reports may 
not represent specific support by the Rwandan government; failure to stop the occurrence still facilitates 
this form of human trafficking (US Department of State, 2013). In this respect, contrary to the Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs’ statement, the accusations against Rwanda do not represent uncharacteristic behavior; 
there are, however, no recent reports of such events occurring.   
Whether by design or not, what is clear is that a vibrant international debate flourishes—namely 
between the GOE representing the UN Security Council and the Government of Rwanda—about 
Rwanda’s alleged covert roles in instigating and maintaining instability over the border. As this chapter 
has thus far demonstrated, strained relations between the DRC, Rwanda, and the international 
community derive from a complicated historical relationship in which the fate of the Banyarwanda became 
entangled. The push and pull of refugees, combatants, arms, and political troubles across the 
Rwanda/DRC border contributes to the enduring citizenship crisis experienced by the Banyarwanda. One 
Banyamulenge community leader poignantly conveys the consequences of the struggles to belong and 
survive in eastern DRC when he said, "For long, the Banyamulenge have borne the brunt of Rwanda's 
forays into Congo" (IRIN, 2007). These communities served as tools of foreign policy—willing and 
unwilling—the consequences of which are ambiguous citizenship status, uncertain futures, and 
protracted, durable displacement. Interviews with the Banyarwanda, including my own, indicate that the 
majority would identify as Congolese if given the choice and peace could be restored to the country, but 
the actual situation is much more complicated and precludes a direct solution that would simplify such 
citizenship claims (Hovil, 2011; IRIN, 2007).   
ONGOING CITIZENSHIP TROUBLES 
As the DRC struggles to regain control over the conflict, displacement, corruption, and resource 
extraction within its border, it continues to revise its constitution. The words written in it, however, remain 
vague and leave room for interpretation much like previous versions. While the UNHCR lauds the 2005 
Constitution as a resolution to statelessness (UNHCR Africa Bureau, 2006), the previous constitution, 
known as the Constitution of the Transition 2002, contained a nearly identical statement in Chapter II: 
Sovereignty, Article 14. The document states, “All ethnic groups and nationalities of persons and 
territories constituting that which has become the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) at independence shall enjoy equal rights and protection in terms of the law as citizens” (Inter-
Congolese Dialogue, 2002). In fact, little of the wording has changed, and much of it is left up to 
interpretation by the government of what constitutes an ethnic group, who had legitimate presence in the 
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country at independence, and whether that ethnic group had to be indigenous and land owning at that 
time. A government cable originating in the US embassy in Kinshasa reveals this loophole:  
Recent events in Bukavu highlight the explosive nature of the nationality question, 
particularly for Tutsis in eastern Congo. Current Congolese law does not recognize the 
citizenship claims of some longtime residents whose ancestors immigrated to the 
country, including the Banyamulenge Tutsis from Rwanda, who comprise less than 1 
percent of the population. The Ministry of Justice has drafted a law that would outline 
procedures to acquire nationality under Article 14 of the Transitional Constitution, which 
says that all persons of ethnic groups or nationalities present in the DRC since 
independence have the same legal rights as citizens. The Banyamulenge, however, were 
not considered an indigenous ethnic group at independence (US Embassy in Kinshasa, 
21 Jun 2004).  
By some interpretations of the law, however, Banyarwanda are automatically eligible for Congolese 
citizenship provided they do not hold any other nationality.  
Reports indicate that a referendum to the constitution now grants citizenship to any ethnic group 
present in the country at the time of independence in 1960, which should confer rights to Banyarwanda 
populations as long as they can provide proof of residency (IRIN, 2005). One Kivu region expert claims 
that this restoration of citizenship is automatic and it is not necessary to initiate reinstatement of 
Congolese nationality. While there are no official mechanisms in place to re-administer citizenship to 
Banyarwanda, they should report to their local leaders or “find five people to attest to his or her nationality 
if residing far from his or her place of origin. The same is true for all Congolese” (Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, 24 January 2006). These loopholes existed during the 2002 transitional 
constitution and, since the wording has not varied much, it is likely that this wording is purposefully 
ambiguous to appease those who wish to exclude Banyarwanda from DRC citizenship, and those at the 
international level who lobby against statelessness. Without listing the specific ethnic groups that the 
DRC government officially recognizes as being in the country at the time of independence, the law 
excludes a vast number of Banyarwanda who cannot provide documentation or local testimony (after 
nearly two decades in camps) to defend their citizenship claims. It also leaves room for the government to 
later revoke citizenship rights by refuting claims that the Banyarwanda groups existed in the DRC before 
independence.  
According to phone interviews conducted by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada with 
organizations involved in the 2005 referendum elections, Congolese of Rwandan ancestry successfully 
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registered for and voted with no discrimination problems (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 24 
January 2006). This required presentation of identification documents that may be difficult for 
marginalized populations to acquire. Additionally, the new nationality law, which allegedly automatically 
confers citizenship to all those living in the DRC prior to independence, does not indicate how those who 
have been in exile for nearly two decades will manage to provide proof of residency. Hovil (2011) 
confirms my own research experience among Congolese refugees in Rwanda when she explains the 
complicated way in which they view their identity, belonging, and future options. They feel clearly 
unwelcome to integrate into Rwandan society as full citizens, but also skeptical of the reception they 
might experience if they returned home to the DRC. As with the return to the Congo, the primary question 
is not about citizenship in terms of voting power, but in terms of access to farmland. The citizen-state-
territory relationship in the Great Lakes Region is firmly rooted in territory. Rwanda’s meddling in the DRC 
is potentially motivated by pursuit of additional land (Jackson, 2006). Refugees' doubts about returning to 
the DRC derive from questions about regaining lost lands (Hovil, 2011). Rwanda’s hesitation to allow 
refugees’ integration as citizens springs from consciousness of the inability to provide any additional land 
to outsiders (Personal communication, Minister Séraphine Mukantabana, 13 June 2014). These three 
aspects combine to place the conversation squarely in the territorial realm of sovereignty.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The spatial restrictions and isolation of this case study provide a particularly salient context for 
understanding durability and the limitations of ‘durable solutions’ to protracted displacement. Rwanda is 
one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, which complicates avenues for integrating the tens 
of thousands of long-staying refugees within its borders (Gillingham & Buckle, 2014). The government 
itself notes that “Rwanda is characterized by acute land shortage” and proposes in its Vision 2020 a 
“modern land law” that will administer tenure of land to its citizens (Government of Rwanda, 2000). The 
already resource-constrained state faced land tenure problems after the genocide when the legal status 
of many land parcels became uncertain or fell under the contested ownership of multiple parties 
(Gillingham & Buckle, 2014). One report states of the land tenure endeavor, “The overarching goal is to 
embark on a land reform process that secures the rights of all citizens including the poor and vulnerable, 
while at the same time supporting national economic development and promoting environmental 
33 
sustainability” (Akinyemi & Nkubito, 2013, p. 4). A 2013 survey report after the land tenure reform laws 
went into effect revealed 84% of households held a land title (Akinyemi & Nkubito, 2013). Since 
approximately 80% of Rwandans rely on agriculture for their livelihoods (US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), n.d.), access to land is an important part of economic and physical survival. The 
Banyarwanda refugees residing in Rwanda’s camps experienced instability in their communities of origin 
due to citizenship problems, mainly related to land tenure. Their return home, even if the government 
restored citizenship fully, hinges on their ability to successfully access the land rights so integrally tied to 
livelihood and survivability (Hovil, 2011). Congolese refugees in Rwanda face very little prospects for 
access to land, given Rwanda’s current land shortage, and uncertain claims to land upon return to the 
DRC. This situation highlights the spatial durability of the refugees’ existence in camps and ties their 
rights and identities, as well as their access to ‘durable solutions,’ directly to land rights. Land tenure and 
access rights, as a spatial component, place yet another layer on the intractability of certain protracted 
refugee cases, particularly in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Furthermore, they remind us that place 
and space still matter in this ever-globalizing world. Without settling the question of land access, the 
citizenship dilemma cannot be properly addressed.  
As far back as 1997, just after the massive influx of Rwandan refugees fleeing the aftermath of 
the genocide, scholars argued that this citizenship crisis in the DRC among the Banyarwanda comprised 
a “time bomb issue in the Great Lakes Region” (Makombo, 1997, p. 60). And so it remains today. As with 
the Banyarwanda in the Great Lakes Region, Africa is experiencing increasing political marginalization of 
certain groups. Mbembe observes: 
[Reclassification of localities] is powerfully underpinned by the recent proliferation of 
ideologies promoting the values of autochthony. Everywhere, the distinction between 
autochthonous peoples and foreigners has been accentuated, the ethnoracial principle 
serving increasingly as the basis for citizenship and the condition of access to land, 
resources, and elective positions of responsibility. (2000, p. 267) 
For the Banyarwanda, and those controlling access to land in the Kivus, the link between citizenship and 
belonging is tied directly to physical territory. Without access to land, there is no livelihood and no political 
representation. Complicating this matter, the Kivu expert cited above told the Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada that the problem is not about Banyarwanda regaining nationality, but the mistrust 
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between ethnic groups, particularly in the Kivu Region, that has welled up into escalating violence for the 
last two decades (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 24 January 2006). A Banyamulenge 
community leader from Bukavu explained,  
Our plight has been made worse because whenever we are attacked, some of us run to 
Rwanda for help, confirming the perception that we are foreigners. If there was peace in 
eastern Congo, Banyamulenge would want to identify with Congo; those who run to 
Rwanda do so because they think it is the only place which can guarantee their safety 
(IRIN, 2007). 
Questionable loyalties contribute to the construction of a Rwandaphone “other” and further preclude 
Banyarwanda access to land, despite constitutional reforms.  
Straddling the local and global, Banyarwanda in the DRC and abroad are caught in the middle of 
state-level quests for sovereignty and power as well as local level interpretations of those international 
motivations. These factors play out not only in the international arena as arms embargos, cross-border 
violence, and public media campaigns, but also at the local-level as the lived experiences of 
Banyarwanda warehoused in Rwanda attest. The tenuous nature of citizen-state-territory relationship is 
clearly demonstrated in the way Banyarwanda vacillate between political partner to refugee/IDP pawns, 
terrorized to terrorizer, citizen and other. Their situation is a symptom of a larger, system-wide dysfunction 
in which “citizen,” “sovereignty,” and “state” can no longer adequately represent the complexity of the 
modern world.  
Examining the experiences and understanding of Banyarwanda refugees in Rwanda begins to 
construct a picture of the complex relationship between citizen and state, revealing more systemic 
sources of durability in refugees’ exile. The Banyarwanda population’s existence at the intersection of so 
many of these physically and politically contested spaces of citizenship, identity, and movement 
crystallize larger theoretical debates within the existing context of central Africa. In search of a durable 
solution for one instance of a human, political, economic, and social problem that is becoming 
increasingly widespread—that of protracted displacement—we uncover state and local level processes 
that indicate a permanence and durability of displacement derived from the relationship between 
citizenship and belonging with state and territory. In order to undo what has taken place throughout 
decades of civil conflict, cross-border infringement of DRC sovereignty, and centuries of migration, the 
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Kivus must confront the question of autochthony and land distribution. To the Congolese refugees of 
Rwanda—and Uganda, though their experiences differ in some ways—the durable solution requires 
confirmation of a territorial home. Citizenship, belonging, and identity derive from the land, and without it, 
refugees see very little hope for their future. In the absence of a physical “home,” and in an environment 
of larger quests for sovereignty in the international system, the Banyarwanda become lost in a durable 
form of displacement. For these reasons, this in-depth focus on the Banyarwanda within the Lake Kivu 
region places human beings at the apex of this struggle and provides an account of conflict, disorder, and 
relative levels of development through the eyes of this particular group, which may arguably be most 
directly impacted by this larger conflict.   
The following chapters consider themes of sovereignty, burden-sharing, post-colonialism, social 
stratification, and social construction to illuminate the ways local, regional, and international processes 
contribute to enduring refugee situations, while placing this case study within a larger theoretical 
framework that transcends the specificities of the DRC/Rwanda borderlands. Building off of NGO and 
scholarly reports from similar contexts, the specific case of Congolese refugees in Kiziba Camp provides 
insight into how these processes play out at the local level and point to the complications of ending a 
system of durable displacement. The contextual history and discussion of the most contemporary debates 
on this region’s socio-economic and political landscapes, situated in conversation with the larger 
theoretical discussion to follow, set the stage for the in-depth analysis of the original data that emerged 
within this study among Banyarwanda refugees in the region.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW: PLACELESSNESS & STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Even if they don’t like us, even if they kill some of our 
relatives…we don’t have any other country. Our home is Congo. 




Forced displacement—including the political displacement that arises from statelessness—tears 
at the fabric of local societies and the international community. This process creates a borderless state 
that contests the most basic concepts of citizenship, territorial boundaries, and the State as a unit of 
analysis in International Relations. At the individual level, deprivation of legal rights to place, nationality, 
or citizenship creates vulnerabilities to exploitation, infringement of human rights, and political 
voicelessness among other problems (Batchelor, 1998; Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). Scholars position 
statelessness as a chronic political condition with concrete and interconnected impacts at the local, 
national, and transnational levels (Agamben, 1995; Bauman, 2004). Giorgio Agamben (1995) and 
Zygmunt Bauman (2004) assert that forced migration and statelessness—and subsequent mass 
containment—result in loss of citizenship, human rights, and belonging in the international system and 
comprise some of the most unfortunate consequences of modernity. From a macro structural perspective, 
statelessness and lack of territorial belonging “throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty” which 
can no longer adequately describe the lived experiences of an increasing proportion of people in this 
world (Agamben, 1995, p. 117).  
As the numbers of refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and stateless persons swell 
with each coming year, their role in the modern international political system cannot be ignored. 
Increasingly scholars take notice that displaced persons play a critical part in local and regional conflict, 
contributing to political destabilization of sending, receiving, and surrounding countries (Adamson, 2006; 
Betts & Loescher, 2011; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher, 1992; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 
2005b; Milner, 2011; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). At once confirming the state as a unit of analysis by 
defining the boundaries between citizens and noncitizens, refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons, by their 
very existence, contest the “original fiction of sovereignty” in which the state provides for the total 
wellbeing of the inhabitants within its borders (Agamben, 1995). To combat the forces of modernity that 
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reduce the reach of states and central governments, international actors derive some self-justification 
from refugees. For receiving states, refugee reception and assistance provides an opportunity to affirm 
relevance in the international area and garner resources and support; in other words, the state shows that 
it is capable of responsibly responding to this international migration pressure. In a similar but opposite 
way, forced migration and statelessness serve to dismantle the illusion of sovereignty in refugee-
producing countries as well as those states unable or unwilling to host refugees. These situations can 
quickly turn into crises where mass forced migration becomes an instrument of disruptive regional 
violence.  
This research focuses on the border between eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Rwanda—specifically the Banyarwanda populations displaced by decades of regional conflict, political 
manipulation, and ever-changing citizenship laws. I explore how statelessness and forced migration 
among this particular population reflects and reproduces larger conflicts, territorial ambiguities, identity 
questions, and human rights concerns in ways that perpetuate displacement. I argue that international, 
national, and local actors have motivations for institutionalizing displacement as a strategic political tool. 
Parallels may be drawn for other cases of protracted displacement, but the intention of this research is to 
delve into the political and social contexts and nuances of force migration patterns between Rwanda and 
eastern DRC. The history and current struggles of Banyarwanda provide an instance of durable 
displacement to interrogate the state/citizen/territory relationship as both a cause and effect of conflict. 
The complexity of the perceived and assigned identity of the borderland Banyarwanda in the transnational 
narrative of DRC/Rwanda political interactions reveals how forced and protracted displacement is a 
symptom of a larger, system-wide dysfunction. In this identity and citizenship turmoil, certain 
dichotomies—insider/outsider, citizen/refugee, indigenous/immigrant, perpetrator/victim—challenge 
notion of refugeehood as a temporary status. Shifting the focus of the conversation on protraction from 
ongoing temporary limbo to one of durability highlights a systemic level of displacement across levels of 
analysis at the macro, meso, and micro scales in international relations.  
Protracted refugee situations are growing in scale, number, and duration. Existing theories have 
failed to explain this expansion of durable cases due to a critical assumption of refugeehood as a 
temporary condition, as well as an inability to look across levels of analysis for systemic causes of 
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extended time spent in exile. As the following sections show, macro-level theories explain problems with 
international collective action and equitable burden-sharing of humanitarian responsibilities; meso 
theories provide insight into state sovereignty motivations and post-colonial structures that lengthen 
refugees’ state of limbo; and micro-level theories at the camp and individual levels explain social 
construction of non-citizen refugee ‘others’ and disproportionate impacts on vulnerable subgroups as a 
means for understanding protracted cases. Very few studies look across levels to identify processes that 
interact and intensify one another resulting in intractable forced displacement. For this reason, while 
existing micro-, meso-, and macro-level theories help us understand the fact of durability in displacement, 
they cannot explain its growth, intensification, and geographic spread. Confronting these aspects of 
protraction and durability requires a multiscalar approach to see the interaction across levels of analysis 
that collectively contribute to unending camp-based refugee situations. The following sections examine 
protraction across levels to reveal a troubling phenomenon: a global system that reproduces ongoing 
protraction and placelessness.  
After first establishing the terms used to describe forced migrants in this research, I substantiate 
the claim that protraction and placelessness have grown in scope and duration. The following sections 
then parse out the different levels of analysis in current related work in order to highlight the usefulness of 
examining refugeehood across all scales to better understand protraction as a durable form of 
displacement.  
INSTITUTIONAL AND SPATIAL DISPLACEMENT 
Spatial and institutional components of displacement emerge as two broad themes in the 
literature on forced migration. In a complex global system that involves conflict, social and political 
divides, and geographic displacement, these two aspects work on one another to produce durable forms 
of displacement. Camp-based refugees inhabit a spatially distinct location separated from the host 
community by artificial borders imposed by the host state governments and INGOs. Additionally, refugees 
are institutionally isolated through the ‘refugee’ label. This label serves as a means to access necessary 
resources for survival as well as a marker of difference from the host community (Zetter, 1991). In this 
way, spatial and institutional distinctions of camp-based refugeehood form a feedback loop that reinforces 
their outsider status. Spatial delineations and artificial borders contain refugees as separate populations, 
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and institutional labels and processes affirm their existence as non-citizen others. The following section 
drills into this feedback loop to emphasize that place still matters to those who have lost their ‘place’—
institutionally and spatially—in the international system. Spatial displacement in particular comes to the 
forefront of the conversation in later analytic chapters where Kiziba residents speak out about their ‘home’ 
and artificial town-like camp. In the following sections, as we stretch across levels of analysis, it is clear 
that the line between spatial and institutional displacement is tangled in the multilayered nature of 
refugeehood and placelessness. The discussion moves from explaining the encompassing term of 
‘placelessness’ and ‘refugee’ in the global system to breaking out the existing literature into broad theses 
that try to explain protraction of what was meant to be a temporary refugee camp solution to human 
migration crises.  
THE SEMANTICS OF DISPLACEMENT 
Policymakers, academics, and humanitarian aid workers and organizations are often careful to 
make the distinction between refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons, with some acknowledged 
categorical overlap. Refugees, on the one hand, flee across national borders from human-induced and 
environmental disasters. IDPs, however, remain within their country of origin yet flee to a different area to 
escape violence and threats to their livelihood. The reason for flight for both refugees and IDPs may be 
the same. In the DRC, for instance, refugees and IDPs fled the same internal civil disorder and 
subsequent targeted violence, but ended up in different geographic places. These definitions are 
understandably separated in practice to protect each type of forced migrant from the unique 
circumstances posed in and outside the country of origin, where one or both groups may have continued 
citizenship claims in that country. Statelessness, on the other hand, demarcates a legal status above and 
beyond territorial location. Populations who remain in the country of origin, for example, may become 
stateless after a regime or law change, among other reasons (Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). The 
statelessness of IDPs and refugees associated with internal conflict in the DRC, for example, is directly 
related to colonialism, land rights, and ethnic identity rather than the dissolution of a nation-state or the 
physical movement of peoples in modern times (Deng, 2001; Mamdani, 2001, 2002; Stearns, 2011).  
Falling outside the traditional territorial state jurisdiction, the United Nations serves as the main 
governing organization for refugees and stateless persons. According to the 1954 Convention relating to 
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the Status of Stateless Persons, the UN defines a “stateless person” to be one “…who is not considered 
as a national by any State under the operation of its law” (UNHCR, 2012a). This is based predominantly 
on a legal classification of state’s claim to jurisdiction over an individual’s wellbeing (Batchelor, 1998). 
While many different factors can lead to one becoming stateless, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) identifies “racial and ethnic discrimination” as the most common (UNHCR, 2013b). 
Regardless of its origin, statelessness can lead to prolonged political marginalization in situations where 
the state cannot or will not resolve citizenship determinations. The UNHCR notes, “Often, such groups 
have become so marginalized that even when legislation changes to grant access to citizenship, they 
encounter huge obstacles and bureaucratic red tape. Often the cost of actually obtaining citizenship is 
almost insurmountable” (UNHCR, 2013b). The complicated nature of statelessness—and the 
determination of this vulnerable status—derives at least partly from the gap between international and 
national conventions on citizenship and the associated complexities of the lives of those who exist within 
and between states (Batchelor, 1998; Redclift, 2013). Essentially, international conventions protecting the 
human right to citizenship somewhere—or the “right to rights” (Goris, Harrington, & Köhn, 2009; Massey, 
April 2010, p. 33), do not specifically address how that citizenship must be determined (Batchelor, 1998; 
Goris et al., 2009; UNHCR, 2012a).  
In the case of the DRC, this citizenship ambiguity results in a massively complex political situation 
where those who have lived in the country for generations have been denied citizenship based on ethnic 
categories and legacy policies of colonial meddling in customary land ownership rights (Autesserre, 2008; 
Deng, 2001; Long, 2012; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 236-239; Prunier, 2009, pp. 48-51; Stearns, 2011, pp. 69-
74). Such historic and contemporary power asymmetries have manifested as a form of de facto 
statelessness1, where Banyarwanda populations are denied citizenship rights in the DRC, even though 
they have never lived anywhere else (Deng, 2001). These and other forms of statelessness result in a 
deprivation of physical and/or political space within the international system (Batchelor, 1998; Weissbrodt 
1 It is worth noting here that stateless persons, such as those classified as Banyarwanda in the Kivu 
Region of DRC have, at different periods of time, vacillated between citizen, de facto stateless, and de 
jure stateless categorizations as used by Batchelor (1998) and Weissbrodt and Collins (2006). This only 
highlights the complexities of nationality and belonging in certain contexts and emphasizes the notion that 
people’s lived experiences do not fit neatly into static categories.  
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& Collins, 2006).2 This broad recognition of statelessness is important because, in the words of Francis 
M. Deng (2001), a former representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, 
“Thinking of marginalization as a form of statelessness, while not creating a legal status, draws attention 
to the gross inequities, discrimination, and lack of protection for many people that call for effective 
remedies” (p. 205). Without recognizing the multitudes of ways that people are excluded from the political 
system and granted access to effective citizenship somewhere, the existing global governance and 
related responses to resolving the refugee crisis remain only partial; meanwhile the severe 
marginalization suffered by so many continues. 
PROTRACTION 
Protracted refugee cases are among those that particularly challenge the resources and 
management of the UNHCR. While long-term refugee situations are not a new phenomenon, the length of 
stay has received increasing media and scholarly attention in recent decades. These refugee crises 
extend beyond the immediate humanitarian emergency, requiring forced migrants to live in temporary 
conditions for decades with no solution in sight. The UNHCR identifies protracted refugee situations using 
“crude measures” that account for populations over 25,000 in exile for five or more years (Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Standing Committee, 2004).  
By these measures, approximately 6.3 million, or 54% of all global refugees live in protracted 
situations (UNHCR, 2015e, p. 28). The same UNHCR standing committee that referenced the metrics for 
identifying protraction noted, “if it is true that camps save lives in the emergency phase, it is also true that, 
as the years go by, they progressively waste the same lives” due to lack of economic and social 
opportunities to improve their situations (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme 
Standing Committee, 2004, p. 3). According to the UNHCR, “The vast majority [of protracted refugee 
cases] are found in the world’s poorest and most unstable regions, and are frequently the result of neglect 
by regional and international actors” (UNHCR, 2006, p. 104). The combination of political, social, and 
economic pressures on these poor and/or unstable host nations creates crises beyond the initial forced 
2 It is important to note here that not all policymakers and scholars agree with the use of the term de facto 
statelessness. See (Massey, April 2010, pp. 27-60) for a more thorough discussion of the counter-
argument.  
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migration. These include competition for scarce resources, regional entanglement in the politics of 
sending and receiving countries, and threats to local and national security (Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme Standing Committee, 2004; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; 
UNHCR, 2006).  
As backlash to these potential threats linked to protraction, host governments increasingly confine 
refugees to camps in order to maintain control over the situation. Not only is this in conflict with the 1951 
Convention allowing refugees freedom of movement (UN General Assembly, 1951), it also sentences 
them to a cycle of wasted lives and perversely contributes to security problems such as militarization, 
human trafficking, and exploitation of children as soldiers (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, 2009). The 
pervasiveness of protracted refugee situations combined with the intractable political conditions that limit 
options for durable solutions motivates this study, particularly focused on the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa. No one has long-term solutions that suit every protracted situation, but perhaps by training focus 
on one particular population, we can reveal dynamics that contribute to the problem. In this way, this 
research may contribute to uncovering previously unrecognized interdependent causes of protraction that 
may one day lead to solutions. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
NEGLECT IN HUMANITARIAN MAINTENANCE 
Massive flows of forced migrants across international borders necessitate an international 
response. Given the tremendous resource and security pressures these movements place on receiving 
states, the response calls for cooperation on a global scale to meet the needs of refugees of both the 
immediate flight and long-term stay. International cooperation and the role of international institutions 
constitute a broad subject area of IR theory that exceeds the scope of the present study. For the 
purposes of the research at hand, this section concentrates on burden-sharing and the global refugee 
regime in order to illuminate how collective action problems to address refugee crises at the global level 
can explain some aspects of protracted situations. Zygmunt Bauman (2004) connects refugee protraction 
and burden-sharing in his discussion of “wasted lives” of modernity. He observes,  
As the ‘redundant’ population stays inside and rubs shoulders with the ‘useful’ and 
‘legitimate’ rest, the line separating a transient incapacitation from the peremptory and 
final consignment to waste tends to be blurred and no longer legible. Rather than 
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remaining as before a problem of a separate part of the population, assignment to ‘waste’ 
becomes everybody’s potential prospect – one of the two poles between which 
everybody’s present and future social standing oscillates. (Bauman, 2004, p. 71)  
Explaining the complications of those “latecomers to modernity”—namely recently modernized states—as 
they attempt to find “local solution[s] to globally caused problem[s]—though with meagre chances of 
success” (p. 72) he continues,  
Even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since 
its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a place they could call 
‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. They are never to be free from the gnawing sense of 
the transience, indefiniteness, and provisional nature of any settlement. (Bauman, 2004, 
p. 76) 
In these passages, Bauman philosophizes on the inherent global processes of modernization that 
contribute to the increasing permanence of temporary displacement. He points, on a very macro level, to 
the hopelessness of achieving local solutions to problems that involve burden-sharing and therefore 
international cooperation. Justified by claims of security threats, refugee receiving states cope with the 
inequitable burden of hosting by most often confining the forced migrants in camps for extended periods 
of time. This section outlines these security concerns and discusses how the United Nations serves as 
the global institution for facilitating resource distribution to populations in need. The section ends with a 
discussion about how these factors contribute to protracted contexts, and suggests that burden-sharing 
alone is not enough to explain why protraction extends for so long. 
SECURITY 
Forced migration has been recognized since the post-Cold War era as both a cause and 
consequence of insecurity (Abuya, 2010; Adamson, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 2006; 
Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). As such, it requires a 
humanitarian response and often an armed intervention on behalf of refugees, to both contain and protect 
forced migrant populations (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 24-26). Particularly in the case of resource-
scarce states, an influx of displaced persons creates pressure on already strained resources, leading to 
animosity from the host communities as well as severe government destabilization for those unable to 
accommodate the influx (Adamson, 2006). Additionally, the displaced can contribute to pre-existing ethnic 
tensions, for example by tipping the balance of a minority group to the majority (Jacobsen, 1996; 
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Loescher, 1992; Milner, 2011). Refugees have also been commonly associated with armed group 
movements, providing resources and/or serving as combatants (Abuya, 2010; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 
2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). In some cases, porous borders afford a gateway for political movement 
across international lines, inciting security issues for the sending and receiving states. As Adamson 
(2006) points out, these challenges are particularly acute in developing countries which host the largest 
number of refugees in the world. Truly understanding the insecurity that accompanies forced migration 
requires a more complete picture of the political context of both sending and receiving countries, as well 
as of the population of refugees themselves (Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005b).  
Containing placeless persons in camps is one way that the host government can preserve its 
domestic order and effectively control the population of refugees. As explained by Foucault (2007), the 
very layout of the camp is a mechanism of control—a “milieu” that serves as a conduit of state power 
throughout a population. From a human geography perspective, Hyndman (2000) argues that camp 
spaces specifically reflect the interest of authoritative powers—that of NGOs and host governments—thus 
privileging certain aspects of camp life over others. As Jacobsen (1996) notes, “Even when there are no 
potential ethnic problems, governments may prefer to house refugees in camps because doing so 
reduces their political saliency within the local community. Refugees in camps are more easily monitored, 
controlled, and registered, all of which also facilitate eventual repatriation” (p. 673). Loescher and Milner 
(2005b) concur with this analysis of refugee camps as political and economic containment units. They 
explain,  
Due consideration of the indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees may pose to 
host states has been lacking in both the research on and policy towards refugee 
movements. In these cases, it is not the refugee that is a threat to the host state, but the 
context within which the refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum 
question for many states. Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now 
present refugee populations as security threats to justify actions that would not otherwise 
be permissible, such as denying refugees freedom of movement, preventing new arrivals 
of refugees and, in exceptional circumstances, carrying out mass expulsions. (2005b, p. 
34) 
The geographic control of refugees within the camp space not only keeps the state and humanitarian 
agencies in control of the influx of people, but it can also act as a management strategy to limit violence 
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and prevent an upset in the balance of power among communities outside of the camp (Loescher & 
Milner, 2005b, p. 33).  
When the host government is weak and does not effectively utilize the camp space as a milieu for 
power, problematic results can occur. Numerous scholars and policymakers have attributed the ongoing 
violence in the DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the ways in which the international community 
handled the massive influx of refugees (Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005a; Stedman & Tanner, 
2003). After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutu refugees who fled to the DRC intermingled in camps 
with militants, génocidaires, and exiled political leaders. International aid fed and supplied the population, 
despite the known fact that these civilians provided resources for those perpetuating local and regional 
instability (Adelman, 2003). As a state in exile, with governance structures relatively intact after fleeing 
Rwanda, this group of forced migrants was primed to become a security threat for the region (Lischer, 
2006). Adelman (2003) takes this a step further, implicating the international community in 
“powerlessness and unwillingness to take any risks” that perpetuated the violence in the DRC, and 
ultimately led to a civil war in the late 1990s—which continues to rage on in the eastern provinces 
(Mamdani, 2001; Stearns, 2011). The political and economic dimensions of the refugee crisis render the 
international community’s humanitarian aid programs as only temporary and insufficient bandages for 
such complex security concerns (Adelman, 2003). 
The effect of the refugee crisis that burgeoned into a civil war and continues to cause regional 
instability in Central Africa has had far-reaching consequences for African state policies. Namely, the 
increasingly common view that refugees contribute to insecurity positions refugees as vital actors in state 
and international relations (Muggah, 2006). According to Loescher and Milner,  
These refugee populations are seen not as passive victims of persecution and conflict, 
but as active agents engaged in the politics not only of their country of origin but also in 
the host country and the wider region, and thus as a potential source of instability on a 
scale similar to that witnessed in Central Africa in the 1990s. (2005b, p. 9) 
In fact, the burden of hosting placeless persons with no foreseeable resolution can be seen as destructive 
to national sovereignty, an opinion heavily influenced by the negative publicity of “refugee warriors” that 
affect local and regional insecurity (Loescher, 1992). Potential security concerns are compounded by a 
general global decline in humanitarian aid and development assistance as well as international 
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impositions on national economies in developing countries based on terms of structural adjustment 
programs. These conditions leave host governments less willing to receive refugees who may be 
placeless for an extended period of time, and some national policies have even become hostile to forced 
migrants (Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b). In some cases, close ethnic and linguistic ties ease some of 
this tension and facilitate local integration, as may be the case with the Banyarwanda (Loescher, 1992). 
More often, however, strained resources and indefinite stays result in national policies influenced by 
xenophobic belief systems held by citizens and politicians.  
BURDEN-SHARING 
As donor fatigue and international support for refugees diminishes the resources available to 
support “durable solutions” including local integration strategies, Loescher and Milner (2005b) contend 
that host nations become “more likely to contain refugees in isolated camps until a solution may be found 
elsewhere” (p. 20). In this way, they implicate burden-sharing of refugees as a driver for the increasing 
number and duration of protracted refugee situations. Advocating for more research into the relationship 
between protracted cases and regional political and security conditions, (Loescher & Milner) assert,  
…protracted refugee situations are caused by the combined effect of inaction or 
unsustained international action in both the country of origin and the country of asylum. 
These chronic and seemingly unresolvable problems occur because of ongoing political, 
ethnic, and religious conflict in the countries of refugee origin and become protracted as a 
consequence of restrictions, intolerance, and confinement to camps in host countries. 
(2005b, p. 21) 
Continued political unrest in the country of origin, unstable political relationships between the sending and 
receiving countries, as well as declining interest and participation of other international actors contributes 
to the long-term, intractable placelessness as seen in the refugee camps of Rwanda. Milner (2000) 
identifies the concept of “security burden” to establish the link between failures of the international 
community to address security concerns in refugee-generating regions and protracted forced 
displacement. While other forms of burden-sharing, including humanitarian aid and resources, are well 
documented in the academic and policy arenas, he argues that without addressing state interests in 
security, the good will of hosting nations wears thin and contributes to placelessness and regional 
insecurity (Milner, 2000).  
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Developing this argument further, Betts (2010) contends that so much international cooperation is 
involved in the refugee regime that it instead resembles more of a “refugee regime complex,” a term that 
he coins to illustrate how many aspects of refugee protection and forced migration interests are divested 
in multiple aspects of international burden-sharing. Elsewhere, he argues that states’ notions of 
interdependence play an increasingly important role in the protection of refugees given the historic unfair 
distribution of burden on states in the global south compared with those in the north (Betts, 2009b). In 
concert, these researchers’ works highlight the complex web of international institutions and agreements 
that have arisen from an environment where large-scale human movement necessitates cooperation 
between international actors. Additionally, they demonstrate that state capacities for managing these 
“globally caused problems” exacerbate the protraction of crises, particularly in the areas of security and 
human warehousing, which produces isolated, aid-dependent, long-term refugee situations that require 
continued international cooperation to provide aid and security. As states struggle to balance their own 
interests in international relations, refugee situations become increasingly protracted, where protracted 
cases represent two-thirds of all global refugees (US Department of State, 2011). 
Refugees’ main hosts are some of the most resource-constrained states in the world. Pakistan, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey hosted the most refugees of any country in 
2013, namely because the two top sending countries—Afghanistan and Syria—collectively produced over 
five million refugees. The top five recipients—Germany, USA, South Africa, France, and Sweden—of 
refugee resettlement globally, on the other hand, saw just 380,300 in their territories (UNHCR, 2015e). 
With the exception of South Africa and France, recipient states are generally far removed from the areas 
of crisis and thus have less pressing need to face the true humanitarian burden of caring for so many 
displaced. At the time of writing, thousands of refugees are arriving by boat to Europe, forcing the hand of 
the EU to come up with an equitable burden-sharing plan to assist those states bearing the brunt of the 
sudden influx. Even among EU member states, there is very little agreement on how to equitably share 
the humanitarian burden of absorbing the refugees (Boehler & Pecanha, 2015; Pop, 2015). The 
disproportionate costs—economic, political, and security—of refugee hosting most often fall on the 
receiving state. As the EU is currently experiencing, however, massive influxes of displaced persons 
constitute a strong justification for international institutions to distribute the costs of a global collective 
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good across all international actors. In this case, the collective good is containment and/or absorption of 
displaced persons and the institution is the United Nations (UN).  
GLOBAL CARE INSTITUTIONS 
Placeless persons exist in a dynamic socio-political terrain, generally without a state to advocate 
for their rights and hosted in some of the world’s most resource-constrained states. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) serves as the main global governing body for coordinating 
supplies, logistics, and funding for humanitarian assistance. As described in the mandate that created the 
organization, it falls under the UN General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council (UN 
General Assembly, 1950; UNHCR, 2015b). The UNHCR originally provided relief only to refugees, but 
given the ever-changing political landscape, it has adapted to provide services to IDPs, stateless persons, 
and those in IDP-like or refugee-like circumstances. It forms the central international institution of the 
global refugee regime complex and facilitates the collective care of millions of placeless persons. The 
most recent published numbers at the time of writing estimated 51.2 million people displaced worldwide; 
11.7 million of the 16.7 million refugees fell under the purview of the UNHCR. Additionally, the 
organization provided protection and assistance for 23.9 million internally displaced and 10 million 
stateless persons (UNHCR, 2015e). To meet the needs of these populations, the agency maintains an 
international staff of over 8,600 in 126 countries and mobilized over 4.3 billion US dollars in 2012 
(UNHCR, 2015b). State contributions constitute the primary funding source, but a steadily increasing 
share also comes from private sector donations (UNHCR, 2013a). Hundreds of INGOs support the 
UNHCR through voluntary efforts from fundraising to day-to-day management of various camp services, 
such as clinic staffing or economic livelihood initiatives. Partners to manage the care and safety of a 
growing number of global persons of concern include the World Food Programme and UNICEF, as well 
as many community and faith-based organizations (UNHCR, 2013c). Together, this refugee regime 
supports policy development at both the international and national level, interacting with states and state 
officials to meet the needs of a growing population of placeless persons (Betts, 2008).  
Among the responsibilities of the UNHCR is the pursuit of long-term, durable solutions for 
refugees, IDPs, stateless persons, and those in danger of becoming placeless. This includes policy and 
advocacy work that some states see as impinging on their sovereign rights to manage their own affairs 
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(Barnett, 2001; Jacobsen, 1996; Kaiser, 2005; Loescher & Milner, 2005a). To accomplish protection and 
service provision of vulnerable populations, UNHCR representatives actively engage host government 
members to promote “inclusiveness, predictability, and transparency” (UNHCR, n.d.). This advocacy work 
includes providing funding to host institutions conducting refugee-related work. The UNHCR also strives 
to “work closely with governments to support safe and respectful asylum policies, to negotiate refugee 
camp locations and security, and to guarantee safety for refugees upon their return home” (UNHCR, 
2015c). In addition to host nation partnership building, refugee affairs encompass the participation of UN 
member states that provide financial support and options for third-country resettlement. Participating 
countries contribute to global policy development related to refugees and advocate for increased 
resettlement quotas adopted by states (UNHCR, 2010). These critical quotas provide long-term solutions 
to a portion of the world’s refugees. In 2013, the UNHCR resettled 98,400 refugees in 21 countries, just a 
small fraction of the 51.2 million displaced (UNHCR, 2015e). With less than two percent of the UNHCR’s 
persons of concern finding lasting solutions each year, only a globally coordinated solution can 
reasonably address the current burgeoning population of placeless persons.  
ONGOING BURDENS 
As the EU is demonstrating as it deliberates on a way forward to address the refugee crisis in 
Greece and Italy, burden-sharing between the global North and South works on a certain economic level 
where donors pass along billions of US dollars to the UNHCR to facilitate the (distant) care of millions of 
placeless persons. This maintenance approach explains some aspects of protraction. As long as the 
refugee-generating crisis remains spatially removed enough, those states that can afford to contribute to 
the global refugee regime do so in order to keep the refugees contained elsewhere (Bauman, 2004). 
When faced with the actual human costs of displacement, states resist notions of burden-sharing in terms 
of resettlement or relocation. This aspect of distancing manifests clearly in the tiny fraction of placeless 
persons finding solutions each year (UNHCR, 2015e). Neglecting the refugees’ need for place, donor 
states relegate the confinement of human bodies to the periphery of the global system, namely 
developing states. Bauman (2004) explains this as a lack of resources and will to resolve the protracted 
refugee cases. Hosting states justify prolonged encampment through the potential security threats posed 
by refugees (Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher & Milner, 2005b). Even the coordinating international institution, 
50 
UNHCR, may find justification for its own existence and access to power and resources through the 
ongoing care work required to maintain protracted cases (Barnett, 2001). And, for both the host state and 
the UNHCR, containment to camps makes the maintenance, care, and monitoring of refugees easier than 
managing the needs of urban refugees (Hyndman, 2000; S. Turner, 2010). All of these issues point to 
larger, structural, global factors that contribute to the protraction of placelessness.  
The confluence of security issues, burden-sharing, and international humanitarian institution roles 
each also contribute to the state of durable displacement experienced by long-staying refugees. States 
and international actors exercise leverage that grants legitimacy and autonomy to each in the 
international system. Extracting political leverage from the act of hosting refugees, receiving states 
stipulate a “price for patience” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 663) that grants access to aid resources and 
international recognition of state sovereignty. Similarly, states maintain autonomy and power through 
allowing (and monitoring in many cases) humanitarian intervention within territorial boundaries. Aid 
agencies, however, with better logistic and financial resources, erode this autonomy by intervening in 
domestic policies and using this relative power as political leverage. This give and take system of power 
between international organizations and refugee hosting states arguably creates an aid 
dependency/international legitimacy nexus that perpetuates protraction of refugee situations. 
Alone, however, these macro-level burden-sharing factors cannot speak to the variation across 
different refugee contexts. In 2013, around 50% of repatriated refugees had spontaneously returned to 
their countries of origin without the assistance of UNHCR or large-scale international collective programs 
(UNHCR, 2015e). This movement points to factors that exist at the state and individual level contributing 
to length of time spent as refugees. In the case of Rwanda and the Congolese refugees, the state and the 
UNHCR cooperative effectively to meet the basic needs of the displaced and engage the sending state in 
diplomatic talks, and yet the refugees remain in a protracted situation with third-country resettlement the 
main available option. Burden-sharing considerations do constitute a motivating factor—particularly in 
terms of economics and security—for keeping refugees contained in camps, but they do not fully 
encompass the extent of protracted cases. At the macro global systems level, states may also confront 
aspects of sovereignty that foster continued protracted displacement.  
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SOVEREIGNTY & INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The term “sovereignty,” while contested, is a central concept in International Relations theory that 
frames some macro-level aspects of durability in displacement (C. Weber, 1995, pp. 1-2). Although 
popularized as a foundational concept within the social sciences, schools of thought vary on its 
interpretation and application. Indeed, “Attention to sovereignty tends to raise more questions about 
international relations than it answers” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996a, p. 2). Most generically, sovereignty is 
the idea that states have domestic control and authority within a given territory and membership in the 
larger international community (Graham & Newnham, 1998, pp. 504-505); which is to say, sovereignty 
implies internal authority within territorial bounds, as well as international recognition and immunity from 
external authority. Krasner (2006) takes the term a step further by defining four types of sovereignty in 
order to demonstrate the complexity of both the concept and its practice in the international political 
system. He conceptualizes these four varieties as domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, 
international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty, the definitions of which he clarifies, “…are 
not logically coupled, nor have they covaried in practice” (Krasner, 2006, p. 660). By delineating 
sovereignty into four interrelated categories, Krasner (2006) articulates the various aspects of authority 
and power that states strive to maintain: the pursuit of resources, power, and recognition. In terms of 
forced migration, relevant aspects of sovereignty can more logically be categorized as dualisms, namely 
material/functional versus ideational/normative and domestic/internal versus international/external. Since, 
by definition, refugees cross international borders and physically reside in some host location, state 
maintenance of sovereignty naturally aligns along both international and domestic priorities and 
aspirations. Likewise, the physical presence of placeless bodies presents both material and ideational 
challenges and opportunities for state performance and maintenance of sovereignty. Using this 
framework for decomposing sovereign interests, I argue that states pursue and preserve sovereignty in 
ways that reproduce certain domestic and regional conditions leading to the protracted “durable” 
displacement of refugee populations. 
Forced migration challenges the sovereignty of states that both host and produce refugees 
(Troeller, 2003). Placelessness ultimately “…unhinges the old trinity of state/nation/territory” (Agamben, 
1995) by removing the linkages between citizen and state through political and spatial marginalization. 
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The state’s power to define insider/citizen in opposition to outsider/non-citizen is compromised by a 
placeless other whose existence “represent[s] anomalies…” to the “…unproblematic nexus between 
state, citizen, and territory” upon which the international system of states is based (Betts, 2009a, p. 44). 
Additionally, as Lischer (2006) posited, a number of factors related to displaced persons can lead to 
destabilizing domestic and regional security threats, further compromising the control and legitimacy of 
the state. Theorizing broadly on the impact of global migration on state security, Fiona Adamson (2006) 
observes,   
Migration and human mobility influence three core areas of state power: economic, 
military, and diplomatic. Here, again, the intervening variable between migration and 
national security is policy: if states have the capacity to design and implement effective 
policies that “harness the power of migration,” international migration flows can enhance, 
rather than detract from or compromise, state power. (p. 185) 
The policy link clearly articulates the role of states in structuring response to migration. Her analysis 
makes the point that states make decisions that affect the relationship between themselves and migrants; 
they can choose to “regime stretch” (Betts, 2013) in order to capitalize on the resources and economic 
opportunities afforded by incoming migrants.  
Arguing that border regulation serves as evidence that globalization has not eroded state 
sovereignty, Adamson (2006) examines external sovereignty in terms of border control using Krasner’s 
(2001) concept of interdependence sovereignty. While this migration flow may challenge the capacities of 
“weak and failing states” (Adamson, 2006, p. 176), it provides an opportunity for others to demonstrate 
effective border control mechanisms. In many cases, however, the existence of placeless persons 
demonstrates a breakdown of domestic authority and control as humanitarian interventions encroach 
upon state politics (Barnett, 2001). Likewise, aspects of state control over international borders become 
challenged by mass migrations from one territory to another (Jacobsen, 1996). The dysfunction of 
domestic authority and border control problems related to forced migration ultimately affect the state at 
both domestic and international levels, demonstrating the many facets of sovereignty that maintain 
importance for the pursuit of resources, power, and recognition. In fact, as Barnett (2001) argues, 
preservation of state sovereignty shaped the entirety of the international refugee regime, including the 
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original scope of the UNHCR and legal aspects of refugee protection laid out in the international 
conventions. 
My interest here is not in whether globalization erodes sovereignty (Bauman, 2004) or if the state 
should be the level of analysis in international relations theory, as are often debated in IR scholarship. 
Instead, I assume that states matter because place and territory continue to have relevance in the world 
today, particularly for those who lack legitimized space and belonging in the international system 
(Benhabib, 2004; M. Weber, 1946). Specifically, states still notionally maintain control of cross-border 
movements of people and goods, as well as the power to confer or deny citizenship rights (Adamson, 
2006). Territory, as a unit of analysis, is most readily defined in terms of a state, which Max M. Weber 
(1946) famously defined as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory” (M. Weber, 1946). Sovereignty, whether degraded or not, 
matters to states because it grants access to international recognition and reasserts territorially based 
domestic authority, which ultimately leads to more resources and power (Krasner, 2006). Clinging to the 
notion of sovereignty for access to resources and power is one particular aspect of state survival in an 
international system (Bull, 2012); one which relates directly to potential motivations for state responses to 
protracted displacement and placelessness.  
In the following sections, I review four aspects of sovereignty—material/functional, 
ideational/normative, domestic/internal, and international/external—to demonstrate how states 
sovereignty is challenged by forced displacement and how the push and pull factors at the regional, state, 
and local level contribute to the permanence of refugee situations. The macroscopic view of global politics 
at the state and international level sheds some light on the possible reasons for enduring forms of 
refugeehood through examination of humanitarian economics, humanitarian intervention, state security 
concerns, and regional security.  
MATERIAL/FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
One particularly salient aspect of state sovereignty manifests as economic opportunities and 
losses. On the one hand, economic losses constitute a serious motivator for containing refugees in 
camps in order to mitigate the effects of population increases and needs in urban areas. Encampment 
provides the additional benefit of keeping the refugees in one area to make humanitarian aid provision 
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easier. On the other hand, economic opportunities afforded over the long-term, as refugee stays become 
protracted, may offset the cost of hosting and in fact provide incentives for maintaining encamped 
populations. This section focuses on the economics of refugee hosting in order to reveal possible drivers 
for durability in encamped refugee situations.  
Displaced populations have a complex effect on the economies of host nations. Jacobsen (2005) 
points to the economic impact on host communities resulting from the “fluidity” of camp populations. She 
explains that residents may leave the camp for a variety of reasons including seeking employment or 
returning home to assess the political/security climate. This shifts the population at various times during 
the displacement and settlement process, resulting in varying potential for economic opportunities and 
impacts on host communities (Jacobsen, 2005, pp. 7-8). In many ways, the influx of placeless persons 
causes an extreme burden on the system, where state money diverts from local projects to meet the 
demand for humanitarian aid and/or containment of the displaced. As these patterns emerge, local 
economies must also adjust to the influx of labor and services. Even among short-term refugee 
displacement, teasing out the economic conditions and beneficiaries of displacement is a very complex 
endeavor (Chambers, 1986).  For example, increased resource scarcity in the host country diminishing a 
state’s public service provision can result in conflicts over resources between the host community and 
refugees (Adamson, 2006, pp. 179-180). Furthermore, containment in camps can often prevent full 
economic interaction with the surrounding communities, making refugees extremely dependent on 
humanitarian aid, while limiting market opportunities for both the refugees and the local host communities 
(Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 10). 
Displaced populations can also greatly strain the local environment, causing degradation of the 
land where camps are built, and forest depletion for firewood (Chambers, 1986; UNHCR, 2009). 
Jacobsen (1997) notes, however, that often this immediate environmental strain is temporary and 
characteristic only of the initial flight. Over time, this may balance out (Jacobsen, 1997), which appears to 
be the case in Rwanda. Host countries often use containing the extent of the environmental stress 
produced by a sudden influx of refugees as a reason for keeping refugees confined to camp spaces, 
rather than spreading displaced populations more evenly throughout local communities (Jacobsen, 1997). 
Jacobsen’s (1997) research suggests that concentrated camp settlements can, in fact, be more harmful 
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to the surrounding environment and communities. In particular, settlements can put severe strains on 
agricultural lands, keeping them from laying fallow to restore soil fertility as well as accumulating waste 
and chemicals in the camp soil from pest control and sanitation (Jacobsen, 1997). While core to the wider 
consideration of the impact of refugees on the existing environmental systems, these ecological 
preservation concerns may also at times mask other motivations for containment that are likely more 
closely related to security concerns and the control of human movement. For these reasons, analysis of 
the cost of displacement must consider the intersecting impacts of economic, social, environmental, and 
political burdens on host populations.   
While examining the negative consequences of displacement on hosting countries, the literature 
suggests simultaneous benefits. For example, refugees can boost the local and national economy. 
Though precise metrics for analyzing this relationship are still being developed, refugees contribute to the 
economy by providing labor, engaging in market activities, and participating in agricultural activities 
(Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 10-11; World Bank, 2012). Increased aid and infrastructure built around 
displaced persons camps may also provide benefits to surrounding communities through access to 
services offered by aid agencies, jobs in camp support and administration, and economic demand for 
local goods (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 70-71; Zetter, 2012, pp. 50-51). Likewise, humanitarian 
agencies may boost local markets by purchasing goods for the displaced and themselves (Jacobsen, 
1996, p. 667). An example of this is when surrounding populations make use of clinic services within 
refugee camps that might otherwise be too far away for easy access (Kiziba AHA Clinic Director, personal 
communication, 13 March 2011). Even this relationship, however, is complicated by the conditions of the 
host community when the refugees arrive. In the short-term, services and medical and educational 
institutions are often stretched too thin for resources to be of much use to host communities. In the long-
term, if these resources become better funded or less in demand by the refugee population, host 
communities may receive access to services they might not otherwise have (Chambers, 1986).  
As Zetter (2012) points out, these economic costs and benefits to the host country and 
communities are unequally distributed, with many of the positive impacts to the economy only apparent in 
the long-term while the negative effects are more easily visible in the short-term. In particular, the poorest 
segment of the host population may feel the economic burden the most as wages drop and commodity 
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prices rise due to increased population sizes and economic demands in the local area (Whitaker, 2002; 
Zetter, 2012, p. 52). This may lead to grievances by the local community against the refugees, who reap 
the benefits of aid intervention and enjoy privileges above the surrounding community in terms of better 
access to public services (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 33). The influx of refugees adds layers to the host 
countries’ social stratification, a point that complicates further integration and may fuel animosity towards 
the newcomers’ access to infrastructure development. Chambers (1986) notes,  
This longer-term gain is even more problematical if the host country faces fiscal crises for 
its recurrent budget, with the dismal possibility that more schools and clinics built for 
refugees and hosts will later mean that the same very scarce recurrent resources for 
textbooks, drugs and the like will have to be spread out more thinly, with the likelihood 
that the poorer will once again be losers. (p. 253) 
Accordingly, host countries must contend with the likely length of refugees’ stay, and make complex and 
often contested decisions about the appropriate investment in resources to sustain the population.  
Jacobsen (2005) observes that the fluidity of the settlement process for placeless persons further 
complicates the economic relationship between displacement and the host community. While host 
governments might recommend or even require refugees to live in contained spaces such as camps, they 
often come and go in a “broad strategy of survival.” At times, this strategy requires them to leave the 
camp in search of work or repatriation options, then later return to make use of camp schools, visit friends 
and family, or escape outside conditions of insecurity, among other reasons (Jacobsen, 2005, pp. 6-8). 
Likewise, surrounding populations benefit from camp communities by entering to trade, sell, or access 
resources such as healthcare within the camps (Kiziba AHA Clinic Director, personal communication, 13 
March 2011; field observation notes, 6 June 2014). While local outsiders may pass freely through the 
camp borders for the benefit of trade and services, for the majority of refugees, income and economic 
livelihood relies almost entirely on the informal economy (Jacobsen, 2005, p. 11).  This means of 
economic survival situates displaced populations even further beyond the reach of the state, while 
solidifying their exchange relations across camp borders with the local community. Paradoxically, the 
relationship between forced migrants and the informal economy could become a reinforcing system in 
which refugees and local communities benefit from increased trade, thereby economically entrenching 
and stabilizing the displacement through processes that integrate refugees into a larger system that leads 
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to protraction. These circumstances inscribe socio-economic relations between refugee and local 
populations in ways that could reach a point where the economic health of host communities relies 
extensively on one refugee populations’ participation, thereby entangling one another in a mutually 
beneficial monetary relationship of potential long-term dependency.  
The existing World Bank research shows very little focus on the positive impacts of displaced 
populations on host communities, though negative impacts are often highlighted. Most contemporary 
reports speculate that a focus on the benefits of refugee displacement may reveal that properly managed 
humanitarian assistance could have “…important positive social and economic impacts on society as a 
whole,” suggesting a further need for micro and macro-economic assessments for conditions such as 
housing and economic livelihood (World Bank, 2012, pp. 11, 40). Jacobsen (1996) theorizes, “The 
economic capacity of the host country to absorb refugees is determined by such factors as land 
availability, the carrying capacity of the land, employment patterns, and infrastructure” (p. 667). Her use of 
the term “absorption” is important here because it captures both the “ability and willingness” aspects of 
refugee hosting—including both positive and negative associations. By taking on the care of displaced 
populations, states may both incur burden and confer opportunities, which poses complex considerations 
of governance and resource allocation. 
 Particularly in the case of developing countries, the possibility that refugees may increase 
economic livelihoods may merit serious incentives for states to sustain hosting and long-term camps. 
Historically, forced migrant populations under certain conditions have had active transnational trading 
relationships which foster regional economic growth. The viability of these types of markets, however, 
depends largely on the domestic policies of the host nation (Chambers, 1986, p. 255). Overall, the short 
and long-term effects of refugee hosting are complex and highly dependent on the conditions of the host 
nation, as Chambers (1986) outlines in his analysis of “which rural hosts gain and which lose” (p. 257). If 
the World Bank researchers’ inference is correct, though short-term economic losses to host nations may 
make displaced populations appear to be burdensome, long-term hosting may have economic payoffs 
that further entrench displacement, in other words incentivizing the permanence of forced migrant 
communities (World Bank, 2012). In this way, protracted displacement becomes economically durable, 
thereby leading to increasing interdependency between displaced populations, local communities, and 
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the national economy. Proper management of the economic policies that provide benefits to the host 
community and country demonstrate competence of national authority that reifies functional sovereignty. 
Mismanagement, restrictive fiscal policies, and scarce existing resources, however, may result in the host 
government losing domestic legitimacy for failing to meet not only obligations to the refugees, but 
responsibilities to its citizenry as well.  
IDEATIONAL/NORMATIVE SOVEREIGNTY 
State sovereignty encompasses normative assumptions that internal affairs and governance 
reside with the state and outside the direct influence of external actors (Krasner, 2006). Forced migration 
across international borders, however, presents challenges to the autonomy of states in the strictest 
sense. As international organizations respond to humanitarian crises, the host state becomes a site of 
international affairs that may interfere or conflict with its own vision for domestic order and processes. 
Humanitarian intervention, however, presents not only challenges to states’ autonomy, but also 
opportunities to reinforce host and sending states’ roles in the international community. This section 
examines humanitarian intervention as both a challenge and opportunity to fortify notions of 
ideational/normative sovereignty. In particular, the opportunities for bolstering sovereignty provide insight 
into how the pursuit and maintenance of state sovereignty contributes to the durability of protracted 
refugee situations.  
International principles of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) complicate interstate tensions by 
providing grounds to intervene in the political issues of another international actor (Evans & Sahnoun, 
2002). Under this premise, sovereignty is a distinction earned by demonstrating competency in facilitating 
international norms; failure to adhere to these conventions provides a window of opportunity for other 
states or international organizations to intervene. This represents yet another layer of state and INGO 
relations regarding displacement and placelessness. R2P impinges on states’ ability to control their own 
governance structures, and can inhibit conflict resolution as we see in the Great Lakes Region of Africa 
(Krasner, 2006). Ideational/normative aspects of sovereignty are particularly important when 
understanding the role of humanitarian intervention within the receiving state. Lischer (2006) emphasizes 
that “the receiving state response is critical to preventing the spread of civil war among violence-prone 
refugee groups, whether classified as persecuted or a state in exile” (p. 28), where the final outcome 
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depends heavily on the host nation’s capacity and willingness to prevent violence. Clearly international 
actors have great incentive to intervene when characteristics and responses of the receiving state 
account for much of the outcome of refugees and potential violence in the region.  
Jacobsen (1996) stresses the complicated relationship that emerges between refugee receiving 
states and international organizations and actors. On the one hand, humanitarian organizations operate 
in refugee camps and crisis areas almost entirely off of the good will and understanding of the receiving 
state. According to her, cultural and religious aspects of the host state influence receptiveness of 
refugees (Jacobsen, 1996). In the case of Rwanda, one cannot help but wonder if there is a connection 
between the country’s receptiveness and its turbulent history. With the pronounced national sentiment of 
abandonment by the international community during the 1994 crisis (AFP, 2009; Warner, 2014), it is not 
unreasonable for the comparatively stable Rwandan government to extend asylum to a population facing 
a similar fate. The similarity is also accentuated by the shared linguistic, cultural, and historical 
connections with the Congolese refugees (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 668). While no direct evidence points to 
these links shaping public policy, it could explain the patience and orderliness with which Rwanda 
handles the Congolese refugee population. Betts (2013) refers to this dynamic as “regime-consistent 
stretching.” By this he means the “degree to which the scope of a regime at the national or local level 
takes on tasks that deviate from those prescribed at the global level” (Betts, 2013, p. 34); in this case, 
Rwanda takes on the role of protector and diplomat on behalf of a population with which it empathizes 
above and beyond the norms of refugee protection. It is “consistent” in that in conforms to the “underlying 
purpose of the regime” (Betts, 2013, p. 34), in this case a public ‘never again’ stance. Here we see that 
states’ receptiveness and refugee policies reflect state interests and political objectives. Humanitarian 
intervention, however, can interrupt ideational/normative sovereignty when international organizations 
force themselves into what should be autonomous state affairs, from the host state’s perspective.  
Even relying on the goodwill or receptiveness of host nations, international organizations have 
used the “threat of bad international publicity” to pressure receiving state to alter state policies or for 
“political consideration in shaping their [policy] responses” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 665). This kind of coercive 
pressure erodes the notion of sovereignty and international understandings of nonintervention (Krasner, 
2006). Jacobsen (2000) qualifies the scope of international organizations’ powers in state affairs by noting 
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the disproportionate advantage they have during an immediate refugee crisis. Observing the financial and 
logistical advantage of organizations like UNHCR during a refugee influx, she observes “this institutional 
weakness gives the better-financed and more experienced UNHCR and other refugee organizations an 
advantage…and limits the host government’s ability to resist their pressure” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 664). 
These powers of the UNHCR during immediate forced migration point to factors that erode normative 
sovereignty, but also imply that this power shifts in favor of the state in the long term. As immediate 
financing and logistic coordination becomes less applicable, namely in cases of protracted refugee 
situations, the state may regain those aspects of sovereignty abdicated for the purposes of addressing an 
immediate emergency.  
Brown (2013) disagrees with the conventional notion that humanitarian aid relationships 
undermine sovereignty. Pointing to receiving states’ ability to negotiate deals and aid relationships with 
humanitarian organizations, he argues that these interactions reinforce sovereignty rather than 
deconstruct it. This is evidenced by the ability of states to negotiate the terms of assistance. He does, 
however, concede that “African policy autonomy may indeed be severely compromised by the aid 
relationship” due to terms and conditions developed and enforced by international organizations (Brown, 
2013, p. 273). Ultimately, Brown (2013) finds that while states sacrifice some degree of autonomy to 
humanitarian intervention, sovereignty forms the foundation of the relationship between aid organizations 
and receiving nations as they collectively determine the terms and conditions of their relationship. 
Jacobsen (1996) supports these conclusions when she summarizes the complicated push and pull 
factors between receiving state and international organizations. She explains,  
In sum, the need for assistance, the avoidance of negative publicity, and institutional 
weakness all move the host government toward interaction with the international refugee 
regime which, in turn, pressures the government towards more positive refugee policies 
and practices. However, as noted, this relationship is not a straightforward one; 
interaction is accompanied by countervailing tendencies such as host government 
leverage over international organizations and sensitivities about sovereignty which may 
offset the positive influence of the international refugee regime. (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 664) 
Barnett (2001) further complicates this state/humanitarian organization relationship by following the 
development of the UNHCR and connecting the organization’s policies with the interests of donor 
international actors—in other words, wealthy donor states. This relationship, he finds, developed into one 
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in which “by the early 1990s UNHCR was quickly becoming more deeply enmeshed in the internal affairs 
of states” (Barnett, 2001, p. 259). In this way his research implies that UNHCR intervention may in fact 
represent the erosion of receiving states’ sovereignty in the interests of a wide variety of international 
actors, including wealthy donor nations of the global North.  
Camp management in Rwanda echoes this complex relationship between the UNHCR and the 
Rwanda Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR). While the camp bears the 
signage of UNHCR, it is an entity operated and controlled by the Rwandan government through 
MIDIMAR. UNHCR outsources many of the service provisions (e.g. health, education, sanitation, food 
and firewood, and economic livelihood projects) to smaller international organizations; MIDIMAR sets the 
terms of these organizations, from establishing the educational curriculum to align with national 
standards, to monitoring elections and security within the camp. UNHCR’s presence implies some degree 
of aid dependency, and therefore power in shaping certain refugee policies (such as changing policies on 
the right to work) (personal communication, Minister Mukantabana of MIDIMAR, 13 June 2014). Rwanda, 
however, exercises its autonomy and independence by determining the flavor and scope of the aid 
administered to Congolese refugees camps. The UNHCR balances intervention with some deference to 
state autonomy. Similarly, MIDIMAR sacrifices some degree of its sovereignty in the strictest sense in 
order to gain a healthy working relationship with this INGO. In this way, refugee hosting both challenges 
and provides opportunities for states expression of sovereignty. Effective hosting nations, such as 
Rwanda, reap the rewards of international recognition and balanced non-interventionist approaches on 
the part of international actors though the obligatory relationship with UNHCR and other INGOs. Properly 
managed, this give-and-take relationship between the host nation and the international community results 
disincentives to dismantle protracted crises, specifically by promoting access to resources and 
international recognition as a functional global actor.  
INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The previous two sections dealt specifically with material/functional and ideational/normative 
aspects of sovereignty that point to incentives that states may have to perpetuate displacement. Each of 
those cases could also be classified as components of internal and external sovereignty, as they address 
state gains and losses in terms of economic and political aspects of refugee hosting. The following 
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section looks at internal sovereignty through the lens of security to understand motivators that exist to 
perpetuate placelessness and contribute to durability of camp situations.  
Forced migration has been recognized since the post-Cold War era as both a cause and 
consequence of insecurity (Abuya, 2010; Adamson, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 2006; 
Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). As such, it requires a 
humanitarian response and often armed intervention on behalf of refugees, either to contain or protect 
forced migrant populations (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 24-26). In terms of domestic sovereignty, 
placelessness has both direct and indirect concerns. Particularly in the case of resource-scarce states, an 
influx of displaced persons creates pressure on already strained resources, leading to animosity from the 
host communities as well as severe government destabilization for those unable to accommodate the 
influx (Adamson, 2006). Additionally, the displaced can contribute to pre-existing ethnic tensions, for 
example by tipping the balance of a minority group to the majority (Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher, 1992; 
Milner, 2011). Displaced populations have also been commonly associated with armed group 
movements, either by providing resources or serving as combatants (Abuya, 2010; Lischer, 2006; 
Muggah, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). In some cases, porous borders provide a gateway for political 
movement across international lines, which can challenge the internal sovereignty of each of the sending 
and receiving states. As Adamson (2006) points out, these challenges are particularly acute in developing 
countries which host the largest number of refugees in the world. Some scholars argue, however, that 
truly understanding the insecurity that accompanies forced migration requires a more complete picture of 
the political context of both sending and receiving countries, as well as the population of refugees 
themselves (Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005b).  
Containing placeless persons in camps is one way that the government can preserve its domestic 
order and demonstrate effectiveness in managing its own internal affairs. As Jacobsen (1996) notes, 
“Even when there are no potential ethnic problems, governments may prefer to house refugees in camps 
because doing so reduces their political saliency within the local community. Refugees in camps are more 
easily monitored, controlled, and registered, all of which also facilitate eventual repatriation” (p. 673). 
Loescher and Milner (2005b) concur with this analysis of refugee camps as political and economic 
containment units. They explain,  
63 
Due consideration of the indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees may pose to 
host states has been lacking in both the research on and policy towards refugee 
movements. In these cases, it is not the refugee that is a threat to the host state, but the 
context within which the refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum 
question for many states. Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now 
present refugee populations as security threats to justify actions that would not otherwise 
be permissible, such as denying refugees freedom of movement, preventing new arrivals 
of refugees and, in exceptional circumstances, carrying out mass expulsions. (2005b, p. 
34) 
The geographic control of refugees within the camp space not only keeps the state and humanitarian 
agents in control of the influx of people, but it can also act as a management strategy to limit violence and 
prevent an upset in the balance of power among communities outside of the camp (Loescher & Milner, 
2005b, p. 33). As explained by Foucault (2007), the very layout of the camp serves as a mechanism of 
control—a “milieu” that serves as a conduit of state power through a population on which the modern 
concept of sovereignty relies. From a human geography perspective, Hyndman (2000) argues that camp 
spaces specifically reflect the interest of authoritative powers, that of NGOs and host governments, thus 
privileging certain aspects of camp life over others, namely gendered women’s work.   
When the host state government is weak and does not effectively utilize the camp space as a 
milieu for power, problematic results can occur. Numerous scholars and policymakers have attributed the 
ongoing violence in the DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the ways in which the international 
community handled the massive influx of refugees (Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005a; Stedman & 
Tanner, 2003). After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutu refugees who fled to the DRC were confined to 
camps where militants and exiled political leaders intermingled with the forced migrants. During their time 
in these camps, international aid fed and supplied the population, despite the known fact that these 
civilians provided resources for those perpetuating local and regional instability (Adelman, 2003). As a 
state in exile, with governance structures relatively intact after fleeing Rwanda, this group of forced 
migrants was primed to become a security threat for the region (Lischer, 2006). Adelman (2003) takes 
this a step further, implicating the international community in “powerlessness and unwillingness to take 
any risks” that perpetuated the violence in the DRC, and ultimately lead to a civil war in the late 1990s—
which continues to rage on in the eastern provinces (Mamdani, 2001; Stearns, 2011). Again, the political 
and economic dimensions of the refugee crisis emerge, rendering the international community’s 
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humanitarian aid programs as only temporary and insufficient bandages for such complex security 
concerns (Adelman, 2003). 
The effect of the refugee crisis that burgeoned into a civil war and continues to cause regional 
instability in Central Africa has had far-reaching consequences for African state policies. Namely, the 
increasingly common view that refugees contribute to state and regional insecurity positions refugees as 
vital actors in state and international relations (Muggah, 2006). According to Loescher and Milner,  
These refugee populations are seen not as passive victims of persecution and conflict, 
but as active agents engaged in the politics not only of their country of origin but also in 
the host country and the wider region, and thus as a potential source of instability on a 
scale similar to that witnessed in Central Africa in the 1990s. (2005b, p. 9)  
In fact, the burden of hosting placeless persons with no foreseeable resolution can be seen as destructive 
to national sovereignty, an opinion heavily influenced by the negative publicity of “refugee warriors” that 
affect local and regional insecurity (Loescher, 1992). This burden of potential security concerns is 
compounded by a general global decline in humanitarian aid and development assistance as well as 
international impositions on national economies in developing countries based on terms of structural 
adjustment programs.  
These conditions leave host governments less willing to receive refugees who may be placeless 
for an extended period of time; some national policies have even become increasingly hostile to forced 
migrants (Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b). Often, this results in national policies influenced by 
xenophobic belief systems held by citizens and politicians. In some cases, however, integration is eased 
by close ethnic and linguistic ties, as may be the case with the Banyarwanda (Loescher, 1992). One 
advantage of their socio-linguistic ties with Rwandans may be the ease with which they remain in 
protracted limbo and interact with the host government. Despite this potential for relatively seamless local 
integration, the stated preference of most refugees in this study is to return “home” to the DRC even 
though they are considered “outsiders” in that country and used as scapegoats for many of its social and 
political problems (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 27-31). This particular case is striking because of the 
close proximity between the host country and the Congolese refugees’ home country, literally just across 
the lake from the camp and visible on a very clear day. The separation represents a very distinct case of 
refugee management within the context of close ethnic ties punctuated by the policies of separation 
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enacted across this highly politicized and symbolic border. As this section demonstrates, the heightened 
security concerns and subsequent restrictive refugee policies that arise justify encampment rather than 
exploration of alternative solutions, including local integration. Regardless of whether the security threats 
are real or merely perceived, containment in human warehouses perpetuates the length of human lives 
held in limbo, and as is further explored in subsequent chapters, contributes to durability of displacement 
through processes of economic, political, and social isolation. 
EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The threat of security does not only affect internal sovereignty. In fact, it underlies much of the 
dialog on forced migration at the macro-level of analysis. The idea that refugees contribute to interstate, 
regional, and international insecurity is hardly contested. A number of studies address the idea that 
refugee flows contribute to the spread of conflict (DIPS, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & 
Milner, 2005a, 2005b; Mhembu-Salter, 2006; Milner, 2011; Muggah, 2006, 2010; Murison, 2002; 
Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Refugees may be directly or indirectly involved in this 
security threat (Loescher & Milner, 2005a; Milner, 2011; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), but for many of the 
reasons already described here, forced migration increasingly takes on the connotation of insecurity in 
international discussions of cross-border human movement.  
Lischer (2006) develops a more nuanced understanding of why certain types of refugee 
populations result in conflict while others do not. She points to gaps in the literature addressing 
militarization of refugees that fail to recognize the types of populations, actions of state and non-state 
actors, and types of violence that arise. By more carefully analyzing particular refugee flows and 
subsequent violence or lack thereof, she implicates both sending and receiving countries, international 
actors, and refugees in the potential for the spread of conflict. Only by separating out the types of 
violence and actions of all parties involved can we begin to understand the correlation between forced 
migration and the spread of conflict (Lischer, 2006). The resultant challenge that forced migration poses 
to managing conflict with neighboring sending and/or receiving states necessitates international 
engagement that reinforces notions of external sovereignty and interdependence with global actors more 
broadly.  
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As mentioned above, refugees feature both overtly and discretely as tools of foreign policy. 
Explaining this in more detail, Loescher (1992) claims that refugee flows are “purposefully created as a 
strategic policy tool” where “Mass expulsions can…be used to destabilize or embarrass neighboring 
states which are strategic or political adversaries” (pp. 29, 32). Protracted and recurring refugee situations 
constitute a major concern for regional and international security, resulting in a number of threats such as 
camp militarization, insurgency, and recruitment of child soldiers (Loescher & Milner, 2005a). Additional 
security threats arise from third-party intervention, where refugees become tools of proxy wars and 
subsequently instruments of regional instability, whether intended or not (Adelman, 2003; Loescher & 
Milner, 2005a, 2005b; Muggah, 2010; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). Refugees also pose significant hurdles 
in peace-building processes. This occurs both at the negotiation table when armed refugee groups have 
committed violence against sending and/or receiving state, but also when the fate of long-staying 
refugees are considered only as a hindsight, rather than part of the peace-building efforts (Milner, 2011). 
Without making concerted efforts to include refugees in peace-building initiatives, Milner (2011) argues 
that international actors may be neglecting a crucial component to lasting peace. Given the role of 
refugees in both creating and sustaining instability between host and sending states as well as the 
international community at large, it is easy to see forced migration as a cause and consequence of 
conflict. The complex relationship between refugees and violence entrenches certain populations in 
unending limbo as peace-building efforts fail and continued protraction breeds potential sources of 
renewed conflict. As the work of these scholars shows, viewing these relationships through the lens of 
external sovereignty and state interdependence sheds light on the ways in which temporary displacement 
can become increasingly permanent.  
DURABLE MACRO-LEVEL INCENTIVES 
In summary, rather than a concrete answer about whether forced migration in fact erodes 
sovereignty, the survey of literature presented above further complicates the role of the state in 
international relations. I start with the assumption that states still matter in IR because territory and 
citizenship remain linked in ways most highlighted by those denied a physical and political place in the 
international arena. The purpose was not to determine a definitive conclusion about state sovereignty, but 
instead to demonstrate that by unpacking the term into its parts and varieties, we uncover a complex web 
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of political processes interacting at international, national, and local levels. By viewing sovereignty as a 
macro-level concept, we see that states may have some economic and political incentives for maintaining 
populations in protracted displacement. The motivators for contributing to protracted displacement include 
state interests in material/functional resources and ideational/normative recognition locally, regionally, 
and internationally. As Krasner (2006) explains, states will violate the norms of sovereignty “in inventive 
ways” to satisfy their needs for autonomy and independence (p. 665), which includes negotiation and 
sacrifice of some forms of the power that accompanies statehood and international recognition. These 
systems work for and against each other creating, what I argue, is a state of durable displacement, where 
refugees move from temporariness into perpetual and permanent limbo.  
In terms of internal sovereignty, refugees challenge the host nation to demonstrate its capacity to 
provide for its citizens by putting pressure on economic resources and posing threats to national security. 
Containment in refugee camps serves to preserve domestic order and provides the opportunity for states 
to demonstrate competency in caring for a non-citizen other. In fact, capitalizing on the label of a specific 
kind of migrant, the refugee, may confer state access to aid and resources that incentivize hosting. 
Through this relationship, the state may develop its own dependence, both economic and political on the 
hosted refugee population.  
Externally, refugee populations also challenge and serve as a resource for defining the notion of 
sovereignty. While forced migration across borders intensify border control operations and relationships 
with neighboring states, including increased potential for interstate conflict, the burden-sharing aspect of 
refugee hosting presents a set of opportunities for states to reassert themselves in international power 
dynamics. Through a give and take relationship, international humanitarian organizations and states 
negotiate terms of aid, administrate funds and resources, and thereby manage power dynamics between 
the host state and the wider international community. As each actor attempts to manipulate the other to 
gain more resource access, recognition, and/or power, they create a dependency between them that 
incentivizes protracted displacement. Additionally, the push and pull factors that create forced migrations 
creates insider/outsider dynamics at an international level. The host nations enter into the international 
arena as functioning partners in the refugee regime, while the sending countries become othered as 
“failed states” or dysfunctional political entities. By not conforming to the norms of sovereignty, these 
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states experience challenges to access power, resources, and recognition in the larger international 
community. This status expels them from the benefits of external sovereignty, a position that may lead to 
instability and protracted displacement for the refugees it produced.  
Again, these macro-level views of protraction—with the state as the central actor seeking to 
preserve sovereignty in a larger international system—provides some insight into possible state and 
system-level motivations for maintaining refugees in protracted encampment. In general, sovereignty 
reveals that host states gain some benefits for hosting in the long term, particularly political influence and 
economic growth. The benefits, however, do not necessarily speak to social and individual reasons that 
camps may stay in protracted limbo for increasingly long periods of time. As later chapters reveal, 
refugees themselves are not devoid of agency and, based on the UN Charter granting refugees freedom 
of movement, they can and do spontaneously repatriate or migrate without consideration for international 
policies or host-state benefits.  
INCOMPLETE MACRO-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS 
What does this mean for the long-term? As Loescher and Milner (2005b) observe, “It is essential 
to recognize that protracted refugee situations have political causes, and therefore require more than 
humanitarian solutions” (p. 18). The discussion on sovereignty and forced migration above illuminated 
some of these political causes that contribute to extended periods of refugeehood. Where Loescher and 
Milner (2005b) emphasize the need to better integrate regional political and security considerations into 
policy development for durable solutions, and Milner (2011) underlines the importance of including 
refugees in peace-building initiatives, I do not believe these considerations address the complexity of the 
entire system. These scholars see states’ failures to act or engage in the peace-building processes as 
sources of protraction. This leaves the international organizations, specifically UNHCR, to monitor and 
administer the entirety of refugees’ needs, thus eliminating long-term options for durable solutions. 
Through the discussion of varieties of sovereignty, however, it is clear that states do act, but it is in 
preservation of their own self-interests—defined as sovereignty here—and in reaction to the 
consequences of their interactions in the larger international state system. Loescher and Milner’s many 
years of research into security, refugees, and peace-building does demonstrate the principles that both 
sending and receiving states must contribute to a long-term solution. However, their extensive studies do 
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not account for the motivations of states within the larger IR arena, thereby providing an incomplete 
framework for evaluating ways to engage actors contributing to durable solutions.  
STATE AND STATE-LIKE ACTORS 
MESOSCOPIC LENS OF POSTCOLONIALISM 
Sovereignty and burden-sharing provide insights into macroscopic views of displacement and 
possible incentives states and international actors have for maintaining protracted refugee cases. 
Zooming in to the issue of long-staying refugees, a postcolonial lens also provides perspective, 
particularly in the context of Africa. The relevance of state sovereignty, in relation to the Western-imposed 
Westphalian state ideal, has long been contested in Africa, where a distinct history of colonial rule 
imposed constructed nation-state divides often through larger ethnic, linguistic, and tribal communities 
(Dowden, 2012; Grovogui, 2002; Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Hagmann & Péclard, 2010; Notshulwana, 2011; 
Sidaway, 2003). Many scholars and popular media outlets claim that colonial powers arbitrarily drew 
African borders; however, others have shown this to be an oversimplification of history (Green, 2012; 
Mbembe, 2000; Touval, 1966). Mbembe (2000) asserts that although Africans did not participate in 
determining colonial boundaries, “…this does not necessarily mean that they were arbitrary”; instead, 
they reflect socio-cultural and economic factors surrounding European and African interactions long 
before formal colonization and boundary delineation (Mbembe, 2000, pp. 264-265).  
Though these borders were not arbitrary, they did most often serve the political and economic 
interests of colonial powers rather than those of the people in border communities; for this reason, 
borders serve as a starting point for many discussions on the failure of governance in postcolonial Africa. 
Bezabeh (2011) avoids the temptation to attribute citizenship and sovereignty ambiguities in Africa, 
especially in DRC, to problems of states “in the making” that suffer from legacy problems left behind by 
colonialism. He instead connects “…the problems surrounding issues of citizenship to the logic of 
sovereignty and state, rather than the peculiarity of the African state or the sense of rootedness” 
(Bezabeh, 2011, p. 590). Likewise, Hagmann and Péclard (2010) find among the consensus of studies on 
Africa that states are “historical processes” which are “deeply embedded in social forces” (p. 542). African 
states build unique conceptualizations of sovereignty over time as necessary to facilitate their own 
political processes. Regardless of its complex origins, the fact that the DRC has been enmeshed in civil 
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conflict for nearly two decades presents serious obstacles to sovereign state operations (Kraxberger, 
2012; Reyntjens, 2007). These challenges manifest in the form of refugee flows across international 
borders into neighboring countries and contribute to the exceptionally long periods these former DRC 
residents and citizens spend in exile.  
The roots of these pressures on internal sovereignty derive long before independence from 
colonial powers spread throughout the Great Lakes Region and arguably begin with the history of 
European influences in Rwanda and eastern DRC. These social forces bubbled into waves of violence—
most recently the 1994 genocide in Rwanda—that underlie much of the modern migration story in the 
Great Lakes Region. Imaginatively contrived race relations constructed by early explorers shaped the 
subsequent ruling strategies colonial powers in the region. In these systems, colonial overseers granted 
social and political privileges along race/ethnic lines as it suited their needs. Pointing to this confluence of 
race and colonial powers’ inflation of social stratification in Rwanda, Prunier (1995) summarizes the 
impending violent future by explaining,  
The result of this heavy bombardment with highly value-laden stereotypes for some sixty 
years ended by inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings 
until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex. If we combine 
these subjective feelings with the objective political and administrative decisions of the 
colonial authorities favouring one group over the other, we can begin to see how a very 
dangerous social bomb was almost absent-mindedly manufactured throughout the 
peaceful years of abazungu [white, European] domination. (p. 9) 
Mamdani (2001) further explains that when the rights and privileges are granted based on constructed 
lines of race and ethnicity, these identities become political, not cultural or biological.  
Belgium took over administration of Rwanda from Germany after WWI as a UN trust territory on 
the path to independence, which it gained in 1962 (Kiwuwa, 2012; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 1988). The 
Belgians extended and adapted their system for a “native policy” in which certain groups were privileged 
above others, socially stratifying the population by choosing local chiefs primarily from among the Tutsi 
(Kiwuwa, 2012; T. Turner, 2007). In the 1920s, the Belgians orchestrated land re-distribution whereby 
Rwandese became local overseers of the people on those lands. The Belgians grouped these land areas 
into a hierarchical structure that reported directly to the Belgian authorities. Generally Tutsi, these 
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intermediaries served the wishes of the Belgians and helped to administer control over the population 
(Newbury, 1988).  
Colonial era policies institutionalized divisive social and legal mechanisms, a legacy that 
continues to shape conflict and politics in the region (Kiwuwa, 2012; Newbury, 1988; Steinmetz, 2007). 
Mamdani (2001) summarizes this multi-layered approach by observing, “Through its discourse on race 
and ethnicity, the colonial state tried to naturalize political differences, not only between the colonizer and 
the colonized, but also—and this is the important point here—between two kinds of colonized: those 
indigenous and those not” (2001, p. 27). Citizenship and belonging as prerequisites to access power and 
resources continue characterize the conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Mamdani (2001) describes a 
“bifurcated state: civic and ethnic” (p. 28) where parts of society were governed by established legal 
systems and others by customary law; this fact, compounded by “institutionally entrenched 
discriminations” (p. 29), left the bottom of the race hierarchy, the Hutu, as “the core victims of colonial 
rule” (p. 27). This conceptualization of socio-political identities in Rwanda is important for understanding 
how deep roots of belonging played a part in the conflict that continues to uproot so many from the Great 
Lakes Region even today.  
Even though a turbulent colonial history lingers in political, economic, and social structures 
throughout the continent, scholars, policymakers, and public media revisit the term “failed state” often 
when reflecting on the political situation of many African nations. In 2013, the DRC ranked number two in 
the Failed States Index (Yonetani & Holladay, 2013) as a result of militia violence—such as that of the 
rebel group M23—rambling out of government control, human rights violations by militias and government 
forces throughout the east, and the growing number of forced migrants (Messner & Lawrence, 2013). 
Additionally, some scholars attribute Africa’s problems with sovereignty and state failure to structural 
inequalities embedded in global hierarchies which enabled colonialism and the subsequent turmoil of 
many African states. Grovogui (2002), for example, notes, “The regimes of sovereignty instituted by 
various modern hegemons have been united by an ethos of hierarchy and privilege, on the one hand, and 
corresponding mechanisms of subordination and discrimination, on the other” (p. 323). Speaking 
specifically about colonialism in Africa, he observes that the “colonial regime of sovereignty” came into 
direct conflict with “African processes and structures of legitimation” (Grovogui, 2002, p. 327). Though this 
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hints at a more systemic reason for state failure in many African countries, sovereignty matters in an 
increasingly interdependent, interconnected world and for that reason, relative governance competency 
measures may still hold some value. Though not all scholars find these rankings productive, the 
conditions measured and the overarching national context play important roles in identifying the capacity 
of those governments to meet the needs of citizens as well as the describing change relative to other 
states (Messner & Lawrence, 2013).  
Scholars may not agree on the validity or relevance of ranking state propensity for failure, 
however, the portrayal of postcolonial African governments in academic arenas is “virtually pathological,” 
where they are often categorized as failed, weak, quasi, or on the verge of collapse (Hagmann & Péclard, 
2010, p. 540). Sidaway (2003) observes, “African states are frequently represented as failed or weak. 
They are compared with sovereignties of the West, measured, weighed and found wanting of the 
strength, power, and effectiveness of western statehood” (p. 160). Use of the term “failed” in reference to 
statehood and sovereignty implies a frame of reference defined entirely from the perspective of 
“successful” states, mainly hegemonic global (north) powers. The DRC, like Somalia, however, 
represents a relatively straightforward case of state failure, with some claiming that it is beyond failure 
and into the realm of “nonstate” for its lack of governance and rampant ongoing violence (Herbst & Mills, 
2013), particularly in the eastern part of the country that is farthest from the capital in Kinshasa and that 
borders Rwanda.  
The phenomenon of a “nonstate” in the Great Lakes Region of Africa exists relatively 
unchallenged; however, this does not reflect disinterest in state sovereignty. Herbst and Mills (2013) 
observe, “African leaders in Congo’s neighborhood who should be most concerned about the country’s 
catastrophe dislike any questioning of state sovereignty, given that many of them do not have full control 
of their own territories” (pp. 78-79). Grappling with their own political turmoil after enduring years of 
colonial rule, neighboring states resist dialog about state sovereignty to preserve public perceptions about 
their own efficacy as international actors. By doing so, they demonstrate a lack of political will to stamp 
out the sources of refugee flows and may participate in long-staying refugee situations. Contributing to 
this strategic silence in the political arena on the validity of DRC’s sovereignty are the economic 
incentives to leave the mineral wealth of the country largely ungoverned (Autesserre, 2008; Eichstaedt, 
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2011; Grovogui, 2002; Herbst & Mills, 2013; Mbembe, 2000; Sidaway, 2003; Vlassenroot & 
Raeymaekers, 2009). The DRC represents a particularly sobering challenge to the notion of a sovereign 
state. Many aspects of its domestic control and international relationships are dysfunctional at best, but in 
most cases non-existent. This case affords an analysis of how foreign aid and multilateral support from 
major powers including the U.S. fail to assure the functional operations of Kinshasa’s central government 
(Autesserre, 2008; Clark, 2004, pp. 57-65; Fidler, 2009; Herbst & Mills, 2013). Deng (2001) sees this as a 
manifestation of a wider problem, however, in which the underlying drivers for conflict in the region stem 
from “…the interconnectedness of the conflict emanating from ethnic marginalization” (p. 184). He 
identifies this as a “problem with boundary making” which extends beyond the physical delineation of 
local, regional, and state borders to include more abstract boundaries such as race, class, identity, 
nationality, and legal status (Deng, 2001, p. 184). In the case of the refugees in this study, ethnic 
marginalization constitutes a primary reason that return to the DRC is a very unlikely solution to their 
protracted displacement. 
The abstract boundaries described by Deng (2001) are an important part of the story of forced 
migration from the DRC into Rwanda, and the wider sense that the DRC government has failed as 
evident in the massive number of displaced refugees. Among those factors that affect public perception of 
the DRC as a failed state, the vast quantity of forced migrants generated in the last 20 years is most 
relevant to this study. The turbulent overarching political, social, and economic context generated a 
migration crisis that spilled beyond the national borders and impacted the daily micro-politics of this 
conflict-laden region. These impacts emerge at the local refugee camp and border community levels. 
Loescher and Milner (2005b) identify “chronic and recurring refugee flows,” such as those between DRC 
and Rwanda, as “a crucial but largely unrecognized component of peace-building processes in failing 
states” (p. 7). These mass movements of people and lack of viable long-term solutions represent 
challenges to the embodiment of sovereignty within the international state system, as discussed above. In 
the larger context of migrant flows that reflect the state of crisis, the case of Banyarwanda refugees 
encapsulates the residual human costs of such unsettled relations, political turmoil, and socio-economic 
divides.  
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Xenophobic and restrictive refugee policies result in othering the non-citizen as a way to reinforce 
notions of nationalism and belonging. This leads the use of citizenship by states and political leaders as a 
tool of exclusion for economic and political gains, as seen in the DRC (Manby, 2009, p. 21). In many 
places, specifically in the Great Lakes region of Africa, this has resulted in autochthonous local political 
systems that exclude “immigrant” descendants of generations past from political and economic 
participation (Bezabeh, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Mbembe, 2000). Scholars have established that 
citizenship crises are the root of many of Africa’s ongoing conflicts, including in the DRC, which resulted 
from the transition to postcolonial independent governments (Mamdani, 2001; Manby, 2009). Manby 
(2009) observes, “Africa’s post-colonial history shows how difficult it has been to create a functioning 
polity from scratch among peoples without a history of common political organization; but also how 
surprisingly persistent is the attachment to the [territorial] units created by the colonizers” (pp. 3-4). Many 
scholars, however, warn that attributing all of the conflict in the Great Lakes region to after effects of 
colonization results in an oversimplification of the underlying causes of the ongoing violence (Mamdani, 
2002; Mbembe, 2000; Niemann, 2007). On top of the political chaos of the postcolonial years came 
feelings of xenophobia left as “…a legacy of resentment of incomers and their privileges that still 
reverberates today” (Manby, 2009, p. 7). From this, a retreat to autochthony resulted in local politics, 
especially in eastern DRC, revolving around socially constructed imaginings of insider/outsider based on 
dates in the historical colonial past, the priorities of which changed with the political tide (Bezabeh, 2011; 
Geschiere, 2009; Mbembe, 2000). For eastern DRC and the Banyarwanda, this resulted in citizenship 
rights and political participation privileges being granted and revoked based on who was in power at the 
time. Bezabeh (2011) emphasizes the importance of placeless persons in this process of nation-building 
by noting, “In fact, the excluded and depoliticized beings are vital to the politically included beings, as they 
are repeatedly used to legitimize those who are at the core of the state” (p. 606). Again, the state most 
readily defines the citizen by establishing what it is not, reinforcing the notion of insider/outsider for the 
purposes of state-building.  
Postcolonialism and the historical context of the region—specifically along the border of Rwanda 
and the DRC—bring to light state-building processes and ethnic marginalization that exacerbate forced 
migration and duration spent in refugee camps. In the case of the Banyarwanda refugees in Rwanda, 
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however, this perspective cannot effectively explain why this group remains in protracted limbo for so 
long. With a shared ethno-linguistic history, residual effects of colonialism do not explain the ongoing 
isolation and discrimination faced by the Banyarwanda refugees experiencing decades of exile in camps. 
Rwanda’s initial hosting response may be at least partially motivated by empathy for the DRC’s political 
turmoil in the wake of independence. In this particular protracted case where local integration appears to 
be a viable alternative to encampment, Rwanda prefers to maintain a containment strategy and keep the 
Banyarwanda as outsiders.  
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
Scholars note that sovereignty is best understood as a spatially and temporally constructed 
concept, the meaning of which has changed throughout history (Grovogui, 2002; Mbembe, 2000; 
Sidaway, 2003; C. Weber, 1995, pp. 1-5). Expanding on this, some scholars describe sovereignty and the 
modern state system as socially constructed; namely, it is “…the normative conception that links 
authority, territory, population (society, nation), and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place 
(the state)” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996b, p. 3). Ultimately, sovereignty is a claim that states make both to 
domestic and international audiences. Refugees contribute to this conversation as states produce and/or 
receive refugees and manage the care of these often long-staying populations. Unpacking the 
relationship between refugees and the social construction of sovereignty helps to reveal state-level 
motivations for maintaining refugees in protracted encampment.  
Claims to sovereignty and establishment as a legitimate entity in the international system conveys 
benefits such as increased domestic support, access to resources such as aid and financing, and power 
at home and abroad. As such, it also ties closely in with burden-sharing and interdependence aspects of 
external sovereignty discussed above. Refugee stays most often prolonged by “political impasses both in 
the country of origin and the country of asylum” (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 37). Beyond nations 
begrudgingly hosting refugees and deteriorating interstate relations, Jacobsen (1996) explains that states 
use forced migration as a bargaining chip in international relations. She observes,  
In agreeing to give asylum to refugees in exchange for increased resettlement quotas or 
financial reimbursement, host governments manipulate the situation to their own 
advantage. By increasing the price of their patience with refugees and calling upon 
donors to finance refugee programs, governments like Pakistan and Ethiopia have 
benefited from the presence of refugees. (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 663) 
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These gains represent both economic and political aspects of international affairs, giving states the power 
to manipulate the good will of international actors in order to reap the benefits from refugee hosting. 
Jacobsen (1996) points to the complex political and economic considerations that receiving governments 
weigh when serving as a host nation for forcibly displaced persons. She draws attention to the fact that 
decisions to host go beyond anticipating access to resources; the decision making process includes 
considerations about relationships with the sending country, political costs of international assistance and 
intervention, and security concerns (p. 674). These benefits associated with “the price of patience” may 
prolong the forced displacement by inhibiting incentives to participate in the peace process. In the case of 
Rwanda, responsibly hosting Congolese refugees for so many years and demonstrating competence in 
cooperating with UNHCR to run the camps contributes the overall image of the country as a “donor 
darling.” Though not directly related to refugee hosting, the public recognition derived by the Rwandan 
government from successful programs in the country funded and supported by international actors likely 
contributed to the country’s acceptance into the UN Security Council in 2012 (Permanent Mission of 
Rwanda to the United Nations, 2013; Republic of Rwanda, 2012).  
Just as states can use autonomy and power conferred through sovereignty to gain access to 
resources and power, these entitlements also become a vulnerability that other political bodies can 
strategically use against them. International state and non-state actors can strategically utilize the mutual 
recognition aspect of international legal sovereignty, for example, as grounds for military or humanitarian 
intervention (i.e., “responsibility to protect”) in another state without its consent (Autesserre, 2008; Ayoob, 
2001; Chesterman, 2003; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Mbembe, 2000). In this way, placeless persons can 
become a tool with which state actors manipulate the definition of sovereignty in the international arena to 
justify cross-border intervention. Likewise, demonstrating effective or even exemplary hosting of 
displaced communities can serve as evidence for legitimacy in the international state system. Betts 
(2009a) describes the complex relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian crises as “the 
gradual shift away from absolute and unconditional state sovereignty toward recognition of the need for 
states to earn sovereignty through their respect for human rights” (emphasis mine) (p. 44).  
In the case of the massive flow of refugees from the DRC, the existence of—and even the act of 
hosting—refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons originating from that country could provide a way for 
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adversarial states to demonstrate the government in Kinshasa’s inability to provide security to its own 
population. With frequent reference to the DRC as a “failed state” in the international arena (Kraxberger, 
2012; Reyntjens, 2007), a considerable political weakness in terms of state sovereignty exists along the 
Rwanda/Congo border. This provides justification for other international actors to manipulate the concepts 
of sovereignty for the purposes of stabilizing the region or to pursue humanitarian intervention, thereby 
masking any underlying political and economic motives (Hege et al., 15 November 2012; Longman, 
2002). Additionally, Rwanda as a host country demonstrates, through proper and efficient management of 
refugees, its own legitimacy as a sovereign nation capable of effective domestic administration of camp 
security and provisions, management of refugee flows across borders, and supervision of humanitarian 
agencies within the country. For these efforts, among many other strong development indicators and 
progress, the “donor darling” Rwanda (Grimm, 2013; Reyntjens, 2011) was awarded a seat on the UN 
Security Council, to the dismay of a vocal segment of the international community ("Rwanda voted onto 
UN Security Council," 2012). The Rwanda and DRC case study will be explored in more detail in a later 
section. For now, it serves as an example of the motivation that can exist to orchestrate conditions 
leading to protracted regional destabilization and situations of durable displacement. 
INTERNATIONAL BORDERS 
Illicit transborder movements and problems with the migration of active nonstate political entities 
increases the perception that states and sovereignty no longer matter, but this could not be farther from 
the truth (Adamson, 2006, p. 176). In fact, I would argue that it is the state’s reaction to these challenges 
that reinforces or delegitimizes its own sovereignty, rather than making the concept obsolete all together. 
Jacobsen (1996) describes how the entanglement between internal and external sovereignty can be used 
as a political tool:  
Sending and receiving countries can manipulate refugee flows so as to embarrass or 
pressure each other. Sending countries create or condone refugee flows for a number of 
reasons: to destabilize the receiving country, to force recognition of the sending country, 
or to stop interference by the receiving country in a sending country’s affairs…In turn, 
host governments can adopt policies toward refugees that are intended to embarrass or 
pressure unfriendly sending countries or prevent embarrassment to friendly sending 
countries. The bestowal of refugee status upon asylum seekers implies that the sending 
government persecutes its people, and a host government may not wish to implicate an 
ally in this way. (p. 665)  
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Here, she provides a window into the social construction of sovereignty at the state-level where refugee 
flows represent strategic political tools. She goes on to point to the perception that forced migrants are an 
extension of a state’s foreign policy initiatives, concurring in this way with the work of other scholars which 
implicate states in the strategic use of refugees as foreign policy tools (Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher, 1992; 
Loescher & Milner, 2005b; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). This political manipulation of forced migration 
implies a broader reliance on refugees as tools in the arena of international affairs; this relationship 
benefits to a certain degree from refugee sending and receiving, and may contribute to the ever 
increasing length of time refugees spend in camps. 
 
 
Figure 2: Billboard on the Rwanda side of the DRC border 
 
Figure 3: Rwanda border immigration and pass office 
Photos by Jennifer N. Fish 
 
Illicit, or “extralegal” (Jacobsen, 1996) cross-border movements provide insight into the degree of 
external sovereignty exhibited by a state through acts of interdependence and cooperation. First and 
foremost, regulation of international borders and granting citizenship and political community rights 
reiterates the territorial nature of the state, even in a globalizing world (Adamson, 2006, p. 176). Refugee 
flows are a particular example of transnational cross-border movement, an event that inextricably links 
the state policies of both sending and receiving countries. The emergence of “refugee-warrior 
communities”—in which political and military groups migrate with refugees across international borders 
and continue operating as nonstate actors—is a serious threat to the political relationship between 
sending and receiving countries, as well as to the integrity of the host state’s internal sovereignty (Lischer, 
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2006; Loescher, 1992; Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 10; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Like Krasner 
(2001, 2006), Adamson (2006) agrees that globalization and increased rates of human migration 
challenge the concept of sovereignty in international relations, but not to the extreme that states no longer 
matter. Krasner (2001) claims that globalization, particularly in the form of financial, resource, and human 
migration flows across transnational borders, is “changing the scope of state control.” And yet, it is at 
these borders that the states most visibly exercise their external sovereignty and interdependence 
(Jacobsen, 1996). These sites serve as continuous moments of interstate construction of sovereignty.  
 
 
Figure 4: View from Rwanda into DRC at Gisenyi foot-
border crossing 
 
Figure 5: Crossing into DRC with daily goods 
Photos by Jennifer N. Fish 
 
On the one hand, globalization and increased transnational movements of people have led to an 
“erosion of national citizenship” followed by a need for more “flexible categories” of citizenship (Krasner, 
2001). This is witnessed both in the daily flows of Congolese and some Rwandans back and forth across 
the DRC/Rwanda border to retrieve staple supplies and trade as well as the comings and goings of 
refugees and locals from the refugee camps in Rwanda. Economic trade necessitates, in the case of 
Rwanda and the DRC, a more flexible category of migrant that allows for daily traversal of international 
borders. While it does not secure voting rights and traditional membership in the citizenry, it does confer 
economic and livelihood rights that are arguably more relevant to the lives of these daily migrants.  
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On the other hand, while interstate coordination and management of international borders 
represents some challenge to domestic authority and autonomy, it also presents opportunities to reassert 
state competency in the international arena. Rather than erode the sovereignty of states, the daily 
transnational flows of migrants forces an interstate relationship. In the process of articulating the terms of 
the migrants’ transborder movements, states find the opportunity to establish and reassert their external 
sovereignties by laying out policies and procedures for international border crossings. 
Both by managing cross-border migrations, as well as receiving placeless persons, a host state 
has the opportunity to legitimize its territorial control as well as make a public statement about its 
competence as a sovereign state (Loescher, 1992). Sending states, on the other hand, clearly 
demonstrate a breakdown in internal sovereignty that ultimately leads to mass human migrations. These 
push and pull/sending and receiving factors create amongst the international community a sense of 
insider/outsider; in these scenarios one is received as a competent member of the international 
community for responsibly hosting placeless persons, while the outsider “other” is seen as a “failed state” 
or otherwise defunct political institution that cannot demonstrate its ability to conform to the international 
norms and expectations associated with sovereignty. This includes sending states as well as those states 
that receive refugees but cannot properly manage them. 
Arguably, some amount of nation building happens in the public eye of the citizenry at border 
crossings. In these spaces, the citizenry witnesses the competency of two nation-states, thereby 
reinforcing notions of domestic sovereignty, while border-guarding processes recreate norms of 
international sovereignty by performing actions of restriction and access at the border. As an example of 
this, the contrast between upstanding international participant (at the state-level) and “failed state” is 
clearly discernable at the Rwanda/DRC border near Goma. On the DRC side of the border, militant 
guards walk around the road as people approach the border on foot. In disheveled uniforms, they wave 
guns and yell at no one and everyone. On the Rwanda side, just steps away, guards maintain posts, 
discretely questioning those crossing the border and inspecting passes. Their demeanor is calm and they 
patrol in predetermined zones under the watchful eye of a state-of-the-art pass office. Just days before 
our arrival during the second field visit in 2013, thousands of refugees poured over this border from the 
DRC into Rwanda, and yet the Rwanda side showed no signs of chaos. Though this was just one day at 
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one border checkpoint, at the surface level the organization and discipline of the armed guards, the state 
of the border control agents and infrastructure, and the bureaucracy apparent in the way people passed 
through each checkpoint exposed the contrast between the “donor darling” Rwanda and the “failed” DRC. 
Again at the border of Kiziba Camp, this interstate relationship—and relationship with the broader 
international community—plays out as formalized monitored camp access and government surveillance. 
Serving as an international border within Rwanda’s national borders, the gate to the refugee camp marks 
a specific point of external sovereignty at which the government of Rwanda demonstrates its competent 
role in the international refugee regime; here the government interacts with international organizations, 
such as UNHCR, that bring with them their own challenges to sovereignty.  
CITIZENSHIP 
As discussed above, placelessness poses both a challenge and an opportunity for legitimizing the 
citizen/state/territory relationship in international relations. As an expression of internal sovereignty, 
administering citizenship represents a “closely guarded attribute of state sovereignty and territoriality” that 
reinforces this complementary relationship (Edwards & Ferstman, 2010, p. 7). According to Shacknove 
(1985), the “normal, positive relation between the citizen and the state” (p. 278) revolves around the 
expectation that the state will provide for individual needs, including security, access to resources, and 
political rights, in exchange for the citizenry’s allegiance. He argues that the state of “refugeehood” 
revolves around a disruption of this “social compact” that is more than migration in or across territories, 
making it a supraterritorial phenomenon (Scholte, 2000) that stems from a dysfunctional political 
citizen/state relationship (Shacknove, 1985, pp. 278-281). Barnett (2001) notes that the historical origins 
of the label “refugee” as a legal category could only have come from “a world of sovereign states that had 
categories of peoples called ‘citizens’ and were intent on regulating population flows” (p. 251). This shows 
the connection between the citizenry and the social construction of state sovereignty. Without support or 
acquiescence of the domestic audience, the internal sovereignty of the state holds little meaning.  
To exist at all, the state relies on the collective belief in the social compact on the part of the 
citizens it claims to serve—without this the state would cease to exist as we know it. Benedict Anderson 
(1991) highlighted the importance of a collective understanding by citizens and noncitizens alike when he 
proposed that a nation “…is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited 
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and sovereign” (p. 6). Extending Anderson’s argument, Biersteker and Weber (1996b) argue that state 
sovereignty is socially constructed, changing and adapting over time to coincide with the citizenry’s 
imaginary. Included in this social construction is a determination of who belongs and who does not, a 
contrast between insider/outsider that critically links migration and citizenship in state politics. As Bauman 
(2004) observes of refugees, “’Being under protection’ does not mean ‘being wanted’ – and everything 
needed, and much more, is being done to prevent the refugees from confusing the two” (p. 79). Indeed 
the camp, as a constructed apolitical space separated from the host community and condemned to 
dependency on the host government and international community, represents a clear delineation between 
insider/outsider and citizen/noncitizen. The camp boundary, security and surveillance mechanisms, and 
reproduction of the Rwandan state within the refugee camps all reinforce the permanent temporariness 
lived by camp residents.  
Betts (2009a) further posits on the relationship between states and citizens/noncitizens that 
“…how states categorize and respond to forced migration is part of the process through which state 
sovereignty is constituted through boundaries, practices of inclusion and exclusion, and the creation of an 
external “other” in opposition to the national political community” (p. 53). By othering the migrant/refugee 
outsider, the state and its citizenry can more clearly imagine the boundaries of the official political 
community (Edwards & Ferstman, 2010; Zetter, 2007). These xenophobic tendencies inform asylum 
policies as well as contribute to the national imaginary of citizenship and belonging (Loescher & Milner, 
2005a). In this way, placeless persons serve as a reminder of what it means to belong somewhere, and 
their status reinforces the internal sovereignty of a state.  
Assuming refugees and other placeless persons are “depoliticized beings” (Bezabeh, 2011, p. 
606), however, downplays the very political role they play in legitimizing a state’s internal sovereignty by 
articulating, through lived experiences, the difference between a citizen who belongs and a non-citizen 
who does not. In fact, I would argue that placeless persons are hyper-politicized beings in that their 
existence both legitimizes the state, as described above, as well as challenges the very notion of a “state” 
as a unit of analysis in International Relations theory. Bezabeh (2011) himself notes that who is 
considered a citizen/insider is “historically contingent” and changes throughout times and contexts. 
Agamben (1995) interrogates this challenging relationship further by observing that placelessness 
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“…unhing[es] the old trinity of state/nation/territory” by removing the linkages between citizen and state 
through political and spatial marginalization. He goes on to state that “...If in the system of the nation-state 
the refugee represents such a disquieting element, it is above all because by breaking up the identity 
between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original 
fiction of sovereignty” (Agamben, 1995). In this way, the refugee stands as a testament to the importance 
of belonging and citizenship in contrast to the alien and unwelcome “other,” while also challenging the 
very notion of sovereignty on which state power rests. In this complex state/non-citizen relationship, 
refugeehood performs a necessary function of state-building/maintenance by codifying the notion of 
citizenship; refugees contribute to this construction of citizen vs. non-citizen by clinging to imaginary 
communities back “home” in their countries of origin and thus permanently enshrouding their time in the 
host community in temporariness.   
POWER AND PERCEPTION 
In general, refugee flows not only demonstrate the sending state’s diminished capacity for control 
over borders, but they also strain local and international resources, international and domestic security, 
and political relationships with the host nation, making refugees “in fact intensely political” (Loescher, 
1992, p. 5). Arguing that sending and receiving states use refugees as foreign policy tools, Loescher 
(1992) points to states’ desires for power as a primary motivator in the strategic use of forced migration. 
Specifically, related to the case of Rwanda and the DRC, Loescher (1992) illuminates how host nations 
use refugee reception as a public statement of place and belonging in the international arena. 
Additionally, the host nation can accept certain kinds of refugees, such as those fleeing regime types like 
communism, in order to take a stand against a sending country (Loescher, 1992, pp. 34-44).   
This control over space and human bodies relates to what Foucault (2007) termed “biopower” in 
which “technologies of power” regulate and control humans and populations as the “object of political 
strategy.” Surveillance and regulation over the human need to migrate in order to secure sustenance 
resources constitutes a critical component of the sovereign control of international borders, though 
Foucault might not have agreed with the conflation of biopower and sovereignty. Building off of Foucault 
and Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) ideas of  “bare life,” Achille Mbembe (2003) furthers the idea that 
sovereignty is control over life and death. Speaking specifically of death, he notes, “To exercise 
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sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of 
power” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 12). In his earlier work, however, Mbembe (2000) emphasizes the importance 
of territorial sovereignty, relating the “deconstruction of existing territorial frameworks” with the 
“[destruction of] ‘superfluous’ populations” (p. 284). This speaks to Bauman’s (2004) conceptualization as 
refugees representing the human waste of modernity and globalization, where their superfluousness is 
irrelevant to the functioning of society. Together these scholars’ works point to a possible explanation for 
the lack of long-term solutions to protracted situations. By regulating international borders—including 
camp borders within the host nation—the state grants access to “life” through resources and virtual 
“death” through denial of resources and opportunities. Reduced to the barest of political life, refugees 
constitute a marginal population of often wasted human potential at the mercy of a state exercising its 
sovereignty and power.  
Adamson’s (2006) observation that mass migrations result in the need for increased international 
cooperation speaks to the role of forced migration in performance of external sovereignty. At the same 
time, however, it poses challenges for internal sovereignty in which increased reliance on the policies and 
political circumstances of others contests state autonomy. Herein lies a linkage between the individual 
lives of migrants and refugees and the sovereign interests of the state. Individual motives and needs 
dictate movement, but the state retains the ability to confer citizenship and the theoretical ability to control 
borders. Individual-level behaviors collectively form an international force that pressures the state’s ability 
to manage both internal and external sovereignty. In particular, security across international borders plays 
a significant role in the social construction of state sovereignty. The social construction of state 
sovereignty represents one bridge between analytical units of analysis in the forced migration research 
that helps to more fully explain the processes that contributed to durability in displacement. These 
concepts help to support the data from the field described in chapters 5 and 6.  
CAMP & SOCIAL GROUP FACTORS 
Scaling down to a unit of analysis smaller than the state and state-like institutions, social groups 
and camp structure reveal factors that entrench displacement by pushing refugees to the margins of 
society. Social stratification denies certain groups of people access to the resources and institutions that 
would allow individual pursuit of lives outside of the camp context. Social construction of refugees as 
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outsiders/others/non-citizens further marginalizes them and institutionalizes the mentality of protraction 
that instills durability in their situation. The following sections elaborate on these concepts to present an 
overview of the research that delves into protraction as an experience at the camp and social group 
levels.  
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACTS 
Much of this discussion on refugees and placelessness amalgamates forced migrants and 
stateless persons into one homogeneous analytical unit. It is worth acknowledging here that not all 
persons experience placelessness in the same way. In particular, certain subpopulations require special 
humanitarian assistance mechanisms to protect their unique interests, including sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV); traumatic experiences of abduction, rape, or military recruitment; and necessary access 
to resources, representation, and justice (Birkeland et al., 2004). These subpopulations stratify along 
race, class, gender, and age lines, with women and children receiving a particular emphasis in the 
literature. This is particularly relevant in relation to protracted cases in Africa where children, adolescents, 
elderly, and women form the most represented demographic characteristics (Crisp, 2002). These human 
qualities cannot be lumped into one “vulnerable” category, however, as each aspect deserves its own 
close look; each provides some insight into the efficacy and completeness of humanitarian assistance. 
Studies of camp life often reveal the necessity of examining these characteristics more closely. For 
example, in a 2006 study of 13 refugee hosting countries, sexual and gender-based violence (SBGV) 
represented the most common crime or dispute affecting a large portion of the refugee population across 
many “vulnerable” categories; this appeared in the interview and survey data even though the 
researchers did not specifically ask about SGBV (da Costa, 2006). In response to research and field 
reports pointing to assistance inequities, the UNHCR clearly delineated “five commitments to refugee 
women” that include striving towards equal decision making representation; individual documentation to 
ensure access to resources; developing strategies to combat SGBV; management and decision making 
roles in aid distribution; and provision of sanitary supplies for independence and dignity (DIPS, 2006; 
Martin, 2004). These commitments form a starting point for equitable service provision, beginning with the 
effect of displacement on gender roles. 
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The upheaval resulting in forced displacement often results in changing gender roles (Hyndman, 
2000; Martin, 2004; M. Smith, 2004; UNHCR, 2008). Often for the first time in their lives, women become 
heads of households due to death and/or family separation during flight. Compounding that complicated 
dynamic, frustration with camp life, low employment rates, and strained resources contribute to higher 
rates of SGBV, putting women and girls at increased risk (DIPS, 2006; Martin, 2004). The UNHCR (2008) 
asserts that protraction has particularly dividing effects for women and girls resulting from increased 
incidents of SGBV, alcohol abuse among residents, under- or misrepresentation in camp justice systems, 
and reliance on “survival sex” as a necessary means to provide economic support for family members. On 
the other hand, interacting with humanitarian agencies and host government norms can also create 
opportunities that “open up new spaces for women;” for instance by participating in economic livelihood 
initiatives that challenge traditional gender roles or serving as elected representatives in camp 
governance structures (Hyndman & de Alwis, 2008). Even among women and girls, therefore, 
experiences and inequities vary greatly.  
The gender-differentiated experiences of placelessness continue beyond the camp. The gender 
divide crosses international boundaries as women and girls seek asylum and/or resettlement options 
abroad. As one scholar observes of the international refugee conventions that states use to determine 
asylum eligibility, “Women’s social and political reality is much more complicated and less linear than the 
parameters conveyed by the [1951] Convention” (Daenzer, 2008). These policy gaps, Daenzer (2008) 
argues, derive from the fact that much of the persecution suffered by refugee women falls within the 
“private sphere,” resulting in ambiguous wording within the foundational 1951 Convention. As such, the 
Convention cannot adequately protect the interest and lives of women. She notes, “Women asylum 
seekers were therefore victims of an enduring paradox: they faced persecution because they were 
women; they were unprotected by refugee laws because they were women” (Daenzer, 2008, p. 232). 
Some states have adopted individualized policies that accommodate for different experiences along 
gender lines (Sadoway, 2008), but even these isolated incidents do not yet address the barriers for 
women to gain access to resources or asylum based on their specific experience of persecution.  
While the UNHCR has made great strides in addressing—or at the very least opening up 
conversation about—gender equity and mainstreaming during humanitarian assistance, the special needs 
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of physically and mentally disabled refugees remains a gap in the provision of services. Estimated to 
number around 6.7 million worldwide (Pearce, 2014), disabled refugees are “often literally and 
programmatically ‘invisible’ in…assistance programs” (Women's Refugee Commission, 2008). Likewise, 
elder refugees comprise an often neglected subpopulation that requires special attention. One refugee 
camp operational reference guide explains, “Few NGOs include older refugees among their target groups 
because of misconceptions that older people are difficult to train, are not open to new ideas and are 
unable to participate effectively in community and economic activities” (DIPS, 2006, p. 119). Elder 
refugees and those with physical and/or mental disabilities suffer from similar deprivations as identified in 
the vast women refugee policy research, namely limited opportunities for economic engagement, 
diminished resource access, and insufficient representation in camp decision making processes (DIPS, 
2006; Pearce, 2014; Women's Refugee Commission, 2008). Despite this, few studies specifically address 
the needs of elderly and disabled refugees. 
This study does not delve into these critical areas of humanitarian assistance, but it is important 
to acknowledge that social stratification along race, class, gender, and age lines, among other 
characteristics, shapes the individual forced migration experience, especially in protracted situations. 
Lack of access to resources across social stratifications may contribute to aid dependency and lengthen 
stay in camp contexts. Additionally, stigma from SGBV may result in being ostracized from the community 
and complicate a return home. While these factors may speak to the stories of a portion of refugees 
remaining in long-staying cases for lack of options back ‘home,’ forced migrants experience protraction 
across all social dimensions. Again, this aspect constitutes but one part of the story about why some 
refugee cases endure for decades. 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A REFUGEE ‘OTHER’ 
From another perspective, Zetter (1991, 2007) argues that what constitutes the concept “refugee” 
as a label of a particular kind of migrant is that which serves the interest of the state. He contends that 
increasing rates of global migrations create incentives to develop restrictive labeling mechanisms that 
enable access to aid and resources for a privileged set of migrants. Zetter (1991) describes the ways in 
which these refugee-labeled identities become transformed through programs designed to create 
autonomy within the population (e.g. livelihood programs and education); but, instead these initiatives 
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cause the refugees to become “marginalized into a segregated and permanently transient and dependent 
status” (p. 55). He expands his argument by theorizing that this is not a one-way process. By selectively 
using the refugee label, refugees themselves transform their refugee identity by accessing privileged 
resources, but also by embracing the apolitical nature of the label. Zetter (1991) describes the complex 
refugee/host nation relationship further:  
These entangled political interests help to explain the contradictory responses of the 
refugees. The state incorporates, in part intentionally, yet it wants to disengage. The 
refugees acquiesce in the creation of dependency; but they wish also to disengage from 
the unwanted outcomes of the policy. Dependency and independence, integration and 
the wish for the repatriation occur, ambiguously, together. (p. 57) 
In this he highlights the duality of the refugee/host nation relationship. They are at once dependent upon 
and desiring autonomy from the host nation. Likewise, the state both “incorporates” and “disengages” 
from the refugees. A cycle of dependency tied directly to the states’ sense of internal sovereignty lies in 
this back and forth relationship between control and autonomy with the state. 
For the refugees, containment in the camps creates an aid dependency that further entrenches 
them in protracted displacement. The existence of refugees challenges the citizen/state/territory 
relationship that may add relevance to internal sovereignty by distinguishing the citizen-insider against the 
refugee-noncitizen outsider. Clinging to notions of a nostalgic “home” further distances the refugee-other 
from the citizen and socially constructs them as temporary visitors in their country of asylum. Their 
existence reinforces the notion of place and belonging for citizens, thereby strengthening the states’ 
internal sovereignty. 
An imposed geographic displacement defines the social location of refugees and creates a sense 
of homogeneity among camp residents. These camp residents also reside within a larger national and 
regional context that “others” them by drawing distinct lines of ethnic and national origin. Patricia Hill 
Collins (1986) introduced the phenomenon of “outsider within” to describe how Black women sociologists 
in a traditionally white male dominated field can draw on their dual perspectives—the academic training 
from a “community that historically excluded them” and the observations derived from their own “family 
experiences”—in order to contribute a greater depth and perspective to the field of sociology (p. S29). 
She notes that some Black feminists already pursue this frame of reference, “embracing the creative 
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potential of their outsider within status and using it wisely” (P. H. Collins, 1986, p. S30). P. H. Collins 
(1986) closes her academic call to action with the powerful statement that an outsider within perspective 
provides a means to bring oneself “closer to…the freedom both to be different and part of the solidarity of 
humanity” (p. S30). This outsider within concept may be expanded to situate the particular status of 
refugees.  
In the context of this study, the residents of Kiziba Refugee Camp grapple daily, and in often-
contradictory ways, with their own identities and limits to agency that invoke their status as outsiders 
within. As I will show in subsequent chapters, refugees are cultured in the ways of the host government 
and the international community, as values, practices, and rules of order are transmitted through 
institutions at both global and national levels. This places the forced migrants in a kind of solidarity with 
humanity that is beyond what Collins (1986) originally described.  Refugees occupy a space at the local 
level in their host countries. They also transcend these immediate spaces of refuge to play a role in 
regional and international politics involved with conflict, peace-building, and the care work of the global 
refugee regime complex. Refugees’ broad global presence unites them in solidarity with humanity beyond 
that which is defined by the relationship between citizen, territory, and state. Specifically, the refugees 
represent a rupture of social contracts between citizens and sovereign states as well as the larger 
international collective obligations to placeless persons (Agamben, 1995; Barnett, 2001; Shacknove, 
1985). They are, in this way, a matter of international affairs and thus hold a kind of presence in the 
international conscience. Refugees also occupy a very local existence situated among rural host 
populations. In the case of Kiziba, the surrounding communities share ethnolinguistic and cultural 
similarities that allow the refugees to blend in while simultaneously embodying the outsider/other. As I 
show later, refugees benefit from their dual status as ethnolinguistic insiders, but also as wards of the 
state-like INGOs and thus simultaneously apolitical and supra-political outsiders. They find their “part of 
the solidarity of humanity” (P. H. Collins, 1986, p. S30) in the in-between spaces of noncitizen/other that 
connects them both locally and internationally. The social complexities of the ‘outsider within’ envelope 
the refugees’ articulated feelings on agency and identity and shed some light into the construction of a 
refugee/other identity that permits access to humanitarian resources.  
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Turner (2010) comes to a similar conclusion when he describes the Burundian refugee camps in 
Tanzania as “a kind of ‘excluded inside’” (p. 10). In his study, the Hutu refugees shaped and were shaped 
by politics in Burundi, their country of origin. This exiled community felt included in the politics of their 
homeland through their formulations of identity and citizenship, yet remained spatially and temporally 
excluded from the daily life in Burundi (S. Turner, 2010). In this sense, displacement in camps heightens 
a collective sense of identity as outsiders in the country of asylum, often as a result of romanticized 
notions of refugees’ countries of origin. In Rwanda, elder Kiziba Camp residents’ nostalgia for “home” and 
an abiding connection to the DRC presented strongly throughout my research. Nostalgia and connection 
with the country of origin creates an imagined community of the DRC diaspora, despite the realities of lost 
land, years of separation, and inaccessible citizenship rights in the actual country (Anderson, 1991). At 
the same time, the refugees live on the very periphery of the state—what Bauman (2004) described as 
“dumping grounds.” They are thus spatially and socially excluded. Turner (2010) observes during his 
fieldwork that “although part of the nation and its imaginations, [the refugee camp] was also a parenthesis 
in time and place, a waiting room where refugees were meant to kill time before returning to ‘normality’” 
(p. 10). The camp “waiting room” served as a space where the refugees constructed “a subversive 
recasting and reinterpretation of [the past] in fundamentally moral terms” (Malkki, 1995, p. 54), or what 
Malkki (1995) calls “mythico-history.” In this space of exclusions, from their perspective as outsiders 
within, the refugees reconstruct identities of themselves, home, and hope for the future that do not 
necessarily reflect the political realities of the region and can have entrenching consequences on the 
permanence of their displacement. 
Zetter (1991) describes this process of identity recreation in long-term refugee cases, noting that 
labeling forced migrants as “refugees” leads to situations where humanitarian intervention “schemes 
become a vehicle for transforming an identity where refugees are marginalized into a segregated and 
permanently transient and dependent status” (p. 55). His ideas begin to unpack refugees’ relationships 
with aid providers in order to understand why the forced migrants would contribute to the durability of their 
own displacement. Emphasizing the contradictory nature of this refugee labeling process, Zetter (1991) 
shows how long-staying refugees manipulate their identities and circumstances in order to reap certain 
aid benefits of the “political currency” they hold through their displaced status. In this sense, Zetter (1991) 
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suggests that refugees use their own status as forced migrants as an expression of agency in their 
everyday lives. Using their political currency, refugees directly and indirectly promote the continuation of 
aid dependency, an act that requires clearly delineating between themselves as refugees and the host 
community members. Zetter (1991) sees this attachment to aid dependency as a conscious decision to 
“sustain an image of transitory status” and cling to the politicized existence as refugees in protracted 
contexts (Zetter, 1991, p. 60). In the case of Kiziba, and the Banyarwanda refugees more broadly, they 
may not consciously make decisions to perpetuate the system of durable displacement, but their 
narratives reveal collective construction of a non-citizen/other category of existence that does not easily fit 
into UNHCR’s model for durable solutions. The narratives presented later in this research bring to light a 
shared identity shaped by protracted displacement, notions of citizenship and belonging, and expressions 
of agency in a camp situation acted upon by various international influences that reproduce ‘refugee’ as a 
status. In other words, refugees form their identities around a shared experience of protraction and a 
common narrative that places Kiziba Camp residents in a subjugated relationship to the state and the 
international institutions that literally and symbolically feed their existence. 
Social construction of the ‘refugee’ label cannot alone explain protraction—it is just one piece of a 
multilayered system that creates and recreates the conditions leading to enduring displacement. The lens 
of social construction, much like the social construction of sovereignty discussed earlier, provides insight 
into the forces that occur between levels of analysis. These forces reveal a system that rejects the notion 
of refugees as temporary and creates a durability in displacement. This perspective explains protraction 
in a new light, not as a long-staying temporary situation, but as a durable form of existence on the fringes 
of the traditional international arena. As we will see in the next chapters, viewing protraction as a durable 
context helps to explain the autonomous and sovereign-like qualities of long-staying refugee camps and 
the possible motivations states may have to perpetuate this existence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Thus far, we have seen that the literature falls into three broad categories: macro-level 
explanations that focus on the international community as the point of analysis; meso-level 
understandings of how state and state-like actors benefit from protracted refugee cases; and micro-level 
dynamics that occur in camps and social groups. In each of these analytic buckets, refugeehood is 
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generally assumed to be a temporary condition, even in protracted cases. This assumption clearly arises 
from the observation that the very word ‘camp’  associated with refugees implies temporariness; refugee 
camps rarely morph into permanence by becoming ‘towns,’ though they take on many of the qualities of 
towns and cities. Alone, the macro-level perspective of permanent temporariness cannot explain all 
aspects of long-term displacement. It does reveal some of the intractability of resolving refugee cases, 
namely through problems with burden sharing and performance of state sovereignty. This broad 
perspective highlights the difficulties of care and impetus for neglect that contribute to ongoing 
placelessness, but cannot explain the finer details that separate one protracted situation from another.  
Mesoscopic perspective sheds additional light on the nuances of displacement, namely adding 
historical context and social construction of sovereignty to the picture of protraction. Legacy policies of 
colonialism, particularly in the Great Lakes Region of Africa where this study focuses, illuminate state-
level factors that contribute to forced migration and protraction. In particular, the DRC’s status as a ‘failed’ 
or ‘non’ state speaks to the mass migrations of refugees and IDPs and the difficulties in coordinating 
massive repatriation of those living in camps for nearly two decades. Again, while this angle provides 
insight into the roles of states and institutions in prolonging displacement, it cannot speak to the choices 
that individuals make to stay or leave a camp. Personal, human experiences encapsulate part of the 
displacement story as they navigate the daily experiences of protraction and encampment. Without 
understanding the camp environment, we cannot yet fully grasp the systemic extent of displacement.  
Microscopic levels of analysis—at the camp and social group level—highlight social stratification 
and insider/outsider constructions that situate refugees at the margins of society and condemn them to 
enduring limbo. In the context of this study, this means refugees may also contribute to durable 
displacement through intentional or unintentional participation in states’ quest for sovereignty and through 
their lived experiences as outsiders within.  
Looking across all levels of analysis, from the refugee regime complex in the global arena to the 
individual camp residents experiencing and participating in the social construction of a refugee ‘other,’ we 
begin to see that there is a system of displacement that produces and reproduces conditions leading to 
protraction. From this, I derive the idea of ‘durability’ in displacement. The system is complex in the sense 
that dismantling any one element described above will not lead to the end of protraction. Each level of 
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analysis and component of the system is entwined in such a way that incentives, motivations, and even 
consequences for their role in the larger refugee regime complex further entrenches cases in protraction. 
Ultimately, protracted situations take on a sovereign-like quality of their own where ‘camps’ move more 
towards entities like ‘towns’ or even ‘states.’ In the case of Kiziba, and other Congolese refugee camps 
within Rwanda, the host government spreads the wealth of aid brought by assistance to the refugees by 
allowing access to medical care, water wells, and trading opportunities in the camp market through 
unfettered camp access for locals; meanwhile, the camp residents are allowed to leave the camp to trade 
and gain resources, but suffer from extremely restricted access to employment, education, or other local 
integration opportunities. In this way, the government both confirms its ability to provide services to local 
Rwandan citizens while reinforcing the international camp borders within its own domestic territory; the 
camp then represents a dependent microcosm of international borders within state borders.  
Like the existing borders between the DRC and Rwanda, Congolese traverse daily to retrieve the 
goods they require for existence—everything from water and food to pots and pans—but in a way that 
economically benefits the border communities (field observation and personal communication, Goma 
border crossings, 27 January 2014). Since border regulation is an important demonstration of 
sovereignty, this regulated economic exchange both reasserts the host nation’s sovereign identity while 
facilitating an economic relationship that entrenches both the host and refugee communities in 
interdependency. Similarly, shared access to camp services by local Rwandan community members 
creates an unseen dependency on the camp population. Evidence of this resides in Rwanda’s Kiziba 
Camp health center where access had to be granted to surrounding communities as well in order to keep 
the peace and ensure “fairness” (Kiziba AHA Clinic Director, personal communication, 13 March 2011). 
According to aid workers in Kiziba, this strategy appears to work; however research suggests that the 
minimal short-term gains may have disproportionately negative effects for the poorest segments of the 
local population, fomenting hostile feelings for these “hidden losers” in the economy of refugee hosting 
(Chambers, 1986; Jacobsen, 1996, p. 667). Through INGO services and state burden-sharing activities, 
refugees and surrounding communities entwine, yet preserve borders that reinforce the distinction 
between non-citizen other and citizen. These processes, as I explain in the subsequent chapters, expose 
how local level dynamics also contribute to the durable displacement of Congolese refugees in Rwanda.  
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The following chapters look closely at Kiziba camp, but this case serves as an instance of much 
larger systems. The research that follows is probative in that it seeks not to prove a hypothesis about 
protraction, but rather looks at one camp to better understand the spatial and institutional forced of 
displacement acting on it. Through this process and a grounded theory methodological approach, I begin 
developing a theory of durable displacement that contributes to the field of refugee studies. Durability as a 
concept helps dispel the myth of temporariness imposed on so many protracted refugee cases 
throughout the world. By defining the situation for what it is, and looking at the systemic causes and 
effects, we can examine the citizen/state/territory relationship and question the roots of protraction and its 
enduring status. The next chapters follow a research agenda of focusing mainly on the social construction 
of state sovereignty and the social construction of a refugee ‘other’ to look across levels of analysis and 
ground the study in fieldwork data collected in Kiziba refugee camp. The social construction theses 
presented above span across micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis and thus provide a foundation 
for the argument that only by looking across these levels can we understand the systemic nature of 
protraction and confront its durability. Following an in-depth discussion of the research methodology, the 
two analytic chapters focus on fieldwork data to expose entrenching factors at the state, international 
institution, and individual refugee levels. The research concludes with discussion about the practical 
lessons we learn from naming durable displacement and the ways we can move forward to dismantle a 






I can see you are taking notes when we are answering your 
question and you’re recording. So what are you going to do with 
what you recorded, with what you wrote down in your small 
book, and the pictures? 





This study builds upon data collected through qualitative methods over the course of three field 
visits beginning in 2011. The interpretive research paradigm used in this study sought to uncover the 
theoretical relationships between individual interpretations of citizenship and belonging within the social 
constructs of life in a refugee camp. This particular research paradigm rests on “the assumption that 
social reality is not singular or objective, but is rather shaped by human experiences and social contexts 
(ontology) and is therefore best studied within its socio-historic context by reconciling the subjective 
interpretations of its various participants (epistemology)” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 102). For this reason, 
the study necessitated qualitative input in the form of personal narratives and verbally articulated 
understandings of “home” and “belonging” in a protracted forced migration context (Brinkmann & Kvale, 
2005). Given ethical considerations and limited access to the refugee population described later in this 
chapter, the most effective way to supplement the interview data was through existing quantitative metrics 
provided by UNHCR, the Rwanda Ministry for Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR), 
NGOs operating within the camp, and reports from other researchers and visitors to Kiziba. Drawing on 
the voices of refugees and NGO workers, in combination with official reports and metrics on Rwanda’s 
refugee populations, constituted an approach that afforded the most complete picture of the protracted 
situation in Kiziba available to the researchers. 
Two university-educated, white, female researchers conducted the interviews presented in this 
study. They managed a team approach to the guided conversations, where one researcher asked 
questions and engaged directly in the conversation while the other took notes. This process maximized 
the use of the two-day pass allotted by the Rwanda Ministry of Disaster and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) 
for access to Kiziba Camp. A university Institutional Review Board (IRB) vetted the interview questions 
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(see Interview Questions) and research methods prior to fieldwork. The full collection of data used to 
develop this study incorporates content analysis of NGO reports, related published field research, and 
historical records combined with interviews conducted with NGO, government, and camp representatives 
over the course of four years. Interview data draw from one-on-one meetings with elected leaders of 
various levels within the camp, group conversations with the camp Elected Council and Security Council, 
and informational overviews provided by representatives of nongovernmental organizations overseeing 
management of the camp. Additionally, as official representatives of the governmental body that manages 
refugee camps for Rwanda, the Minister of MIDIMAR and the Kiziba Camp Manager each provided one-
hour long one-on-one interviews.  
These data provide insight into refugee migration within the Great Lakes region, as well as a 
focused examination of one specific camp, which serves as an exemplar to the larger context. Common 
to forced migration studies, the context of Kiziba is methodologically challenging, both because of its 
remote nature and because of its access limitations (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). Despite this, including 
in-person interviews is a critical feature of this type of research effort because it gives context and voice 
to populations impacted by larger trends in protracted refugee displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012, pp. 
103-111). As Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) note,  
…an increasing number of researchers have recognized that when the object is concrete 
human experience, then qualitative methods are the most adequate means of knowledge 
production. Following a well-known principle of inquiry, which dictates that researchers let 
the object of research determine the method, rather than the other way round, qualitative 
methods become an objective way of investigating a qualitative human world. (p. 162) 
Each subsequent visit to Kiziba informed the next phase of the research project as interviewees 
illuminated different aspects of the protracted displacement experience or new concerns about their 
position in the global refugee crisis. Our goal in conducting this iterative approach to the research 
question and goals was to develop a study that can be used as an advocacy tool for the participants as 
well as contribute to the global conversation on protracted displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012, pp. 104-
105). Turton (1996) describes this advocacy approach to research by noting the importance of 
challenging assumptions formed by the dominant “elite,” including politicians and academics. For him, 
research on “extreme human suffering” is only justified when “alleviation of suffering [is] an explicit 
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objective of one’s research” (Turton, 1996, p. 96). Direct voices of participants constitute at once a 
motivation to produce such research as well as a context in which to understand the depth of the refugee 
experience.  
The intent to include personal narratives, however, must not compromise the integrity of the study 
or challenge the objectiveness of the methodology (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005; Jacobsen & Landau, 
2003). As Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) point out, “Ethical as well as scientific objectivity is about letting 
the objects object to what we as researchers do to them and say about them” (p. 169). They warn that 
bad methodology in forced migration studies can lead to sensationalizing or exaggerating the status and 
claims of participants, thereby contributing to “myths about refugees propagated by host governments 
and xenophobes” (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 187). Throughout the research process, participants 
were welcome to contribute to the conversation and questions posed during interviews. Given the limited 
communication connectivity of residents within Kiziba, it is impossible to allow each participant to review 
the data throughout this analysis portion, but we made concerted efforts to contact those with Internet and 
telephone access for verification and clarity. 
This study relies predominantly on data collected in and about Kiziba Camp, though Rwanda 
maintains several other camps of Congolese refugees, and similar camps exist in Burundi and Uganda. 
Kiziba represents a microcosm of the extensive populations of Congolese refugees living outside of the 
DRC. In particular, the Congolese refugees in Rwanda are part of an ethnolinguistic group of 
Kinyarwanda speakers, the fact of which has led to discrimination and revocation of citizenship within the 
DRC, a topic of focus for this study. Specifically, unlike many of the other camps in Rwanda, Kiziba 
represents a geographic mixture of Congolese refugees from North Kivu (88%), South Kivu (7%), the 
region around Katanga (3%), and the rest (2%) from other parts of the DRC (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp 
Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013).1 Knowledge derived from conversations with 
MIDIMAR’s Kiziba Camp Manager, NGO representatives, and Kiziba residents suggests that other camps 
in the country house more geographically homogenous populations, with the majority coming from Masisi 
in North Kivu, for example. The heterogeneity of Kiziba’s population, as well the longevity of its nearly 20-
1 As of 2011, three residents of Kiziba Camp originated from outside the DRC: one each from Kenya, 
Eritrea, and Ethiopia (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). 
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year operation, makes it the prime candidate to study the particular dynamics of displacement within the 
region. Additionally, the safety and stability of life in Kiziba Camp, given its relative permanence in the 
region, made it an exemplar area to study the effects of protracted displacement on identity and 
perceived citizenship. Finally, Rwanda’s national anti-corruption policies and public commitment to 
government transparency allowed a level of access to the camp unattainable in other countries. As with 
all anthropologically-based studies, key informants played a significant role in the development of this 
project. This included those who provided introductions and assistance navigating the official applications 
for camp access passes; we would be unable to replicate this level of assistance in Uganda or Burundi 
where we had no initial contacts. Repeated visits over the study period and personal connections 
between the researchers and several residents of Kiziba afforded a level of trust that permitted access to 
interviewees in even remote parts of the camp.  
A key informant assisted with the selection of interview participants during the course of fieldwork 
in 2014. We acknowledge that over-reliance on one key individual potentially creates ethical challenges, 
as participants are likely part of the same social network or subgroup of residents and information shared 
between them could compromise security within that network (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 196). Access 
limitations and issues of trust, however, required reliance on the key informant as a critical link between 
the researchers and the Kiziba community. While this carries with it some potential for bias and harm, we 
viewed the connection with the key informant also as a mode of protection for participants. The key 
informant sought out participants without the researchers around, relieving pressure potential 
interviewees might feel declining participation in our presence. Given the potential biases, the scope of 
this probative study situates Kiziba Camp as a microcosm of the larger refugee crisis (Bhattacherjee, 
2012, p. 105). It stands as one case study that explores the micro-level effects of political marginalization 
and isolation over prolonged time spans and extrapolates to understand how this experience informs the 
broader political situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa and beyond. The interviews are not intended 
to represent all Kiziba residents, all refugees in Rwanda, all Kinyarwanda speakers, or all refugees of the 
DRC. They are a small snapshot of life inside the camp of native Kinyarwanda speakers that help to 
inform a research agenda that questions notions of citizenship and belonging in the political environment 
of this specific region of Africa, namely the DRC/Rwanda border. This chapter sets the context for 
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fieldwork in Rwanda, specifically Kiziba Camp. Following a discussion of theoretical research 
considerations, the specific limitations, and means of gaining access to study participants forms the core 
of the methodological conversation. Finally, I describe in detail the data collection process and lay out an 
outline of the process for analyzing the data collected during this study.  
 
 
Figure 6: Refugee camps in Rwanda 
(Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit- UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi, 2012, UNHCR 





Kiziba Camp is one of five refugee camps housing a total of 70,612 refugees, most from the 
DRC, as of May 2014 (Fitzpatrick, 2014). The Rwandan government originally designed one of those 
camps, the Nkamira Transit Center, for Rwandan returnees, but it was soon flooded with Congolese 
refugees. A new camp, Mugombwa, began accepting residents of Nkamira Transit Center in February 
2014 to ensure relocation to better accommodation than the large warehouse-like tents of the transit 
location (MIDIMAR, 2014b). In the global context, Kiziba is a unique displacement context. Given its 
longevity, certain aspects of the camp take one forms of permanence, which illustrate the complex nature 
of humanitarian aid in protracted situations. What follows is a thick description of the environment and 
services in Kiziba. This serves to contextualize the experience of a particularly long-term, stable displaced 
population under the care of international and nongovernmental organizations and run by a uniquely 
stable host government.  
The population of Kiziba is 16,513 as of May 2014, the vast majority of whom are Kinyarwanda 
speakers from North Kivu province, South Kivu province, and Katanga. Most of Kiziba residents arrived, 
or are descendants of those who arrived, in 1996 following the onset of a civil war in the DRC. Others 
arrived in 1998 and 2006 following various armed movements that displaced more people from eastern 
DRC. Given its enduring nature, Kiziba is deeply entrenched in MIDIMAR and UNHCR standards for 
institutional organization and governance structure. The camp is divided into 10 quartiers, each 
containing around five villages. Residents elect representatives at the village, quartier, and camp levels to 
represent the interests of the camp residents. UNHCR camp management guidelines suggest 50% 
representation of women in elected positions as the optimal goal (Birkeland et al., 2004). The UNHCR 
understands, however, that women’s participation in leadership roles may be dictated or limited by certain 
cultural and political practices, and therefore sets these as guidelines rather than requirements (UNHCR, 
2008).  
Along the camp’s main walkway is an increasingly vibrant economic center, which features small 
cantinas, mobile phone charging stations, shops to purchase minutes for mobile phone access, and a 
small market that sells vegetables and everyday necessities. Representatives from each of the villages 
participate in an elected camp security coalition that oversees daily activities. Camp elected leadership 
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refers crimes beyond the scope of reprimand to the Rwandan Police for official processing. The 
structured and repetitive nature of life in the camp results in reportedly low crime rates and a general 
sense of safety. The established election structure also lends well to finding elected leaders with whom to 
speak about the operations and daily activities of the camp. For these reasons, Kiziba serves as both a 
particular site for an ethnographic study of this microcosm of society at a contested border, and a 
representation of the larger structural manifestations of protracted displacement in the Lake Kivu region of 
Central Africa.  
 
 
Figure 7: Kiziba Camp Market in June 2014 





To understand the context in which this study took place, it is important to understand the 
environment. In some ways, the camp represents a reduction of human life to its very most basic form. 
The allotment of land for the refugee camp abuts agricultural plots owned by Rwandan citizens. The 
division between camp and Rwanda at first seems arbitrary, but is quite stark: where the cluster of 
houses ends, Rwanda begins again. Houses are very small and constructed of wooden scaffolding 
surrounded by dried mud. In the majority of homes observed in this study, the roofs were mostly 
composed of UNHCR tarps that had long since disintegrated in the equatorial sun. The faded tarps serve 
as a reminder of the waiting endured by residents of this camp; UNHCR tarps should be short-term relief 
from the elements, but instead have become long-term architectural components of permanent living 
structures. This feature of camp life is slowly giving way to tin roofs, starting mostly from the outermost 
reaches of the camp, in order to address the leaks during heavy rains. While this provides relief from the 
elements—rain and leaking roofs being the most prevalent complaint among residents according to the  
 
 
Figure 8: House in Kiziba with scaffolding exposed 
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community leaders—it also symbolizes a shift toward permanence. A drive past Kigeme Refugee Camp 
in 2014 revealed that the majority of roofs there were tin and the walkways were more prominent, giving a 
sense of airiness in the thoroughfares not present in Kiziba. It also looked more like a small city than 
Kiziba, serving as a glimpse into the protracted nature of Congolese refugees’ camp lives in Rwanda. No 
longer “camps” in the traditional sense, these areas increasingly gain qualities that befit established 
villages or towns.  
The paths between houses in Kiziba are just wide enough to walk through. At some spots, one 
must angle her shoulders to slide through. The ground in these alleyways is often uneven from years of 
erosion that has washed away the dirt into deep grooves between the houses. This is particularly 
problematic during heavy rains when rivers of water flow between the houses to slide down the 
mountainside. Most houses have some sort of door, generally made from wood or tin from the oilcans 
that come as part of the World Food Programme distribution system. Windows have no coverings, 
furthering the sense that there is no true privacy in the camp. Small spaces between the houses serve as 
a communal place to dry clothing and as garden areas for some families. Every conversation is within 
hearing distance of someone else, given the close proximity of the neighboring houses.  
AID DELIVERY 
As with most displacement settings, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivers aid on a 
relatively regular schedule. When available, the aid arrives monthly. Food distribution benefits all camp 
residents holding the appropriate paperwork and represents a global standard of the bare minimum 
nutrition required to keep an adult human alive for one month: 11 kg of maize, 900 grams of oil, 3 kg of 
beans, and 0.15 kg of salt. This ration also assumes that supplies come exactly every month, which is not 
always the case given international donor fatigue and funding shortages throughout the WFP. 
Additionally, UNHCR subcontracts the firewood delivery to the camp, which residents use for cooking 
while the supplies last. Once there, a group of refugees supervises the distribution of the wood, which is 
reportedly not enough to make it through the entire month before the next drop-off. It is not uncommon to 
see refugees carrying bundles of firewood up the mountainside from the town below to supplement the 
official rations.  
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SANITATION 
Communal toilet and bathing facilities are centrally located throughout the camp. This requires 
that residents walk short distances to access sex-divided shared sanitation spaces. During the first visit in 
2011, we arrived on a day when a man with a plastic pack on his back was spraying chemicals around all 
of the toilets presumably to enforce sanitation. Since that time, the camp upgraded many of the toilets to 
concrete buildings with cement floors. A cistern outside the stalls collects water to manually flush the toilet 
after use. This provides considerable improvement to both the sense of privacy and the level of sanitation 
at the toilet facilities. On the outskirts of the camp, however, this is clearly an internal commitment to 
sanitation. At the edges where the camp gives way to Rwandan farmland, open pipes of sewage spill 
from the mountain to the road below, traveling down into the fields. The refugees commented that this is 
“the end” of the toilets. Public infrastructure in Rwanda has not yet reached this particularly remote 
refugee camp. Water wells are also dispersed throughout the camp. Unlike many other camps in Africa, 
water rations in Kiziba are far above the bare minimum for survival (Sutter et al., 2012). In fact, in order to 
demonstrate good will to their Rwandan neighbors, refugees allow access to the locals’ cows for drinking 
and cooling off in the water supply. The relative luxury of updated sanitation facilities and ready access to 
water again reflect a permanence to life in Kiziba. The concrete, relatively modern facilities rival those 
available in much of the Rwandan housing in the surrounding areas. Rather than a temporary settlement, 
these sanitation features and the care with which refugees maintain them imply a certain investment in 
life there that exceeds a high enough standard that the refugees feel compelled to share with surrounding 
Rwandan neighbors.  
HEALTHCARE 
The clinic serves the basic medical needs of refugees, as well as those from surrounding 
communities who find it more convenient to travel into the camp than all the way to town. A primary 
feature of the facility is the malnutrition program that manages infants suffering from food deficiencies. 
Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA), a nongovernmental organization, runs Kiziba’s clinic as of the time of 
writing. Patients with medical ailments that are beyond the expertise of the clinic staff require a trip to the 
medical center Kibuye for further diagnosis. For extremely difficult cases, patients must go to Kigali for 
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medical treatment. The capital is the last stop. If doctors in Kigali cannot diagnose and treat the medical 
condition, the patient must return to Kiziba with no medical resolution.  
In 2011, the head of the clinic staff had been working in Kiziba for ten years. She noted that most 
likely because the population had been there so long, no recent outbreaks or epidemics occurred, 
resulting in a relatively stable overall health level for the camp. According to the clinic head, malnutrition is 
rare and mostly results from mothers who lack the ability to produce breast milk themselves and thus 
require supplemental feeding. To help expectant mothers in general, the World Food Programme extends 
rations three months before and after birth to ensure a caloric intake sufficient enough to support healthy 
maternal and child development. The medical staff expressed concern that residents use these rations for 
trading instead of supplementary nutrition for expectant mothers. A shortage of economic opportunities 
for camp residents makes extra rations a valuable trade commodity.  
Malaria and respiratory issues are the major concerns. Kiziba clinic resources cannot meet the 
needs of tuberculosis and diabetes, so these conditions present significant challenges to residents and 
staff. HIV/AIDS still has relatively low prevalence in the camp, with only 162 (0.01%) reported HIV+ cases 
in 2011, even compared with Rwanda’s national rates (2.9%) (UNICEF, 2012). Gender-based violence is 
a reportedly diminishing occurrence in the camp. It still exists, and a common form is for men to take a 
woman’s rations to purchase alcohol. Due to intervention measures, it is becoming less shameful to 
report gender-based violence. Neighborhood community volunteers with training in sensitive gender-
based violence incidents respond to these situations. This may have contributed to the diminishing 
number of cases. Reported rape cases are relatively rare, with 101 cases in 2011, though unreported 
cases remain difficult to measure. One female counselor is on staff to help address these issues and 
meet the needs of victims. The clinic staff estimated that in 2011, women under the age of 18 accounted 
for 30% of all pregnancies. Given the resources in the clinic and the relative poverty of the surrounding 
communities, Rwandan citizens who need to use clinic services have free access to the camp’s medical 
center (AHA Clinic staff, persona communication, 14 March 2011). Again, the luxury of local healthcare, 
though it does not meet the complex needs of some residents with challenging illnesses, stands in 
contrast to the relative access of the surrounding Rwandan community to medical treatment. With a 
pharmacy and multiple programs to address the more common health needs of residents and neighbors, 
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the clinic does not invoke the trauma center style facility imagined of refugee camps. Instead, the relaxed 
nature of operations and concentration on training and education for community members exemplifies the 
stability of an isolated, relatively homogeneous population that has coexisted in the camp for nearly two 
decades. 
EDUCATION AND OPPORTUNITY 
In Kiziba the most prominent influences of the Rwandan government are in the security and 
education sectors. Kiziba Camp hosts a school system that provides education through the tenth grade 
(ninth and tenth grades were newly added in 2014), run mainly by the refugees themselves under the 
purview of the host-nation educational system. The schools in the camp follow the Rwanda national 
curriculum, which focuses on science and English but also includes courses on entrepreneurship and 
some religious studies. In 2008, the Government of Rwanda converted the national language of its 
educational curriculum to English as an effort to align with the East African economic community 
(McGreal, 2008). Since the school systems in refugee camps follow the curriculum of the host 
government, this shift greatly affected the mode of education in Kiziba. Those teachers not yet fluent in 
English have the opportunity to attend seminars each year given by the Rwandan government to improve 
their conversation skills. English and Kinyarwanda dominate the classroom environment, but French still 
persists in some situations where teachers remain predominantly francophone. The linguistic influence 
over one of the most prominent institutions within the camp emphasizes the insider/outsider complexities 
of refugee life. While they exist on the periphery of society, lacking work permits and full integration into 
Rwandan life, the structure of the camp education system represents host country priorities and values. 
The values of the educational system integrate them in some ways with the broader Rwandan society; 
however, the abrupt termination of their education in 10th grade with little opportunity to use or expand 
what they have learned accentuates the outsider status of a refugee. This complex notion of belonging 
revealed itself in the ways the curriculum advisor in 2014, a refugee, boasted that the high school is the 
highest scoring school in the region, and yet the refugees have no access to education beyond the 10th 
grade. The relative success of Kiziba schools in comparison to others regionally is inversely proportional 
to the opportunities available after their studies finish. 
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In 2011, the Jesuit Refugee Services managed the school system, though they eventually 
withdrew their support in the camp. The principal of the high school in 2011 reported that 1,200 students 
attended mandatory co-ed classes supervised by 40 teachers. Some teachers are given salaries by 
nongovernmental organizations, while many are advanced students from the school that came back to 
teach as volunteers. They are not required to have university teaching degrees. While the school does 
not have enough books to issue one per student, each gets one notebook per subject and four pens per 
year. Girls and boys are present in representative numbers in the school system. In 2011, the principal 
noted that 75 students had abandoned school during the previous year. His general feeling was that boys 
who fail a class would not return to finish their studies. Girls, on the other hand, generally leave school 
because they become pregnant, but will often return after giving birth. He felt this may stem from the fact 
that global and national gender equity movements have created ample opportunities for girls to get 
scholarships to continue their education outside the camp, but tough economic times have dried up donor 
resources and resulted in the end of many of the scholarships that would support boys. The school year 
has three semesters, with the long vacations taking place in November and December. The high school 
has a solar-powered computer lab with access to Internet. After graduating from the school system, 
however, refugees do not have access to the lab any more.  
After graduating from school two paths exist for refugees. A select few will receive sponsorships 
or scholarships to continue their studies outside the camp. Some with advanced language or 
management skills may get full or part-time work with one of the NGOs operating in the camp. An even 
smaller minority might attempt to find informal work on neighboring farms or nearby cities; though, this is 
at their own peril as they do not have proper identification that allows legal employment in Rwanda. The 
majority will go on with regular life activities, which largely translates to idleness in the camp. There is a 
hall where refugees can watch some soccer tournaments and hold community events, which was 
donated by the Spanish soccer club, Futbol Club Barcelona (Pedersen, 2010). In addition, the camp 
contains soccer fields on which to hold matches. Several men in the camp started an English 
conversation club, and the American Refugee Committee (ARC) encourages groups that specialize in 
certain crafts in order to promote access to economic opportunities and skill development. Additional 
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projects to promote economic livelihood include small kitchen gardens, chicken keeping, and rabbit 
husbandry.  
Education and opportunities connect vitally to a baseline level of human existence central to 
camp life. One of the most predominant observations in Kiziba Camp is that of the cumulative impact of 
idleness. Even with the introduction of key supportive NGO projects and a successful education program, 
in such a protracted situation, residents face expansive stretches of time in a repetitive environment, 
leaving little opportunity for enrichment or access to life outside of the camp. In many ways, one of the 
most striking observations by the researchers during each visit to the camp was the palpable loss of 
human potential. Some residents find purpose by working with service providers, but many find the 
monotony of daily life oppressive. The Security Council indicated that idleness, in their opinions, was a 
major contributor to the potential for mischief. Of the problems that plagued the security officers the most, 
teenage idleness leading to misbehavior and adult abuse of alcohol topped the list. The Council felt 
unanimously confident that these behaviors result from having nothing else to do, perhaps as a sign of 
rebellion or even depression. When I asked our key informant in 2011 what he would be doing if he was 
not showing us around, he replied, “Nothing. Just sitting and waiting” for nothing in particular. This facet of 
life reoccurs several times throughout the different forms of interviews. Boredom with the selection of food 
rations and boredom with the opportunities available to do something with one’s life consistently 
resurfaced in dialog as a type of torture that they endure as a consequence of decades of political limbo.  
RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
FEMINIST METHODOLOGIES 
This study speaks to the larger concerns of feminist methodologists through its focus on the 
acquisition of data and the intention to apply this research to larger concerns for human rights, equality, 
and justice. While the research presented in this study does not specifically address women’s issues or 
directly challenge notions of gender, it addresses larger concerns of citizenship, which necessarily 
involves parallel considerations of race, class, gender, language, and sexuality at a global level. 
Additionally, the methodological approach to the study embodies a feminist research agenda, guided by 
principles that classify it as such. In the conclusion of their work, Taylor & Rupp (1991) suggest that, “in 
the course of our work…we came to believe that there is not a distinctive feminist methodology but rather 
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a feminist perspective on the research process” (p. 127). This observation gives feminist research 
methodology the space to apply to more than just women’s issues, but marginalized communities more 
broadly when they are cast through the lens of a feminist perspective (Harnois, 2013, pp. 5-6). 
Specifically, it adapts the qualities that Maria Mies (1991)describes of feminist research when she said, 
“While dominant science views things as static, dualistically ahistorical, mechanical, and additive, feminist 
science, which has not lost sight of its political goal, strives for a new view of the whole societal 
constellation in which things appear as historical, contradictory, linked to each other, and capable of being 
changed” (p. 63). The research process in this study follows the assumption that protracted refugee 
circumstances are more than a scientific occurrence, but rather a dynamic system embedded in global 
politics and history. The analysis of this type of system requires the lens of a political activist who believes 
these situations can and should change. In this case, the feminist approach lends itself to analyzing 
systemic interactions between individuals and global collective actors, which “dominant science” cannot 
reveal. Using the work of Fonow and Cook (1991) as a framework, refugee research of this type is clearly 
feminist in nature. Among the qualities of feminist research that they describe is “reflexivity” in which 
researchers “…reflect upon, examine critically, and explore analytically the nature of the research 
process” (Fonow & Cook, 1991, p. 2). By becoming involved in the life narratives of Kiziba residents, 
linking them to our own understanding of regional dynamics, and critically assessing an iterative approach 
to research in this context, we maintain that even without a primary focus on gender, the methodology 
described here is indeed feminist.  
Another aspect of feminist research that plays out in challenging environments such as Kiziba is 
that of acknowledging the role that the researchers’ own emotions play in the process of inquiry. In 
feminist research methodologies, this is not seen as a scientific weakness, but rather an opportunity for “a 
source of insight or a signal of rupture in social reality” (p. 9) that contributes to the production of 
knowledge (Fonow & Cook, 1991). The fact then that I was drawn to this research topic because of my 
interest in migration, as a member of a family of migrants, and compelled to study Kiziba based on 
conversations with a Red Cross acquaintance in Rwanda serves as an opportunity in feminist analysis to 
draw upon personal insight and emotions to deepen the study. In this particular setting, it would be 
impossible to claim that our own emotional states of being and insights did not play a role in the research 
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process. Asking refugees about traumatic life experiences and the journey from peace to conflict to safety 
and subsequent limbo draws one into the interviewees’ lives. Without expressed empathy for the speaker, 
an interviewer cannot delve into the ways in which these individuals conceptualize their own experience. 
The goal of the research was not simply to gather statistics on the self-identification of nationality, 
citizenship, and belonging, but rather to engage the multi-faceted experiences of Kiziba residents who live 
in an existence of intense waiting. For that reason, the feminist methodology that embraces the fact that 
emotions play a part in all data gathering processes is fully realized in the way the Kiziba Camp study 
evolved. That is not to say that the research was entirely emotionally driven. Maria Mies captures the dual 
nature of balancing emotions and objectivity with what she called “partial identification,” which 
researchers use to develop a “double consciousness...[to become] aware of the objective structures 
within which we live and work (1991, p. 79).”  She suggests that a researcher must disengage from her 
consumerist identity and instead channel her “human beingness” so that she can adopt “...the necessary 
closeness to the others as well as the necessary distance from [herself]” (Mies, 1991, p. 80). In this way, 
we opened ourselves up to the open conversations about experiences of displacement while channeling 
one another to maintain focus on the broader topic at hand. 
The three tenets of feminist research articulated by Fonow and Cook (1991) serve as guiding 
principles of this research methodology. Specifically, they call upon researchers to demonstrate flexibility, 
theoretical reflexivity, creativity, and therefore dynamic growth framed through a feminist perspective. 
These qualities manifest in refugee research, as demonstrated by the ways in which the research agenda 
adapted to the changing requirements of MIDIMAR, the internal governance structures of the camp, and 
the availability of interviewees to speak freely with us. In particular, aspects of reflexivity, calls to action, 
and social justice featured prominently in our experience with the refugees, where they took an active role 
in the research process and shaped the nature of the goals of this study beyond the scope of scholarship 
alone to the aspirations of using this research to serve as a political platform with which to assist in 
improving the lives of this population of protracted refugees. 
REFLEXIVITY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 
A critical facet of feminist research methodology involves considering one’s own social location in 
relation to the study and its participants. Social location describes the prism of socio-economic and 
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political factors that shape a person’s viewpoint. The combination of these factors imply that there cannot 
be a truly objective study, as the human investigators are subject to their own life circumstances and 
experiences that shape the ways they approach the project at hand. These factors account for “…cultural 
values and power relations that contribute to subordination or oppression of other groups,” including race, 
class, and gender (Wood, 2009). By acknowledging our social location as economically and politically 
privileged, white, educated, women researchers, we can begin to challenge the underlying power 
dynamics that potentially shape the data gathering and analysis process. In particular, we represented 
the global North, a geo-political region the refugees immediately associated with political agency and 
power. This aspect of our social location added a layer of complexity to the interview process as refugees 
regularly asked us to be ‘ambassadors’ for their stories. Ambassadorship carried weight in terms of the 
ability to affect political change by sharing the refugees’ stories to politicians and INGOs that can change 
the circumstances of Kiziba’s protracted exile. These notions of ambassadorship and our perceived 
relative power to carry their messages into the international community form a section of the data analysis 
chapters to follow.  
Confrontation of the researcher’s social location and subsequent effects on the study and 
participants involves a reflexive analysis of the process of inquiry at its most fundamental level (Fonow & 
Cook, 1991, p. 2; Oakley, 1992). In what way does my culture and relative privileges shape the way I 
hear and see the stories of others? In what way does it shape the way other participants see me, and 
subsequently the study? How does knowledge of this affect my methodological approach? These are the 
important considerations for the researcher to both observe potential areas for bias and protect 
participants from unintentional exploitation or harm. Some, however, argue that overreliance on reflexivity 
to accomplish these goals may lead to a false sense of tempering negative influences on the study 
(Hesse-Biber, 2012, pp. 197-198; Naples, 2003, pp. 41-42).   
Despite some criticisms about the extent to which reflexivity of research processes improves the 
study both ethically and methodologically, the concept provides opportunity for the population of interest 
to move from being the “researched” to active participants (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005; Oakley, 1992). In 
feminist theory, this creates an environment for richer, deeper analysis of the complex dynamics that 
shape social situations. Part of the reflexive process is to allow participants to ask questions of the 
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researcher and directly engage in the process, though not all choose to take part in this way (DeShong, 
2013). In the case of Kiziba Camp interviewees, one recurring theme arose from the opportunity to ask us 
questions, that of story stewardship. In different words, many of the participants asked how we would use 
their stories, images, and in what ways we could actually make changes to improve their life 
circumstances. The prevalence of this question was itself surprising, demonstrating not only how the 
refugees viewed our relative power but also how in tune they were with the larger political and NGO 
systems that affect their everyday lives. No one asked for any specific measures or made demands that 
we felt we could not meet. This is an important point as we constantly strive to avoid false promises or 
misleading participants in any way. Through these questions, the interviewees took an active role in 
shaping the project by helping us to formulate a way to incorporate a scholar-activist approach, where the 
researcher attempts to directly engage with the participants to attain mutually beneficial study outcomes. 
On a very individual level, this manifested as an offer to share the images and portraits we collected with 
them. Pictures are relatively rare in the camp, but many have access to technology that allows them to 
download images. Additionally, we plan to print portraits to mail to the camp manager for distribution to 
our interviewees.  
More broadly, and calling us to a higher level of commitment to this research, the refugees asked 
how we could use our power and privilege to affect change for them. This aspect of the ambassador 
request ties directly to the concept of “action orientation” in feminist research (Fonow & Cook, 1991, pp. 
5-9). What could we do to help them change their circumstances? It is a very heavy question to reflect on, 
and challenged us as researchers to consider our larger activist roles in the topics we choose to study. 
For them, protracted refugee status is not a lens through which to view larger political dysfunction at the 
regional and global levels. Their questions about ambassadorship constantly reminded us that this is a 
lived experience—one that they seek solutions in order to transform both their daily lives and the larger 
structural circumstances of Kiziba. While our social capital and relative power waver in relation to context, 
within the refugee camp research environment it took on the symbolic significance of being an avenue to 
bring an end to protraction, or even the monotony of food availability. Throughout this project, we paid 
close attention to the various methods with which we can use our privilege as a tool to give voice to 
refugee stories in a way that might somehow ultimately contribute positively to their lives. As academics, 
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our most prominent method to affect change is through writing, research, and subsequent awareness. In 
the short term, this is what we could offer, and most respondents seemed comfortable with that answer. 
For the long term, we continue to contemplate the ways in which our scholarship possesses the potential 
to engage in larger political and social change. Through the seemingly simple act of engaging the 
refugees in the research project by creating space for questions, they ultimately shaped the project and 
our own capacities for thinking reflexively on the research process in a forced migration context. The 
refugees themselves encouraged us to grow and think beyond the boundaries of academe to the realm of 
activism.  
ETHICS OF FORCED MIGRATION RESEARCH 
A number of scholars have written specifically about the ethics of conducting research among 
refugee and IDP populations. These studies encompass an array of migration locations—combat zones, 
IDP camps, refugee camps, urban settlements, and settlement abroad—from a variety of disciplines, 
mainly bioethics and social work. Among their contemplations of the roles and responsibilities of 
researchers working with displaced persons, philosophical and practical themes emerge. This section 
focuses on these broad ethical themes beginning first with the philosophical and ending with the practical. 
I will address these in turn in the context of the Kiziba Camp study to evaluate the methodological 
planning before the study, the iterative process of adjusting methods to reflect changing understandings 
of ethical research in this context, and finally the assessment process after the study’s completion. 
PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 
Qualitative feminist field research derives from a strong desire to immerse oneself in the 
narratives of others, allowing their stories to guide the interview content and direction to shape the 
outcome of the final project. Often, this research methodology receives criticism from more quantitative 
fields for being overly subjective, limited in scope, and at times emotional, thereby risking objectivity by 
engaging too personally with the “subject” of the study. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) offer an alternative 
assessment of this approach. In their attempt to conceptualize a moral framework with which to conduct 
ethical field research, they caution that rules, as those posed by IRBs, are not enough to guarantee 
ethical compliance. They observe,  
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…describing the real does not leave us with a value-neutral world devoid of moral content 
and guidance. Rather, with the help of thick ethical description—using concepts that are 
at once descriptive and value-laden (e.g. “courageous,” “brutal,” “gentle”)—we can re-
enchant the world morally, and disclose the moral normativity that we inevitably have to 
deal with in our lives as humans and researchers. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, p. 176) 
Ethically, then, as researchers we must acknowledge that our academic goals cannot be divorced from 
the study participants’ humanness or our own. To embrace this is to readily admit the bias in our work so 
that others can make informed decisions about applying the scope of these studies to other situations. 
Among the philosophical moral challenges we must confront in forced migration fieldwork, concepts of 
power, vulnerability, and a commitment to “do no harm” are the most predominant. 
POWER 
In feminist methodologies, as described in the previous section, considerations of the 
researcher’s social location and relative power in the interviewer/interviewee relationship plays an 
important role in disclosing the potential, and acknowledged, sources of bias in much the same way 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) advocate for using language that discloses this connection. The same 
researchers note that ethical qualitative research represents certain power imbalances despite the 
leaning toward participant-guided studies, cautioning that qualitative methods do not necessarily translate 
to ethical, power-balanced studies. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) argue that power dynamics emerge 
when the researcher controls the start and end of the conversation, uses the interview as an instrument to 
further her own research agenda, manipulates the conversation to guide it back to the research topic, and 
monopolizes the interpretation of the data collected. They warn that without acknowledging these power 
dynamics, one cannot conduct ethical, objective studies.  
Lammers (2007) criticizes this researcher-centric analysis of power by noting that it is equally 
crucial to recognize a researcher’s lack of power in the relationship. She recounts her experiences 
working among urban refugees in Uganda and how her social location as a white, female researcher with 
relative wealth translated to very little ability to make a substantial difference at the level expected of an 
“expert.” She recalls, “It was not mere modesty that made me not want to be approached as the expert; I 
found it unbearable to be confronted with my own powerlessness in the face of so much hardship” 
(Lammers, 2007, p. 74). She goes on to criticize that often researchers considering the power dynamics 
in a study think only in terms of economic power. This is troubling because: 
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Refugees are especially affected by this discourse of powerlessness and it is often 
overlooked that power springs from many sources: power that comes with wealth or 
status, physical power, the power of personality, intellectual power, the power, or ability 
to have rewarding relationships with others, the powers of creativity. (Lammers, 2007, pp. 
74-75)  
In my experience, my own power has always manifested in my mind as the power to leave the camp at 
the end of the day. These moments of crossing the camp border elicited reflection on the larger relative 
power I hold in my ability to pursue my life goals without substantive restrictions, travel across a range of 
geographic locations with minimal surveillance, and even regulate the rhythm, tempo, and variety in my 
every day activities. Regardless of personal intentions, these power differentials embed innate 
imbalances in the researcher/researched dynamic. The point Lammers raised, however, is an important 
one because, in the context of refugee camps, we rely almost entirely on key informants, gatekeepers, 
and the generosity of participants who share their stories. At those moments, it is they, not us, who have 
more power in the relationship. They control access and the flow of information; they control which voices 
and truths will be represented and which will not. Lammers’ contestation of the common use of “power” in 
methodological conversations calls us to reflect upon moments and situations of relative power—rather 
than a sense of overall power or dominance—and provides an ethical framework with which to view our 
data collection. Some researchers view this relative power in subtle ways, where interviewees’ stories 
later become researchers’ data, where refugees have little control over the outcome and researchers 
maintain a “monopoly of interpretation” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, p. 165). Ethically, this manifests as 
forms of “stealing stories” that many researchers take for granted (Pittaway, Bartolomei, & Hugman, 
2010). By taking precautions, such as maintaining ongoing communication with study participants and 
ensuring their access to interviews and portraits, we attempt to mitigate the relative power differential that 
situates us in control of their stories.   
VULNERABILITY 
Another major theme in the conversation on research ethics among displaced persons revolves 
around the definition and use of the word “vulnerability,” particularly when applying for IRB approvals. As 
Turton (1996) describes, “displacement” carries with it the assumption that humans naturally belong to a 
certain place and that losing this territorial association, “…is to lose some part of one’s very humanity” (p. 
97). This assumption, carried over in refugee research, creates the sense that potential research 
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participants are necessarily vulnerable for having been stripped of a part of themselves. Some reasons 
for this potential vulnerability include: lack of political rights in host nations; limited oversight from 
authorities or governments during flight; and camp demographics that reflect the incident that precipitated 
their flight, meaning potential for mixed ethnic and political groupings within camps exist (Leaning, 2001). 
Extending this argument of refugee vulnerability, Lange, Rogers, and Dodds (2013), using the case of 
bioethics, warn that vulnerability is best described in terms of layers of attributes that incorporate 
spatiotemporal factors and “explain an individual’s susceptibility to harm or wrongs” (p. 336). This is an 
important point that distinguishes certain populations from others. They argue that to ethically address the 
vulnerability of research participants, “researchers must attend to the broader circumstances facing 
research participants and the entire constellation of their inherent, situational, and pathogenic 
vulnerabilities” (Lange et al., 2013, p. 336). The literature on ethics in refugee research informs us that we 
should treat the use of the word “vulnerable” with care. Certain societal and political changes do indeed 
lead to vulnerabilities in access to service, political oversight, and potential for violence, among others. 
The term, however, should not loosely define all displaced contexts, as the specific instances of 
vulnerability are unique to each situation.  
In the case of Kiziba, the type of vulnerability is not the same as that of an IDP camp situated in a 
conflict zone, or that of a camp that has only been settled in the past few years. Kiziba, as a relatively 
homogenous camp of Kinyarwanda-speaking refugees from the DRC who fled in one of two waves in 
response to conflict nearly two decades ago, reflects human vulnerability that arises not only from conflict, 
but also from prolonged political limbo and extended periods of monotony in everyday life. These factors 
uniquely inform the ways in which we describe Kiziba residents as “vulnerable,” noting that most are not 
in immediate physical danger or devoid of food, medical care, or education. Kiziba residents, in this 
context, are vulnerable in that their existence hinges on the participation of the aid community—the 
rhythm of life revolves around the sometimes unpredictable aid truck deliveries. They are vulnerable 
because they are outsiders without full citizenship and participation rights in their host country, even if 
most have an amicable relationship with neighboring Rwandan citizens. And, among myriad other 
reasons, Kiziba residents are vulnerable in their relative lack of agency to change their situation; those 
who have tried to go home have often met violence or death in the DRC, and those who stay remain in 
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political limbo. Thus, the researchers’ interpretation of the Kiziba context represents a more nuanced 
approach to ethically defining “vulnerability,” leading us to use the descriptor in reference to a distinct 
case in terms of the nature of power relations, longevity of location, and proximity of imminent threats.  
DO NO HARM 
A prominent theme in the academic conversations about ethical research among forced migrants 
is the idea that research should “do no harm.” The often traumatic experience of flight, regardless of how 
long ago, is a sensitive topic for most refugees. Inviting participants to discuss their forced migration 
revisits these past traumas in ways that can be harmful, emotionally or physically, to participants (De 
Haene, Grietens, & Verschueren, 2010, p. 1672). To protect “vulnerable” populations, IRB approval 
necessitates a research procedure that includes acquiring informed consent from the participants. 
Pittaway, Bartolomei, and Hugman (2010) challenge this step of protection noting, “It cannot be assumed 
that research participants necessarily share a common understanding of the purpose of research, the role 
of the academic and the academy, notions of consent, forms of engagement (and recruitment), or 
communication and perceptions of risk” (p. 242). Only an iterative process of informed consent, in which 
the subject is reminded in different parts of the dialog how this data will be used, can ensure that the 
participant fully accepts the researcher’s goals (Hugman, Pittaway, & Bartolomei, 2011, pp. 1278, 1281). 
This is not to be condescending, but to ensure that academic norms transcend cultural and linguistic 
barriers. For the Kiziba study, we openly answered questions from participants about the use of the data 
and photographs taken of every participant. Well versed in NGO “speak,” the participants challenged us 
about how we would be “ambassadors of their stories” and what we could do to improve their situation. It 
is impossible to know if these conversations crossed linguistic and cultural lines in order to be interpreted 
in the same way by both researchers and participants, but interviewees seemed comfortable with the idea 
that their stories (without identities) would be shared with the international community in book-form which 
would shed light on the protracted displacement they have been experiencing for the last two decades. 
Hugman et al. (2011) caution, however, that this can create its own potential for harm where some 
community members are willing to risk danger in order to share their stories. This, they observe, is not 
necessarily a universally shared opinion among the other camp members, and accordingly does not 
demonstrate an understanding of the scope to which this data could be used or how it might affect them 
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at later stages in their lives. The researchers recall a particular incident where a refugee resettled abroad 
and saw his shared images on promotional materials. Pittaway et al. (2010) of the same research team 
observed, “While for the most part they are proud to be featured, at times they are shocked to find that 
their story is public knowledge” (p. 233). These incidents carry a legacy and travel through refugee 
communities in ways that impact all researchers; participants’ assessment of the intentions and potential 
dispersion of information gathered through contact in camp situations can create mistrust or aversion to 
participation.  
Finally, Hugman et al. (2011) argue that harm can also come unintentionally as part of the 
research process. When researchers leave the site, some think of the information collected in the field as 
“data” and the participants as “sources,” while the refugees, from their own studies, “regard themselves 
as continuing to be part of the research” (p. 1278). An important ethical consideration for researcher, 
then, is the concept of ownership over data. This informs the care over all copies of the data and privacy 
of information contained in those interviews, as well as the ways in which the data are used to improve 
the lives of those who donated their stories. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) describe these as “macro-
ethical considerations” (p. 167). In contrast to micro-ethics which ensure that individuals are treated 
ethically with respect and dignity, macro-ethics dictate the ways in which the “knowledge produced will 
circulate in the wider culture and affect humans and society” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, p. 167). It is this 
consideration that ensures not only the privacy and safety of the individual, but the responsible use of the 
data derived from these personal interviews, which is not the property of one individual, but rather the 
combined endeavor of the researchers and participants.  
PRACTICAL ETHICS 
This last point transitions into practical guidelines to help the researcher practice good ethics 
during fieldwork. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) argue that these are best learned as cases in fieldwork 
context, rather than as concrete rules to follow as each situation warrants its own ethical lens. They urge 
researchers to become “morally proficient” by evaluating the work of others, specifically observing the 
context of the interview in both space and time (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, pp. 177-178). In general, 
however, the researcher’s goals must balance between minimizing risk to the participants while gathering 
enough data to paint a picture of the field. This risks re-traumatizing participants or even exposing them to 
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research assistants or translators who create feelings of insecurity among those sharing narratives 
(Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 193). 
Pittaway et al. (2010) introduce a version of reciprocal research in which participants both inform 
the direction of the study and design of inquiry. While they acknowledge that there is no established 
framework for accomplishing this in every case, and that funding is short and IRB approvals complex, 
ultimately all researchers must allow participants into the research process in ways that contribute to a 
dynamic, iterative process of participation. Speaking directly to the nature of questions that the Kiziba 
study participants posed to us, Pittaway et al. (2010) recall of their research, “They challenged us to 
consider both our own ethical research practice and the value of the organizational ethical arrangements 
which informed our work. More importantly, they challenged us to examine if we actually applied the 
principles of human rights and community participation, which we so proudly espouse in theory, to our 
work on the ground” (p. 235). In Kiziba, questions about our plans for follow-through, policy involvement, 
and use of their stories came up in nearly every interview. The participants called us to a higher level of 
academia—one in which we at least try to use their narratives as a tool to help improve their lives.  
The challenge of morally undertaking the care of so many sensitive stories for the “greater good” 
is a question of how to leave a research site. Given the realities of funding to access remote global 
locations and the relative lack of connection after leaving the camp, how do we walk away carrying pieces 
of participants’ experience with us? Jacobsen and Landau (2003) express this in terms of friendship after 
working closely with refugees (p. 192), while Pittaway et al. (2010) encourage researchers to “recogniz[e] 
them as subjects in the process and not simply as sources of data,” implying a commitment to revisit the 
community again (p. 231). The efforts of Pittaway et al. to establish a working research relationship with a 
women’s group in Thailand called into question the idea of data ownership after the project’s completion. 
Often this data becomes the “property” of the researcher or institution, rather than a shared commodity 
that results from collaborative work. To complicate this, they note that many representatives, particularly 
women, in camps are figureheads for male household members. This brings into question the validity of 
data collected. The authors ask, “How do researchers ever know that the version they have recorded is 
an accurate reflection of the refugee experience?” (Pittaway et al., 2010, p. 233) Ultimately, the ways in 
which one leaves a research site defines more than potential future interactions with the interviewees; it 
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establishes an ethical standard for the research profession that elevates inquiry into populations of 
interest from “researched” to “participants.” Only through these considerations does our work take on the 
potential for social change beyond academic publication, an aspiration that should exist in all research 
work (Turton, 1996). 
To perform research ethically in the Kiziba case, we assured participants that photos would be 
used for educational purposes only—so that more people could know about the protracted status of 
residents in the camp—as opposed to media, promotional, or other activities. We promised that we would 
distribute the pictures to them later, and four participants have already received copies of their photos.2 It 
is impossible to make guarantees about returning for larger projects in the camps, since we cannot 
assure funding access. We strive to be moral in our use of the data as a probative case study into the 
specific protracted refugee experience of the members of Kiziba Camp, rather than all refugees globally 
or even those in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. By contextualizing our approach and limiting the scope 
of the study, we endeavor to avoid many pitfalls of unethical research that implies broader generalizations 
than afforded by the data. The remote nature and limited access of the Kiziba community prohibits the 
type of reciprocal research envisioned by Pittaway et al. (2010); however, as researchers, throughout this 
four-year project, we maintained contact with key informants, developed a short-term project to meet the 
needs of some participants, and plan to continue our relationship with MIDIMAR and the camp staff, 
NGOs, and residents.  
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
The two researchers involved in the qualitative data collection portion of this study submitted a full 
application detailing the study objectives, methodology, and research questions to the university 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) though the College of Arts and Letters at Old Dominion University. This 
application specified the terms and scope of the personal interviews conducted in Kiziba Camp in 
Rwanda. Protocol as articulated in the IRB application ensures confidentiality of all information and 
narratives gathered in the camp. Pseudonyms replace participants’ real names to protect their identity, 
safety, and privacy. Prior to each interview, the researchers informed the participant of the study goals 
2 These residents have access to social media and email resources, so we provided digital copies. 
                                                     
 
121 
and intended outcome. Interviewees provided verbal consent to participate in the research. The 
researchers regularly engaged the participants to ask questions and reiterate the extent to which the 
narratives would serve the larger academic and policy-oriented community. Interviewees could end the 
interview and/or withdraw from the study at any point. Beyond official meetings with elected councils, 
NGO representatives, and MIDIMAR staff, the researchers made every effort to ensure one-on-one 
interviews to protect the privacy of the interviewee. It is important to understand, however, the context of 
refugee camp environments, particularly the proximity of residents to one another. As much as possible, 
given the close quarters of the camp, the researchers maintained privacy by utilizing key informants who 
kept others away from the meeting areas. The researchers recorded all interviews, with the recording 
device kept in full view of the participant, in order to maintain the integrity of their narratives and 
experiences without relying on notes or shorthand. As described above, in order to maximize the 
available time to speak directly with refugees during the two-day window allotted by MIDIMAR’s camp 
pass, the researchers approached interviews as a team where one engaged in dialog with the participant 
while the other took notes. This effectively allowed the two researchers to present the study questions 
fluidly, follow up to questions arising from the dialog, and address questions directed at the study and the 
researchers from the participants.  
CAMP ACCESS AND LIMITATIONS  
ACCESS 
Conducting research in a refugee camp poses unique challenges to the data collection process. 
At the national level, the government of Rwanda is very sensitive to negative criticism and wary of outside 
researchers for at least two reasons. First, the government is trying to prevent outside researchers from 
collecting data in Rwanda and simply taking it out and publishing articles and research from it, but giving 
no credit to the data-producing institution. The Minister of Health for Rwanda articulated the vulnerability 
of public institutions to this problem given the large amounts of data the government records and 
maintains (Agnes Binagwaho, personal communication, 22 January 2013). Western researchers often 
publish reports independently without opportunity for input from Rwandan officials on the study 
methodology, data use, or results leading to negative publicity for government-sponsored programs. 
Abuse by external researchers claiming to seek collaborative work in the past is a serious consideration 
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for all government agencies evaluating proposals by foreign researchers. This type of behavior resulted in 
a general mistrust of researchers coming in to collect data for their own career advancements. A second, 
related reason the government is wary of outside researchers stems from the recent publication of 
negative reports on different aspects of Rwandan life and politics that reflect negatively on the country 
without an opportunity for review or rebuttal of the study results. These dynamics certainly represent 
larger power struggles between researchers and “researched,” especially in developing countries.  
MIDIMAR in particular faces these same challenges compounded by the responsibility of 
protecting a large, politically and economically vulnerable population in its purview. Minimally, these 
conditions warrant thorough vetting of all researchers intending to study the Congolese refugee 
population. According to Rwanda’s government standards, formal applications with copies of official 
passports and letters of explanation precede a visit to the Ministry to receive an official letter of approval 
granting a two-day maximum entry pass to the refugee camp. This is the first layer of barriers to entry. 
With the official Ministry letter, complete with government stamp, after traveling to the remote mountaintop 
location of Kiziba, one must then gain access through the elected camp leadership. This study took place 
during three separate two-day trips spanning four years, but each entry required some scrutiny from the 
camp leadership above and beyond the official Ministry level. The next section describes the process of 
gaining entry through this second layer of scrutiny in more detail. 
BUILDING TRUST 
To gain access to the formal application process, I relied upon organizational support systems, 
strong existing research networks, and key informants from Rwanda who could navigate the internal 
processes and local politics of access. In 2011, a personal contact at the Rwanda Red Cross facilitated 
the process of attaining an official camp pass from MIDIMAR. As mentioned above, the sensitivity of 
allowing foreign researchers into this highly protected community necessitates scrutiny on the part of the 
government. An endorsement from the Rwanda Red Cross, an agency with which they work closely, 
made the camp pass request possible during that first research year. It is important to note, however, that 
even with the Red Cross backing, numerous phone calls, official letters, and application requests were 
still part of the admission process. MIDIMAR granted the pass based on the recommendation of the 
Rwanda Red Cross, but still thoroughly vetted us before allowing entry.  
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For the first visit to the camp, the official MIDIMAR letter was not enough to gain entry past the 
Kiziba gate guards. The guards, refugees themselves, also conducted an extensive check of our 
credentials. My professor, two fellow graduate students, driver, and I arrived in the main square of the 
camp only to find another barrier to entry. In a room off of the main square, the Council of Elders spoke 
with our driver at length in Kinyarwanda to gather details of our intentions and objectives while in the 
camp. The evidence our driver used to persuade the Council of Elders to allow us into the camp to 
conduct research hinged directly on the concept of trust and protecting the vulnerability of those in their 
care. Our driver recounted to them an incident that happened while we drove up the mountain from town 
to the camp. My professor had spotted a woman wearing an Obama handkerchief on her head with a 
picture of the President of the US printed on it. She wanted to take a picture, but asked our driver to ask 
the woman on our behalf if it would be okay. The woman declined, so we thanked her and drove away 
without a photo. Using this story as evidence, our driver convinced the Council that we would respect the 
privacy and wishes of those in the camp.  
This moment of research spoke to me for two very personal reasons. First, I was acutely aware of 
the fact that we, a group of four white US women, relied entirely on our black native Congolese male 
driver to negotiate in a language we could not understand to a room full of men in order to gain access to 
the broader population. This irony of feminist research emphasized for me my own limitations as a white, 
female researcher with nonexistent linguistic abilities among a group of people for whom verbal 
communication with peers is so important. Had our driver not noticed that photographic consent moment; 
not known us as well as he did and been able to articulate our intentions; not been raised in the DRC 
himself; and not been seen as a male “elder” in his own right, I am not convinced that the Ministry pass 
would have been enough to get us into the camp that day. My own social location, age, and gender 
naturally inform the lens through which I viewed these moments, but also presented as a set of limitations 
in this very sensitive and restricted environment. The encounter with the elder group also hinted at a 
phenomenon of durability that presents more fully in Chapter 6. The council and elected officials 
disregarded official Red Cross and MIDIMAR paperwork giving us access to the camp; this act represents 
a sense of autonomy, perhaps even state-like, that the Council oversees the affairs of the camp and 
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ensures the welfare of its residents. This constitution of the camp governance system placed us squarely 
as outsiders, entitled access only as deemed acceptable by this elder male council.  
The visit in 2013 unfolded much differently than the previous trip. The official letter took several 
trips to the Ministry, networking connections with the MIDIMAR Camp Manager, and navigating the 
Ministry channels to find the official pass administrator. This time, with the same driver but also 
accompanied by an upper-middle class, female Rwandan friend, we met very little resistance at the front 
gate, yet more resistance in the main square than the previous year. Upon our arrival, a man introduced 
himself to us as the Camp President, though later conversations with a MIDIMAR representative called 
this title into question. He was reluctant to allow us to enter the camp or speak directly with the residents 
there. To confirm our official MIDIMAR letter, he called the Kiziba Camp Manager. When he was unable 
to get through, the Camp President offered to personally answer any questions we had, but would not let 
us directly interact with the refugees. We were not interested in his singular narrative, so we convinced 
him to assemble groups of elected representatives with whom we could speak without leaving the main 
square of the camp. To get permission to speak with these two groups required extensive explanation of 
what we were planning to study, the kinds of questions we planned to ask, and what we planned to do 
with this information. Ultimately, two all-male groups of elected camp leaders met to speak with us at 
length.  
The first group represented the elected leaders of various aspects of life in the camp, such as 
president (overall), education, sports and recreation, and health. The second group was comprised of 
security personnel from a selection of the camp’s villages and the overall elected security representative 
for the entire camp. The camp president facilitated these meetings over the course of two days and 
contained them to one room off of the main square and behind the high school. At the end of the second 
day, the elected head of education convinced the stand-in president to allow us to walk to the market, 
about one quarter of a mile from the square toward the center of the camp, with strict supervision. As we 
toured the short stretch of road, two members of the Security Council monitored us to ensure we did not 
interact with anyone inappropriately or take any pictures. As the day began to end, these two guards left 
us to do other things. The extent of our research freedom that year was limited to an hour and a half 
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unsupervised in the market and just before sundown. The rest of the data were collected from official 
elected representatives in one single room reserved for camp administration.  
The third visit, in June 2014, represented an entirely different process. At the Ministry, we 
received our camp pass with very few hurdles as we had been through the process twice before. 
Accompanied by a different driver who coincidentally was born and raised in a similar part of the DRC as 
many of the refugees in the camp, we easily negotiated access to the front gate. At the main square, we 
met the new elected camp president, a young man in his early twenties who spoke English. I recognized 
him from the council of camp officials from the previous year, and with very few questions he entrusted us 
to the supervision of our key informant for the rest of our time in Kiziba. No one said it to us explicitly, but I 
believe access to the camp came easiest in 2014 both from our repeat visits over the years and our 
vested interest in some of the camp residents and their projects. That year, I worked with the American 
Refugee Committee to develop a two-day workshop on knitting and crochet, led by my mother, an expert 
in those skills. The workshops were well-received and may have contributed to the sense that we, as 
foreign researchers, are invested in the lives of Kiziba residents. Additionally, I think respecting people’s 
rights and privacy during our previous visits and just showing interest enough to come back for a third 
time gained us some credibility that simultaneously facilitated access. Regardless of its origin, the camp 
president’s approval that year granted us unfettered access to the entire camp, allowing insight into the 
farthest reaches of this seemingly permanent temporary city on a remote mountaintop near Kibuye. 
The obstacles we faced each year to gaining entry to the camp, both at the national and local 
levels, reflect underlying hierarchies of power and structural changes in Kiziba that occur throughout time. 
Though much of the camp seems stagnant and permanent on the surface level, life and society changes 
in response to conditions in Rwanda, the DRC, and the humanitarian organizations that provide services 
and stability for the residents there. Furthermore, each year, access to this remote, highly monitored, and 
shifting society hinged centrally upon our ability to draw from local informants and utilize a wide range of 
existing contacts within Rwanda.   
KEY INFORMANTS AND CAMP GEOGRAPHY 
Kiziba is a densely packed community of small mud brick and wooden buildings whose borders 
drape over the sides of a mountaintop, looking onto Lake Kivu. Accommodating over 16,000 people, the 
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majority of roads are footpaths that weave in between these buildings and merge onto a few main 
thoroughfares. It would be easy to get lost in the maze of alleyways, and given the close proximity of 
houses, it would be equally easy to unintentionally invade someone’s privacy while walking past an open 
door. These geographic, housing, and socio-economic realities placed sharp contours on our ability to 
show up as outsiders and talk to residents in efforts to gain personal information and interview data. 
“Fitting in” took on a number of layers within this lived context. Rather than setting out with specific 
research questions in a formal method, we learned to see daily life through the eyes of residents, walking 
through their world and experiencing dimensions far outside of our initial conceptualization of the central 
thematic topics.  
The first visit in 2011 started with a brief orientation walk through camp down the main road that 
passes the camp market. We did not try to interview anyone or ask questions, we simply spent a few 
hours observing life in the camp around the main center of economic activity. During that walk, a man in 
his mid-twenties approached us with the intent of practicing the English skills that he had learned in a 
small conversation group. He offered to show us other parts of the camp and asked what most interested 
us. During that initial tour, we visited a nursery school on the outskirts of the camp, the high school in the 
very center of the camp, the clinic, and several family houses. Based on advice given to us by Dr. Susan 
Martin of Georgetown University shortly before this trip to Rwanda, we were most eager to see the outer 
edges of the camp. There, she claimed, is where one can really get a sense of what life is like in the 
camp and the residents’ needs. Without a local guide, I cannot imagine how we would have gained 
access to these far reaches of the rural camp.  
From an ethnographic observational perspective, the most striking dimension of life in Kiziba is its 
orderliness, cleanliness, and general sense of security. The camp Security Council and other elected 
leaders all confirm that the rate of crime is very low. As one leader pointed out, “We have nothing, so 
there is nothing to fight over or steal” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). As an 
example of a well-run refugee camp in Central Africa, Kiziba Camp hosts a number of high profile NGO 
visitors each year in addition to the NGO staff working there, making residents relatively comfortable with 
foreigners walking around and asking questions. I never felt that we needed an escort for our safety or 
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security; rather, the escort served as a cultural ambassador who was familiar with the camp layout, 
offered insights into life there, and facilitated interviews that enabled informed consent.  
The daily rhythm of camp life closely follows the schedule of school children. Students of all ages 
leave class en masse for lunch break and flood the camp walkways. After the break is over, they return to 
their respective classrooms, with different schooling levels located throughout the camp. The nursery 
school is on the outskirts of the camp. On our second day in Kiziba, our guide offered to walk us out to 
the outer camp boundaries as we had requested. The walk to the nursery school was down a narrow dirt 
path that clung to the edges of the mountain below the houses in the camp above. It wound slightly down 
toward a soccer field and a collection of small cement buildings where our volunteer guide convinced a 
teacher to allow us to join class. The education system in Kiziba is both a particular source of pride for its 
regional success in producing passing students as well as a source of discontent given the limited extent 
of its services. Residents regularly comment about the lack of resources to finish high school. 
Additionally, while at school students have access to Internet and are taught how to use computers. Upon 
leaving school at the terminus of 10th grade, however, residents can no longer use these Internet 
services. Instead, they must rely on mobile phones to connect with those beyond the camp, a problem 
with inherent economic constraints. 
That man who became our guide for the next day and a half assumed the role of a critical key 
informant for this study and facilitated access in each of the subsequent visits. Between the first visit in 
2011 and the second in 2013, we lost contact with our key informant due to lack of access to an Internet 
connection and ability to secure enough money beyond basic expenses to activate his mobile phone 
regularly. These economic restrictions dictate access for the majority of residents in Kiziba. Only through 
irregular employment or trading opportunities can one get money to charge and buy minutes for mobile 
phone use. Though we lost contact with him between 2011 and 2013, upon our arrival during the second 
visit, he happened to be walking past the main square as we parked our vehicle and we were once again 
reunited. As a central hub for daily social interactions, this meeting was serendipitous but also spoke to 
the rhythm of life in Kiziba, which is highly tuned to events in the main square. This chance meeting 
precipitated the subsequent two years of research, but also highlighted the vulnerability of our research 
methods on connectivity and social connections amidst considerable technological challenges in the 
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camp. Speaking to the challenge of maintaining contact with refugees over the course of the year, the 
following research visit required coordination both with the key informant over sporadic email and phone 
messages, as well as communicating to him through others in the camp when they had access to social 
media and email outlets. Continuity of research, in this case, relied on a complex network of both 
technological and human social networks to maintain relationships with those in the camp.  
Though there was not much he could do to improve our access to residents that year, since he 
was not a member of any elected council, he managed what access he could in the market where we met 
with his mother. In 2014, that same guide and friend worked tirelessly for two full days tracking down 
volunteer village and quartier leaders willing to participate in our interview process. Truly without the 
intervention of this key informant, this study would not have materialized in such a fruitful way. Even a 
Kinyarwanda-speaking outsider would have encountered difficulties locating so many willing elected 
leaders to participate individually in our study. Likewise, at the Ministry level, key informants with personal 
connections to the Kiziba Camp Manager and Minister of MIDIMAR led to the opportunity to hold hour-
long interviews with each representative.  
Another dimension of reliance on others to produce the interview data lies in the linguistic 
barriers. In 2011, there were relatively few fluent English speakers in the camp. Rwanda converted the 
official language of public school instruction from French to English in 2008 (McGreal, 2008). Even with 
some French knowledge, many of the older refugees there only speak Kinyarwanda. During the first visit, 
we relied mainly on our Francophone driver’s negotiations with camp representatives in Kinyarwanda, as 
discussed above, and on French/English translations from our volunteer guide. The interviews conducted 
with NGO and school representatives required no interpreter as their education levels afforded them 
English and French fluency. For the second visit, we relied mainly on translations provided by our 
Francophone Rwandan friend and volunteer translations in English offered by the elected head of 
Education for the camp, who was eager to practice his conversation skills. Knowing that these 
interpreters were not fluent English speakers or professional language experts, we later had the 
recordings of the conversations translated for official research purposes later. The immediate translation 
services offered in the camp provided enough context to allow further questioning and in-depth 
conversations. During the third visit in 2014, our driver served as both cultural and linguistic interpreter 
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among the interview participants recruited by the key informant mentioned above. My own Kinyarwanda 
skills are limited to hello, how are you, and thank you very much, which I used as often as I could. While 
this is always a first start to breaking down cultural barriers, realistically the entire study hinged on the 
translation and interpretation skills and services of native Kinyarwanda speakers. Some nuances of the 
conversations and responses were likely lost in translation. This is a particular challenge to conducting 




Interviews followed a semi-structured format, relying on certain key questions asked to everyone 
and designed to guide the flow of conversation. If the interviewee felt compelled to diverge from the 
question to expand on certain ideas or convey personal experiences, she or he was encouraged to do so. 
Despite some concerns from the interviewees about giving “wrong” answers, we ensured that each 
person had the space to share to the extent he or she felt comfortable. As a two-person team, the 
researchers took turns asking questions from the core list of questions, while both adding follow-on 
inquiries as they arose. This allowed for one researcher to finish taking notes while the other proceeded 
to the next question. A small recording device documented all interviews, but supplementary notes served 
as a critical component of the research program to account for background noise that occasionally made 
parts of the recording difficult to understand. As much as possible, we conducted these interviews 
individually in order to grant the speaker privacy regarding her or his answers and allow free-flowing 
conversation about a variety of potentially sensitive topics. Unlike the interviews with elected council 
members in 2013, and the meetings with NGO representatives in 2011, the 2014 interviews with 
community leaders did not occur in group settings. Each leader was given as much time to answer and 
ask questions individually as she wanted. Our university IRB recommended against the use of focus 
groups for this phase of the questions in order to protect the privacy and sensitivity of the conversation 
topics.  
As mentioned above, one must understand privacy in a refugee camp in the context of the 
crowded, open-door environment of Kiziba. As much as possible, these interviews took place on benches 
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distanced from open doors and windows of the many neighboring houses, and key informants who 
facilitated our research visit asked passersby to keep their distance. In particular, it proved challenging to 
keep small children away, who regularly began to accumulate in the alleyways between the houses 
surrounding our interview sites. Our key informants often chased them away and encouraged them to go 
back to school, but they were nevertheless present in the background of our research. Most adults 
maintained a respectful distance from the interview site. This may have been out of respect for the 
elected officials we were interviewing. Despite the apparent distance, the close proximity of everything 
inside the camp makes it difficult to guarantee that no one overheard the conversation. The second on-
site measure of protection we could provide for the interviewees due to lack of complete privacy was 
simply to observe reluctance to answer a set of questions and move on to other topics of interest. If an 
interviewee was not comfortable talking about a set of questions, we chose not to pursue that particular 
set of prompts in order to respect her or his privacy not to answer questions in such an open 
environment. A deeper description of the camp setting follows, and may better illustrate the challenges of 
maintaining true privacy in this environment. 
This study purposefully addresses the divergence of Hutu/Tutsi history only as necessary to 
further the understanding of a particular group of forced migrants. While certain aspects of this 
racial/ethnic distinction are a critical part of the story, much of it is not since this study takes as a 
foundational assumption that the Banyarwanda refugees in Rwanda are from the DRC. Ethnic tensions, 
discriminatory practices, and social exclusion hinge on the Rwanda/Congo divide above and beyond 
Hutu/Tutsi distinctions. For this reason, and to respect national sensitivities about racial/ethnic 
discussions in Rwanda, I did not ask any interviewees who participated in this study to identify as one 
ethnic group or another. The question did not add value to the present study and, as the following section 
shows, would add a layer of tension that unnecessarily complicates a shared condition of protracted 
forced displacement.  
We asked every interviewee questions about past, present, and future living conditions, as well 
as about messages to give to the international community (see Interview Questions). About the past, we 
asked where she was from and what it was like there, as well about relations with neighbors there before 
the war and whether she still had family there. Additionally, we asked each interviewee where “home” 
131 
was to him and to tell us his “nationality.” This theme of belonging also arose in questions about where 
one would live if one could choose. Every person answered questions about the future, specifically about 
what life he sees for his children in the coming years. We also asked questions about leaving the camp 
and whether the interviewee knew anyone who left to live in either Rwanda or the DRC. For those few 
who knew someone, we asked them to share what they knew of the experiences of those who left the 
camp. As concluding questions, we asked each participant: 1) What would you like the international 
community to know about this situation here in Kiziba? 2) Would you like to ask/know anything of us?  
As feminist researchers, we designed these final questions with reciprocity in mind. We had 
hoped that it would give the interviewee the freedom to ask some questions about us to satisfy some 
curiosity or to no longer feel like the object of a study. We intended the question as an invitation to 
participate directly in the study, rather than serve as a data source. Our interpreter informed us early on, 
however, that in Kinyarwanda this question translates as an opportunity to make a request or “wish” of the 
person asking. Wanting to avoid the perception of giving false promises, we attempted to rephrase the 
question, but many still saw it as an opportunity to voice concerns and ask for activist-type help rather 
than learn about us. The exception to this was some of the camp youth that we interviewed, who were 
also interested in cross cultural learning as well as using the opportunity to make larger “wishes” for the 
work we plan to do with this interview data. In fact, the consistent way in which Kiziba residents received 
this question informed a growth moment for the study and the researchers. Their interest in how we plan 
to use the data and how it would benefit them challenged us, as outsiders with little opportunity for regular 
communication with our participants, to envision ways to carry this work forward in both an academic and 
policy/activist way. The most productive use of this connection with the community leaders of Kiziba is not 
yet clear, but the participants generally felt that a book publication was a legitimate means to get their 
story out into the larger international arena. As researchers, we continue to contemplate the questions 
posed to us by the participants regarding the ways in which we would be “ambassadors of their stories” 
and how our research could help them in their daily lives.  
INTERVIEW PROCESS 
The data collection for this study began in 2011 with interviews conducted with the official 
approval of camp authorities to attain overview information, demographics, and general data on Kiziba 
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Camp. We arranged to meet the leadership of each of the NGOs operating within the camp, with the 
exception of the ARC whose representative was away that week. These meetings consisted of 
informational interviews with the lead medical staff at the clinic operated by Africa Humanitarian Action 
(AHA), the principal of the camp high school, who also served as a representative of the Rwandan 
education system, and the head of the education-based humanitarian assistance, who was then an 
employee of Jesuit Refugee Service USA. Each of these representatives provided facts and information 
about their respective sector of camp services and answered questions that contextualized life in Kiziba. 
Given their education levels and training, most of these representatives conversed in English, with the 
exception of the 2011 high school principal who was predominantly Francophone. 
In 2013, through a contact at the Rwanda Red Cross, we secured a one-hour private interview 
with the Kiziba Camp Manager for MIDIMAR. In his official capacity, he explained the history of the camp, 
its demographic makeup, and the national policies related to Kiziba’s operations. As an official 
representative of the government, this representative used English comfortably throughout our interview 
in the nation’s capital, which afforded room for several follow-up themes within the conversation. At the 
camp, through the unofficial camp president, we participated in two meetings with elected officials of 
Kiziba. One group consisted of six all-male members of the Executive Council. These elected men 
represented various sectors of camp life including Education; Youth, Sports, and Culture; Health and 
Welfare; Security; and Borders. This sample of meeting participants constituted the entire Executive 
Council, to the best of our knowledge. The second group, led by the camp level Head of Security, 
consisted of an all-male assembly of security officials elected from village and quartier (neighborhood) 
levels. While there are 10 quartier and approximately five villages in each (two have six villages), eight 
security members participated in the dialog based on availability. Executive Council members and the 
unofficial camp president selected these participants, thus the group likely reflects some level of bias. Our 
native Kinyarwanda-speaking, educated, female, middle-class Rwandan friend from Kigali interpreted the 
interviews into French and English when necessary. The elected head of the Education sector in the 
camp supplemented the English interpretations. A fluent Kinyarwanda/English speaker later translated 
the recorded conversations to ensure word-for-word recording of the dialog. 
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The third return visit to Kiziba generated the most in-depth and expansive data set. The 
interviews conducted in 2014 adopted a different format than in previous visits. These interviews were 
conducted in a one-on-one setting, providing as much privacy as the environment allowed (see Interview 
Questions). Given the full population size of Kiziba totaling over 16,000 and the limited two-day access 
pass, a reasonable random sampling of residents was not possible. In order to develop a strategic plan to 
obtain an overview of feelings within the camp, I determined the most productive use of our time there 
was to concentrate on those who elected by their community members to represent their voices to higher 
echelons of power within the camp. Interviewees were selected based on their social position in their 
respective sub-communities. Two major groups were the focus of this interview process. First, using the 
connections of our key informant, we interviewed 11 elected leaders in the camp. Each was the elected 
village representative, responsible for approximately 70 households per village, who reports directly to the 
elected leader of the quartier. One interviewee was one of only two women quartier leaders out of the ten 
officials at this level in the camp. She oversees five village-level leaders and reports directly to the camp 
president. The United Nations standards for the camp require 30% of elected leadership to be filled by 
women (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). At Kiziba, 
women hold over 40% of these seats. So, we sought out both male and female village leaders to 
participate in the interviews. They represented a wide range of ages, from 22 to 68, and various 
communities of origin in the DRC. The vast majority of this group had very little grasp of French or 
English. We conducted interviews primarily in English, relying on word-for-word interpretation by a native 
Kinyarwanda speaker at the time of the interview recording. 
The second group in 2014 consisted of youth in their late-teens and early twenties. We did not 
choose these youth based on leadership qualities, as there were not any relevant youth-led groups from 
which to sample during our time in Kiziba. These participants volunteered based on availability and 
interest, and thus may reflect some sampling bias. Yet their input served as a vital dimension in 
understanding the experiences of youth who were born in Kiziba and who had not ever left the camp 
environment since their birth or early arrival. Both women and men participated in this round of interviews 
and represented a variety of regions in the DRC and ages upon first arrival in Kiziba. Given the study 
topic of citizenship and belonging, this group served as a critical insight into perceptions of “home” given 
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that many had never been or could not remember their place of origin in the DRC. This demographic 
group provided additional perspective on life and opportunity for youth in the camp, as well as future 
plans given the limited opportunities afforded in protracted limbo. Adapting to their various education 
levels and completion of English language courses, we conducted some of these interviews in English, 
while others required the services of our native Kinyarwanda-speaking interpreter. Many of the 
interviewees understood our questions in English, but felt more comfortable answering in Kinyarwanda. A 
professional research assistant who worked with us throughout the interviews and observational 
moments interpreted all of the interviews word-for-word. Sharing a common geographic history as the 
interviewees, he also provided insight into the spatial relationship between participants’ areas of origin. 
As mentioned briefly above, the interpreter used for the 2014 interviews was Rwandan, but born 
and raised in an area of the DRC familiar to the participants. His personal connection with some of their 
areas of origin played a vital role in participants feeling at ease during each interview session. At the start 
of an interview, our interpreter introduced each of us, explained the purposes of the study, the types of 
questions we planned to ask, and his role in the process. He formally gained their verbal consent through 
this process, but informally gained their trust by relating stories of his own childhood in the DRC and 
reflecting on places or people that they might know in common. Considering the importance of trust 
building and the complexities of conducting research in a refugee camp, this interpreter became a 
defining element in the overall success of this research. He served the greater purpose of ensuring for 
our participants that we meant no harm by our questions and intended to use the answers in a 
responsible way. Additionally, his engagement with our research provided cultural insight to help us 
understand why some of our questions did not cultural translate to participants. A later section discusses 
this further. 
SECONDARY DATA 
The residents of Kiziba Camp embody the notion of a highly protected research group. The 
sensitivity of their living conditions and life experiences, as well as the security aspects that brought them 
to the camp and continue to keep them there, make interview research somewhat ethically challenging. In 
an effort to protect the residents of the camp, the Rwandan government generally issues only two-day 
passes for groups no larger than three visitors. This ensures some level of privacy for the refugees and 
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helps to prevent their exploitation as a kind of captive audience. Due to these limitations, secondary data 
played a significant role in developing a set of data with which to analyze this particular protracted 
context. To supplement the life narratives gathered through personal interviews, we also interviewed 
MIDIMAR representatives. Additionally, UNHCR and other NGO reports on the status of Congolese 
refugees in Rwanda and residents of Kiziba more specifically added to the data available about life there. 
Where available, we utilized news articles and quotes from MIDIMAR officials from media sources. 
Reports conducted by other researchers in camps near Kiziba along the DRC border and a Global Youth 
Connect report from August 2012 also provided valuable context and references, given the limited access 
to documentation specifically about Kiziba and limited allowable hours inside the camp.  
Though not providing data specifically related to citizenship and belonging, NGO representatives 
played a role in data provision for this research project. In Kiziba Camp, with its enduring presence in the 
area, the UNHCR has overall control over the distribution of aid resources. This is mainly an 
administrative role, with each aspect of aid outsourced to different NGOs in the camp. As mentioned 
above, Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) maintains the camp clinic. The ARC oversees livelihood/ 
economic opportunities projects as well as others within the camp. In 2011, the Jesuit Refugee Services 
maintained and administered the camp school system. This has since changed hands. These NGO 
representatives keep the camp functioning on a daily basis in coordination with MIDIMAR officials who 
manage the overall camp and provide national-level assistance as necessary to keep the refugees safe 
and healthy. The majority of NGO workers enters the camp in the morning and leaves at night, with the 
exception of those who are refugees that live in Kiziba. Interviews with representatives from AHA, Jesuit 
Refugee Services, and school staff shaped the study by providing context for the situation in which the 
refugees live.  
Additionally, through a chance contact, the Minister of MIDIMAR, Séraphine Mukantabana, in the 
company of her chief public affairs officer, generously provided us a short-notice, hour-long meeting in 
her office in Kigali. As a former refugee, she balanced the discussion between official humanitarian 
policies and her own experiences. We did not record the interview on an audio device, but took extensive 
notes on the conversation. Her experience as a refugee, NGO worker, and later Minister provided 
perspective on the national policy considerations that provide both support for refugee welfare and 
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practical use of limited resources in a developing country. She provided insight into the challenges 
Rwanda faces in developing long-term solutions for the residents of Kiziba and other camps. In particular, 
she tries to work with her counterpart in the DRC, facilitating meetings in camps to discuss the security 
situation there and options for return. While the meetings are infrequent and difficult to arrange, she feels 
it is extremely important for the refugees to hear from their home government about the specific security 
situations in order to make informed choices about their future. Despite the Minister’s self-proclaimed 
weakness in English and the background noise of the street below, she answered extensive questions 
about national policies and camp conditions with no trouble. Her grasp of the conversation was extensive, 
having lived as a refugee and worked through the NGO ranks to become more deeply involved in macro-
level policies. This perspective served as a valuable insight into intersections between macro- and micro-
level decisions that contribute to protracted displacement in the Great Lakes region.  
DATA ANALYSIS 
Conversations with MIDIMAR representatives took place at the Ministry offices in the capital city, 
Kigali, in English and followed both guided questions posed by the researchers and freeform 
conversations initiated by Ministry representatives. The researchers recorded notes from these 
conversations by hand during each interview and later transferred them to digital format. By approaching 
the NGO facilities in person, the researchers organized interviews with NGO representatives working in 
Kiziba Camp. The conversations accompanied tours of the NGO facilities within Kiziba and took place in 
the presence of other staff members, service providers, and camp residents. In order to observe the 
sensitivity and privacy of clients in the NGO offices, the researchers did not record these interviews on an 
audio device, but documented them as handwritten notes. We partially guided these dialogs with our own 
questions and NGO representatives supplemented the conversations with the prescribed information 
about their respective duties and mission that make up the standard organizational rhetoric. During the 
2014 data-gathering visit, we recorded and transcribed, word-for-word, all interviews, taking care to 
ensure the privacy of each conversation to the best of our ability within the camp. Though we used an 
interpreter during the interviews to facilitate conversations when English did not convey properly or the 
interviewee could not understand the question, a native Kinyarwanda and fluent French speaker 
transcribed all portions of the interview word-for-word into English.   
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I coded three years’ worth of field notes and interviews by theme using the software Dedoose® to 
develop a qualitative analysis of the collected data. Phenomenological research methodologies informed 
process of analyzing these data, “emphasiz[ing] the study of conscious experiences as a way of 
understanding the reality around us” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 109). Most distinctively from other 
methodologies, this type of qualitative analysis requires iterative creativity on the part of the researcher, 
as well as a suspension of personal and academic biases and presuppositions (Bhattacherjee, 2012; 
Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Unlike quantitative analyses, where assumptions and theoretical frameworks 
are in the foreground, grounded theory and content analysis allow the researcher creative room to 
develop theories by working through varying types of qualitative data sources.  
The first step in this process involves reading through the entire collection of field notes, interview 
data, and supplementary data to get a macro-level view of the context in which these narratives take 
place. Next, the researcher identifies points of interest or “units of significance” in the data which can be 
grouped into themes (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008). For these units, the researcher must explore the question, 
“Of what is this an instance” (Rosenau, 1980, p. 33), to gauge the relative importance of the text as well 
as situate it in the larger collection of data (Lofland & Lofland, 1995, p. 186). As in Grounded Theory 
research, themes emerge from the data, rather than in positivist methods where hypotheses and existing 
theory determines the categories of data analysis (Charmaz, 2008; Lofland & Lofland, 1995).  
Finally, given the larger macro-level, regional contexts of war and displacement and the micro-
level, lived experiences of refugees in Kiziba, the researcher interprets the data to derive meaning and 
theoretical foundations for future work on protracted refugee situations (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008). Based on 
the principles of Grounded Theory, this theoretical building process is distinguished by “sampling for 
theory construction to check and refine conceptual categories, not for representativeness of a given 
population” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 83). For this particular type of research agenda, emergent themes 
unintended by the researchers’ original questions constitute a major advancement in developing 
theoretical underpinnings to describe the context at hand. In the case of Kiziba residents, the participants’ 
direct interaction with the researchers’ questions, particularly about stewardship of stories, not only 
ethically guided the study but also moved the research focus toward agency, activism, and engagement 
with global politics among refugees. Analyses of these interactions with participants and emergent 
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themes constitutes a “sense making” approach to research where data enhances understanding of the 
experience of protracted displacement rather than testing hypotheses or existing theories (Bhattacherjee, 
2012, p. 113).  
As described in the data collection section, additional NGO and media reports supplement the 
available data to understand the life, conditions, and political situation of Kiziba Camp. I analyzed these 
texts using content analysis, where reports pertaining specifically to life in Kiziba, similar camps in 
Rwanda, or IDP camps in the DRC with similar demographics are broken down into analytic units. As in 
the interview data, I then organized these units into themes and collected them into larger constructs with 
which to develop theories about protracted displacement in the Great Lakes region of Africa 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012, pp. 115-116). Using the above techniques, this study incorporates a mixed set of 
qualitative analysis strategies in order to understand the experiences of Kiziba residents and frame them 
in the larger socio-political dynamics of the region. Those analyses will follow in subsequent chapters. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter outlined the process of developing a study about protracted refugee experiences in 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Specifically, it described the context of Kiziba Camp in Rwanda and the 
process of collecting data in a sensitive context. This process involved proper consideration of the ethical 
challenges facing researchers of forced migration as well as the barriers to entry to access isolated, 
protected populations. Using a feminist methodological approach, two researchers conducted interviews 
with MIDIMAR officials, NGO representatives, Kiziba elected representatives, and a small group of youth 
over the course of three years. This data gathering process relied on the expertise of key informants and 
skilled interpreters, as well as networking access to service providers who helped us to navigate the 
gatekeepers of Kiziba Camp. With camp access limited to short visit passes, I supplemented interview 
data with media, NGO, and researcher reports on Kiziba and nearby camps in order to develop a more 
complete picture of protracted political limbo of Kinyarwanda speakers from the DRC. I analyzed the data 
using principles of phenomenological research methodology, specifically Grounded Theory and analysis 
of texts, to build a theoretical framework with which to understand the intersection between protracted 
refugee situations, citizenship, and concepts of “home” and “belonging.” The next chapters detail the 
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DURABILITY AND THE STATE 
 
For me as a former refugee, I think that resettlement is of 
course a solution. But it can’t be a last, last solution. The last 
solution is to come home. Somebody has to be sure to have his 
own country. 




KIZIBA AS A MICROCOSM 
The residents of Kiziba Camp represent a subset of the Banyarwanda population from the DRC 
forced from their respective regions beginning in 1996 (Mhembu-Salter, 2006). The first refugees to cross 
into Rwanda who now live in the camp arrived on 27 November 1996, with another wave arriving in 2006. 
Now, the camp is closed to new arrivals unless they fall under the family reunification plan of Rwanda and 
the UNHCR. From the total population of approximately 16,000 refugees, about 88% of residents come 
from North Kivu, 7% from South Kivu, 3% from Katanga, and 2% from other parts of the DRC (G. 
Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). The differences in their 
geographic origins, given the varying historical experiences of citizenship, marginalization, and migration, 
did not reveal any regionally-specific trends in the data. This likely points to the homogenizing effect of 
camp life and collectively constructed identity discussed at length in this and the next chapters. Three 
residents from other parts of Africa (Kenya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia) also live in the camp (G. Karagire, 
Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013).1 With the exception of those three, 
the vast majority of Kiziba residents are Kinyarwanda-speaking and from the same broad Banyarwanda 
ethnic background (Mhembu-Salter, 2006). This makes them particularly well suited to live in Rwanda, 
given their shared language, which allows for interaction between the refugees and their Rwandese 
neighbors.  
1 The Kiziba Camp manager at MIDIMAR revealed the nationalities of the three non-Congolese refugees 
in the camp. Camp residents confirmed their presence during our fieldwork. The houses for these three 
non-Congolese were situated directly along the main thoroughfare through the camp, so we had the 
opportunity to greet them. Since the project focus is on the Banyarwanda story, we did not pursue 
interviews with these individuals, yet their experiences within the camp would be interesting for a future 
study.   
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In this demographic way, Kiziba represents a microcosm of the population of Banyarwanda driven 
out of the Congo nearly two decades ago. Their shared experiences, despite vastly different geographic 
points of origin, contain a common history of exclusion faced by Banyarwanda in the DRC. Drawing from 
the narratives of this population as a starting point, this chapter explores the ways in which the host 
nation’s state structures are reproduced within the camp to form a sense of permanence in what should 
be a temporary situation. Throughout this chapter, meso-level (states) ‘voices’ are often portrayed 
through the voices of refugees, rather than state actors. The sampling of state voices here is limited to the 
Minister of MIDIMAR and the Kiziba Camp Manager; however, refugees serving in administrative roles 
within the camp walk a fine line between the state- and individual- level perspectives. In the process of 
recreating host-state governance structures within the camp, elected and volunteer camp position-holders 
report to state institutions and to refugee constituents. For that reason, many of their voices feature here 
as insight into the relationship between the state and the camp/individual level experiences within Kiziba. 
This presents some analytical challenges as refugee voices fill in for state-level perspectives, opening up 
a gap in the state representation within this study. Yet the applied realities of the field setting limit both the 
accessibility of state official data and the opportunity to gain perspectives beyond official government 
speak available to the public. Future studies might resolve this by gaining access to government reports, 
more refugee administrators at the state-level, and the government’s public statements about refugee 
hosting. Here, refugee voices illuminate the perspective of state and camp level interactions that best 
support a notion of durability. The portrayal of structure and governance by camp elected leadership and 
security volunteers highlights the entanglement of meso- and macro- structures and institutions that point 
to durable displacement. The lens of governance within the camp ensures that this study captures state-
level actions and perceived motivations by the refugees that contribute to durable displacement. It does 
not provide a strictly state-level view of refugee hosting, and that analysis will be left to future studies.  
Humanitarian protocols additionally give legitimacy to the recreation of the functioning state at the 
local level. INGOs contribute in their own ways to durable displacement through indoctrination into 
national and international values and norms, as well as the construction of economic livelihood initiatives. 
These meso-level voices appear in the study as proxy presence—through humanitarian agency workers 
and billboards, rather than through the organizational rhetoric offered through camp management guides. 
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Again, a dedicated analysis of camp management guides would provide fruitful data for future studies, but 
the focus in this chapter is to evaluate the intertwined messages and perception of INGOs and refugees 
to demonstrate structures of durability within the camp.  
Given the extreme length of protraction, the experiences of refugees in Kiziba Camp shed light on 
how forced migration becomes entrenched as a form of durable displacement—an existence in which the 
refugees feel no disillusions about integrating into Rwanda, but also no sense that there is a place for 
them in this world or in the world outside the camp. The Kiziba Camp case study demonstrates how, in 
the process of treating the symptoms of temporary displacement, state and NGO interactions actually 
become processes of reinforced permanence. Refugee voices help to hone in on these interactions rather 
than analyze state and INGO policies expressed through camp management manuals or institutional 
rhetoric. This chapter details key mechanisms by which Kiziba Camp becomes a container of larger state 
and international relations through the four aspects of camp life: security, education, politics, and 
economic livelihood.  
DISCIPLINE AND BIOPOWER 
Foucault describes two aspects of state control over bodies, discipline and biopower that are 
useful for understanding the dynamic between protracted refugees and the state. This extends to the 
relationship between refugees and the state-like INGOs that provide services within the camp. As S. 
Turner (2010) contends, in refugee contexts INGOs such as UNHCR take on a state-like quality through 
their “everyday practices of governing the camp through norms” (p. 8). As with states, UNHCR requires 
funding, international legitimacy or recognition to operate within sovereign borders, and power in order to 
fulfill its mandate to protect placeless persons (i.e. Responsibility to Protect (R2P); these factors convey 
to similar priorities of states preserving internal and external sovereignty. Similar to states, international 
organizations manage the relationship with citizen-subjects (in this case, refugees) to administer services 
and maintain security. In refugee camps in particular, UNHCR and other service-providing NGOs take on 
state-like qualities in relation to the refugee population that, like the host state, produce systems of 
durable displacement.  
Protraction is central to understanding the state’s role within refugee camps because in these 
extended periods of time and through repetitive interactions, the host government, INGOs, and refugee 
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populations themselves structure and reproduce power relationships. The iterative nature of the 
relationships and power dynamics between these actors inherently exists through the social organization 
and governance of refugee populations in sustained co-existence. Reproduction of this power dynamic 
over the course of decades is part of the cyclical entrenching effect that promotes durable forms of 
displacement. Power of the state over the population requires no explanation; but, as Foucault describes, 
control of the modern sovereignty relies on “…the form of a total and exhaustive obedience in [individuals 
within the population’s] conduct to whatever the imperatives of the state may be” (Foucault, 2007, p. 453). 
In other words, the host government and INGO control over the camp relies on the refugees’ “obedience” 
to the sovereign processes of power and discipline. Hearing refugee voices portray aspects of 
governance throughout this study brings this aspect of ‘obedience’ to the forefront and therefore the 
state’s entanglement in the refugees’ lives and extended protraction. Security provision, educational 
objectives, political structuring and quotas, and the affording of economic opportunities shed light into 
how the host government and INGO attempt to exert these forces in the camp to achieve acquiescence 
with certain values and norms. In a certain sense, then, in this study state and INGO voices are often not 
heard directly, but felt through refugee representatives’ descriptions of state interactions. What I examine 
in this chapter manifests as meso-level instances of power experienced at the micro/individual level. For 
that reason, refugee voices provide valuable insight into the state/INGO/refugee relationship. S. Turner 
(2010) explains INGOs’ desire for strict compliance to norms and imposed social structures as the wish 
for the “self-governing citizen-subject” who, in a camp situation, is more akin to the subject of colonial 
domination. He sees the refugees as largely acted upon by UNHCR; however, as I argue in Chapter 6, 
refugees participate in the processes of protracted displacement in ways that exhibit both lack of agency 
in response to governance as well as some ability to own their situation and derive a sense of power from 
it.  
S. Turner’s (2010) research among Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania in 1997/8 demonstrates 
how state-like INGOs, specifically UNHCR, strategically govern camp populations as non-citizen ‘others’ 
in the host country. The analysis extends to host states that benefit from the presence of refugees by 
reaffirming the citizenship aspect of internal sovereignty. In his study he describes how humanitarian 
144 
agencies often frame the residents as helpless victims, which distorts their own sense of agency and 
autonomy. He explains,  
In the liminal space of the camp, refugees are considered by relief agencies and the 
general public as being outside the normal political life of citizen-subjects. The primary 
concern of the UNHCR is to control and contain this population while at the same time 
keeping it alive and healthy, waiting for the day when the refugees may return to 
‘normality’ and become proper citizens once again…Refugees are, in other words, 
assumed to be without political subjectivity. (S. Turner, 2010, p. 2) 
Through this angle he interrogates the notion that refugees are “innocent” or devoid of any agency by 
situating historical narratives of their violent past, as told by the refugees, into a larger geopolitical 
context. He further argues that refugees serve the interests of nation-states by demonstrating a 
“necessary other” that defines “what the national citizen is not” (S. Turner, 2010, p. 7). In fact, in Turner’s 
(2010, p. 7) view, humanitarian agencies create the notion of dependent, innocent, apolitical victims 
through “the trivial daily practices of ‘caring for’ refugees” in programs such as economic development 
initiatives, agriculture programs, elections, and even healthcare.  
This study extends Turner’s analysis of refugees’ relative agency by placing them as not only 
agents, but also vital actors who occupy a supra-political space. While at first they appear to have little 
voice in the larger political, economic, and social structures that govern daily life, their very existence 
challenges national identities of insider/citizen versus outsider/noncitizen, making them subjects of state-
level identity formation and policymaking. Additionally, their engagement with the global political terrain 
and existence as a UNHCR “population of concern” places them as collective actors in the international 
sphere, affecting international processes through interactions with INGOs and visiting officials.2 Their 
voices in this chapter contextualize the relationship between the host state, INGOs, and refugees that 
further entrenches displacement and leads to durable structures of protracted refugee status.  
BORDERS WITHIN BORDERS 
Understanding refugee camps in terms of state sovereignty starts with the conceptualization of 
this contained space as a representation of an international border within the host territory. In fact, states 
2 Among the political dignitaries and INGO stakeholders who have visited the camp, the refugees spoke 
of Joan Laporta, president of the FC Barcelona soccer club in Spain who contributed to the funding and 
establishment of the community hall equipped with a television to watch soccer (Pedersen, 2010). 
                                                     
 
145 
create this coping mechanism to reinforce international boundaries without violating international norms of 
non-refoulement (Purkey, 2013, p. 701). In other words, the host nation cannot maintain its position within 
the international community by choosing to refuse entry to refugees or force them back over the border. 
In order to validate control over its international borders, however, host nations strive for a containment 
policy that isolates refugees in international borders within domestic borders. In fact, as Purkey (2013) 
explains, fiduciary refugee dependency, which Rwanda arguably follows, bolsters state sovereignty by 
allowing it to exercise a “duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of refugees” (p. 706). This 
practice stands in sharp contrast to the more traditionally accepted notion that humanitarian intervention 
on behalf of refugees erodes domestic sovereignty of the host state. Rather, by assuming more 
responsibility, Purkey (2013) demonstrates that “the state is actually strengthening its claim to sovereign 
power” (p. 706). Rwanda follows this model by publicly demonstrating its commitment to ensuring the 
safety and humane support of refugees. In a statement to the media, the Minister of MIDIMAR noted,  
The establishment of this camp justifies the efforts of the Government of Rwanda into the 
protection of Congolese refugees. However, we recognize that this is not the everlasting 
solution. That is why Rwanda is actively involved in all peace deals at both international 
and regional levels aiming at bringing back peace to DRC, which can be the major factor 
for refugees to return home. (MIDIMAR, 2014b) 
Clearly this altruistic-like hosting also serves a higher international purpose, with Rwanda stepping in to 
work diplomatically with its neighbor to establish a lasting peace.  
The implied role it plays as a ‘donor darling’ and international mediator of peace speaks to the 
state’s pursuit of international recognition critical to its maintenance of sovereignty (Krasner, 2006). By 
hosting the DRC’s refugees and “bringing back peace to DRC,” Rwanda positions itself as an 
international peace-builder, justifying its role on the UN Security Council. This role also confers resource 
support for the burden-sharing of refugees produced by the DRC’s state failures. The Minister of 
MIDIMAR, Séraphine Mukantabana, spoke directly to this during our personal interview by conveying her 
efforts to collaborate with her counterpart in the DRC. Despite the difficulties she faced in doing so, this 
alignment held both strategic and symbolic value for efforts to promote peace and bilateral diplomacy. 
Minister Mukantabana also framed Rwanda’s refugee hosting in terms of the national government’s 
engagement in cross-border peace talks. She emphasized,  
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The most important commitment is to advocate for peace for the refugees…it’s always 
sad to be [away from] your family. It’s one thing to travel abroad [for leisure], but it’s 
worse when you have been forced to leave your homeland. The main assistance 
[needed] is to provide security and peace in the region. (Séraphine Mukantabana, 
personal communication, 13 June 2014).  
Minister Mukantabana even said that her DRC counterpart had visited at least one refugee camp to 
convey the security situation to them and explain their options for the future, namely that they must stay in 
the camp until the political climate in the Kivus improves (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal 
communication, 13 June 2014).  
Minister Mukantabana’s interaction with her DRC counterpart speaks to Rwanda’s public 
attempts to maintain relationships with neighboring countries and work towards regional peace. 
Specifically, the diplomatic rhetoric of the Minister reflects a national commitment to managing 
relationships with neighboring DRC and the international community as a whole—yet another affirmation 
of state sovereignty. Interestingly, the state also plays upon this particular woman leader’s identity as a 
former refugee to represent the country in these cross-border migration issues. Within the larger national 
system of governance, Rwanda’s refugee camps feature as an international entity inside the sovereign 
state. Warranting international attention, peace-building talks and initiatives, and visits from Congolese 
diplomats positions the refugees as both local and international participants, and makes the camps active 
sites to make powerful political statements. In this way, while these Congolese refugee camps represent 
some of the greatest challenges in coping with the region’s conflicts, they also provide political 
opportunities to bolster the identity of the host nation. At the same time, they challenge the ability of the 
international aid/relief system to meet the demands of a long-staying settlement with extensive service 
needs. UNHCR and other INGOs step up to fill this services gap and, in doing so, take on state-like 
qualities such as managing international ‘borders,’ facilitating interstate relationships, rallying international 
support and resources for its operations and policies, and negotiating policies with international actors to 
increase burden-sharing.  
MAPPING KIZIBA 
Let us turn to a virtual immersion walk through Kiziba Camp to identify particular practices, 
systems, and physical features that literally and symbolically reveal this larger international function of 
protracted refugee cases. As a starting point, the seemingly benign layout of Kiziba Camp actually 
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functions as a conduit for expression and interaction between the sovereign power (state and state-like 
INGOs) and camp population. Discipline used to control human bodies inside a territorial state manifests 
as control over space. Specifically, Foucault notes, “…discipline structures a space and addresses the 
essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements” (Foucault, 2007, p. 35). As in 
the towns Foucault describes, Kiziba’s central square serves as the seat of power in the spatial 
configuration of the camp. Here, government and NGO representatives communicate with the population 
though a bulletin board system and maintain a physical presence in this common ground to uphold their 
role as leaders. The square also houses the primary meeting points for elected leadership. The radiating 
structure of the camp’s roads and alleyways from this central meeting point illustrate Foucault’s idea of 
the “milieu” (Foucault, 2007, p. 36), where the layout of this “town” (Kiziba) facilitates social interactions 
including trade and communication, but also functions as a conduit of security and control.  
This system places disproportionate impacts on particular populations and may be less secure in 
practice. In fact, Hyndman (2000) argues, refugee camp geography enables the work of government and 
INGOs but is “inconvenient and potentially dangerous for refugees” and “can exacerbate the workload of 
refugee women” (p. 100). In her analysis, the layout of the camp first and foremost serves the interest of 
the governing body. This is not to say that the camp layout represents some sinister form of control by the 
government or UNHCR; in fact, as Foucault describes, it is a very natural social organization. However, 
the milieu allows for “circulation” throughout the camp, equating to an environment where actions and 
environments become interdependent because they are all spatially linked; the residents become more 
than just individuals, they are a united “population” (Foucault, 2007, pp. 36-37). In this way we can begin 
to imagine the layout of Kiziba as a city-like space, one that may harbor its own sovereign-like qualities. 
As a collective, the population is easier to govern and control. Foucault goes on to summarize that the 
“territorial sovereign [is] an architect of the disciplined space, but also, and almost at the same time 
[historically], the regulator of a milieu” (Foucault, 2007, p. 51). By this, we can see Rwanda—or any host 
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Kiziba Camp offers one differentiating point of governance between host state and INGOs that 
arises under Foucault’s framework. The Rwandan state features primarily in security and disciplinary 
structures within the camp, exemplifying governance and sovereign power. INGOs, however, fall more in 
line with Foucault’s concept of biopower. This type of power comes from subjecting refugees “to a 
strongly moralizing and ethical biopolitical project by humanitarian agencies” through the provision of a 
“caring biopower, concerned with the life and health of the refugee population” (S. Turner, 2010, p. 9). 
Though the state and INGOs exert power over the refugees in different ways, the motivations for these 
actions derive from the same pursuit of resources, recognition, and power so central to the ideas of 
state—or state-like, in the case of UNHCR—sovereignty. Viewing the spatial layout of Kiziba as 
Foucault’s “milieu,” I proceed by identifying sectors of life in the camp, namely security, education, and 
economy, to demonstrate how interactions between refugees, the state, and INGOs perpetuate the 
permanence of their displacement. 
SECURITY 
In his conceptualization of the evolution of state power, Foucault classifies discipline as a way to 
control human bodies spatially, temporally, and behaviorally. Biopower, however, concerns “…a number 
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of phenomena that seem…quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic 
biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of 
power…” (Foucault, 2007, p. 16). Like Foucault, I do not see these power relations as necessarily 
negative or positive, but simply the outcome of a history between the sovereign state and the bodies 
within its territorial jurisdiction. This is an important point because I do not intend to imply that the host 
governments necessarily invoke state control mechanisms with nefarious goals. In fact, I view some 
degree of the reconstruction of state structures within a refugee camp to be a logical outcome of the 
protracted relationship. Based on the criteria set forth by Jacobsen (1996), Rwanda meets nearly all of 
the benchmarks for responding positively to the refugee crisis from the DRC. Some of these criteria 
include establishing a host government institution to support refugees (e.g. MIDIMAR), granting 
permission for refugee-related INGOs to assist in-country, and cooperation with those agencies. 
However, in Lischer’s (2006) rubric where she defines qualities that make certain refugee populations 
more likely to militarize, the Congolese refugees of Rwanda fall in the “somewhat likely” category (p. 19). 
According to her analysis, this type of population has some likelihood of becoming politicized during long-
term exile and thus could pose a potential security threat to the host state and the region. This puts the 
government and INGOs in a precarious position. They must balance the restrictive nature of camp life 
with the frustration experienced by long-term refugees that can lead to local and regional security crises 
as refugees militarize. Threat of potential security disruptions may serve as a powerful motivator for the 
entrenching aspects of Kiziba life explored in this chapter. States and INGOs create systems of 
displacement in order to prevent militarization or other harm to the population. In doing so, they contribute 
to the protraction of the displacement that potentially leads to violence and conflict. 
Given this assessment and the strict character of the Rwandan state, it is not surprising that 
security and surveillance feature prominently in the structure of Kiziba Camp. As I described in the 
literature review, to maintain the legitimacy and efficacy of its internal sovereignty, the state must assure 
citizens of its ability to control populations within its territory (Krasner, 2006). By demonstrating obedience 
to these systems, refugees both find space for personal agency (Holzer, 2013; Zetter, 1991) and 
perpetuate dependency on the host nation and supporting NGOs (Purkey, 2013; Sutter et al., 2012, p. 61; 
Zetter, 1991). From the state and INGO perspective, as S. Turner (2010) argues, “it is the trivial daily 
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practices of ‘caring for’ refugees that create the refugee as bare life” (p. 7). He is speaking of the 
relationship between NGOs and encamped refugees, but the same applies for the host state. Through the 
micro-moments and repeated interaction of caring for the refugees by providing security and the 
necessities for life, the power-institution creates a dependency that defines the refugee as a political 
other. In this way, the interactions among refugees, the state, and other governing agencies (INGOs) 
become cyclic, dependent, and further entrench protraction.  
Careful control of its refugee camps affirms internal and external sovereignties for the host nation. 
Smoothly operating camps, such as Kiziba, serve to exhibit Rwanda’s competence at managing internal 
affairs and security. Likewise, refugee hosting instantiates the Rwandan state’s involvement in the larger 
regional and global political arenas, demonstrating its ability to manage cross-border relations and 
participate in international diplomatic processes. The border surveillance and maintenance aspects of 
refugee hosting speak to larger conversations about securitization of refugees globally. In the context of 
globalization, especially after 9/11, refugees are increasingly viewed as having the potential to militarize 
or bring insecurity to the host country and even host region (Hammerstad, 2011; Loescher & Milner, 
2005a, 2005b; Muggah, 2006; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Though, as Lischer (2006) demonstrates, 
the propensity for violence of refugees is highly dependent on more contextual factors such as the cause 
of flight, the state of the sending and host countries, regional political dynamics, and the presence or 
establishment of a state in exile. Even Rwanda’s MIDMAR Minister admits that these protracted situations 
can lead to security issues. She explained in her interview that the idea of resettlement “alleviates the 
problem of fighting to go home,” but that not being able to go home elicits ideas of fighting. She 
continued, “Being near the border with nothing to do, here is a possibility of thinking about ‘fighting to go 
home’” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). Given that possibility, and the 
turbulent inter-state history between Rwanda and the DRC, one might wonder why Rwanda would go to 
such lengths to accommodate large, protracted refugee populations in the ordered manner that it has so 
far.  
Alexander Betts (2013) provides a theoretical explanation for why some regimes “stretch” to 
accommodate refugees when others do not, a phenomenon he proposes occurs when it benefits the host 
government elites. He defines “regime stretching” as “the degree to which the scope of a regime at the 
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national or local level takes on tasks that deviate from those prescribed at the global level” (Betts, 2013, 
p. 30). In the case of Rwanda, at the surface level the responsible hosting of refugees appears to be the 
government’s way of engaging international norms of refugee hosting. This has not always been the 
case; in fact, the protracted drain on resources and security compounded by premature announcement by 
the UN that the Congo War was over led to at least one major incident of refoulement by the Rwandan 
government (UNHCR, 2002a, 2002b). This was in clear violation of one of the main tenants, 
nonrefoulement, of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN General Assembly, 
1951; UNHCR, 2012b). Those types of situations, however, appear to be isolated incidents in Rwanda’s 
past. Understanding Rwanda’s approach to refugee hosting likely encompasses a broader national 
rhetoric that serves the interests of the country’s governing bodies and elite citizens, namely solidarity 
with an ethnolinguistically related population facing violence reminiscent of the genocide.  
Overtly, Rwanda may be performing “regime-consistent” stretching (Betts, 2013, p. 30) in that 
protection of the Congolese refugees contributes to its “never again” stance toward the 1994 genocide 
(Bromley, 2009; Clover, 2014; Hintjens, 2008). Particularly following the Gatumba massacre in a 
Congolese refugee camp in Burundi in 2004, but also during various spurts of violence in Bukavu, the 
“genocide” label comes up again and again in reference to the Banyarwanda, mainly the Tutsi exiles from 
the DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Structured, orderly care of the Congolese refugees in Rwanda 
aligns with the domestic intent to unite the country against future ethnic violence as well as cement its 
regional commitment to a larger linguistic diaspora that continues to face persecution. Hosting refugees 
facing persecution like that experienced in Rwanda during the genocide may also be an instance of 
nation-building, where refugees serve as a visual reminder of the consequences of disobedience to 
Rwanda’s strict norms on ethnic identification and discrimination. One scholar notes, “ensuring that 
refugees are offered adequate protection and rights may …be seen as an important expression of state 
sovereignty as opposed to an erosion of state authority” (Purkey, 2013, p. 695). To be clear though, while 
they are part of the collective Banyarwanda diaspora, a distinct demarcation between the status of 
Congolese refugee and Rwandan citizen remains firmly intact and defining for Kiziba residents, with 
significant barriers to transition from the former to the latter. As Loescher and Milner (2005b) contend, 
without alternative policy options, containment of refugees is the most effective way for many host states 
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to maintain political and security-based control over the displaced population. Performance of stringent 
security protocols at the border of the camp serves as a daily reminder of the reach of the state, the 
hospitality of the host, and the political placement of the camp residents as outsiders, all of which 
reinforce the notion of sovereignty at home and abroad.  
The Rwandan state manifests itself in a number of ways within Kiziba Camp. Returning to the 
camp virtual tour, while no fences encircle the boundaries of the camp, the refugees manage official entry 
by way of the main vehicle road. When approaching Kiziba Camp from Kibuye on the shores of Lake 
Kivu, the main road splits at the mountaintop. To the right, a singular dirt vehicle road leads into Kiziba 
Camp, forming the first territorial barrier to entry. The Rwandan government and international NGOs 
officially define the camp’s territory, but the remoteness and almost tragically picturesque location of 
Kiziba’s mountaintop location reinforce the functional security operations of separation and containment. 
The length, remoteness, and marginal quality of the road itself, for example, assures that only those with 
an intention to visit the camp would travel along the eroded infrastructure leading up to the entrance gate. 
Upon arriving at the official border, another border space emerges through physical structures, security 
systems, and even the land’s distinct terrain.  
Despite Kiziba’s distance from Kigali, the guards record entry and exit from the camp daily, 
including non-resident visitors who stay for a few days. Refugees can pass freely through the gate as 
long as they carry their refugee identification cards with them (border guard, personal communication, 
January 26, 2013). Regularly visiting INGO and government workers are generally exempt from scrutiny, 
but every unknown person attempting to pass through the gate must present the official paperwork from 
MIDIMAR granting access to the camp (see Webb (2011) for an account of approaching Kiziba without 
proper paperwork). The MIDIMAR camp manager establishes the entry protocol and the border control 
security volunteers then perform this monitoring and security action of the state (border guard, personal 
communication, January 26, 2013), enacting borders as state representatives. Surveillance and 
documentation of visitors to Kiziba performed by the refugee security volunteers speaks to Rwanda’s 
tendency towards orderliness and firm governance, a feature that it recreates in the camps through 
security protocols.  
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In Kiziba, once the registration book is full, the guards submit the logbook to MIDIMAR in 
exchange for a new one. In this way, the daily tasks of the guards replicate two particular aspects of the 
Rwandan state: record keeping and surveillance. Hyndman (2000, p. 124) explains that cataloging and 
mapping refugee camp populations mirror aspects of colonialism in which metrics represent instruments 
of state control over the colonized. The camp’s border guards, as well as hierarchical elected system of 
representatives, neatly catalog all entry to and from the camp, thus enabling and enacting these 
mechanisms of control all while reinforcing the notion of barriers and borders. The camp borders 
symbolize and demarcate the Congolese foreigner non-citizens against the Rwandan citizens who may 
enter to trade or make use of camp services and water. Administered and performed by the refugees at 
the local level, the Rwandan state exercises its authority and governance while managing the migration 
and political effects of cross-border relations with the DRC that manifest within its own territory in the form 
of long-staying refugees. The rigidity of these protocols and their seamless integration with the rhythm of 
camp life creates its own sense of permanence. Passage of security-based time occurs as the record 
book fills and is replaced by a new book, though no one knows what happens to the names and phone 
numbers contained within. Security volunteers serve as representatives of the state as they regulate the 
population and monitor the borders according to the host nation’s norms and specifications. At the micro-
level, as the security volunteers perform this regularity, they participate as self-governing citizen-subjects 
of Rwanda; meanwhile, they embody the non-citizen ‘other’ that reaffirms Rwanda’s domestic sovereignty 
by serving as a living example of who a citizen is not (S. Turner, 2010). Security performance illustrates 
the blur between the meso- and micro- perspectives. Refugee voices bring life to the policies and 
procedures enforced by the Rwandan host state, but also carry meaning at the microscopic/individual 
level of analysis. The nightly security plan instantiates nearly seamless integration of state and camp 
governance structures and points to durable structures that help maintain refugees in protracted 
situations. 
The omnipresence of the Rwandan state through police and military activities, in combination with 
the responsiveness to requests for help as reported by the Kiziba security volunteers (Personal 
communication, 26 January 2013), represents a level of state involvement not usually seen in other host 
nations (Holzer, 2013). Holzer (2013) asserts that the UNHCR often takes over certain responsibilities to 
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enforce the law within the camp setting. She explains the consequences of this, “Being a ward of 
international law is inextricably tied to alienation from the host law. Camp inhabitants experienced host 
law, primarily though their interactions with the police and security forces, courts and prisons, and the 
chieftaincy” (Holzer, 2013, p. 858). Generally then, in the case of her own research and another 
conducted in Ghana, she observes that civil disputes and criminality were “privatized, administered by 
refugee organizations or nongovernmental organizations rather than state officials” where the “security 
burden [is pushed] onto the backs of already vulnerable camp inhabitants” (Holzer, 2013, p. 858). In 
Kiziba, regular daily disputes are the purview of elected leadership within the camp. Unlike the 
experiences in some other camps, however, the government of Rwanda takes an active role in policing 
the boundaries of the camp. In the event of crimes beyond the scope of the elected camp governance 
mechanisms, the Security Council transfers the cases to the Rwandan Police and justice system. Gender-
based violence and sexual assault occur within the camp, creating a disproportionate risk to women and 
girls. A nongovernmental organization, AVSI (Association des Volontaires pour les Services 
Internationals), attends to cases of sexual assault during the day. When incidents occur during the night 
(since all INGOs leave the camp at sundown and return in the morning), the refugees report them directly 
to the police and send the victim away for care at the hospital in town as soon as possible, rather than 
waiting for the aid workers to return the next day. The attacker is reportedly always remanded to the 
Police, so the refugees did not know the punitive outcome since that is “police matters” (Kiziba Security 
Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). The respect for Rwandan police and justice 
institutions again places the refugees as participating citizen-subjects; the way the matter disappears into 
the Rwandan system, however, emphasizes their outsider status. From the state perspective, then, the 
refugee comply with the host nation norms of security and surveillance and, through the volunteer 
security patrols, facilitate governance and control of the population.  
Foucault (2007) said, “Police is the direct governmentality of the sovereign qua sovereignty” (p. 
441). In this case, the participation of Rwandan security forces serves to demonstrate and reiterate state 
sovereignty over this contained population of non-citizens. Host-state justice institutions take over when 
Kiziba councils cannot address the level of offense. Rather than distancing themselves from the refugees 
and refusing responsibility (Holzer, 2013), the Rwandan government takes a proactive stance while 
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enabling some agency of control within the camp borders. As articulated by the Minister of MIDIMAR, this 
measure reflects the commitment by Rwanda to provide security for the refugees for as long as they are 
on Rwandan soil (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, June 13, 2014).3 The following 
sections take these ideas of host government state structure and views their manifestation in the lives of 
refugees—in particular security volunteers—in Kiziba camp. Together, these sections help to illustrate the 
messy blur between Rwandan institutional and governmental norms and the refugees’ maintenance of 
their own security structures. In the in-between, we begin to see that the state, INGOs, and camp 
residents are intertwined in a way that reinforces durability in displacement through the maintenance of 
security protocols and practices.   
MICRO EXPRESSIONS OF STATE SECURITY STRUCTURES 
Though often not physically present, the reach and values of the host state convey through the 
daily local actions of Kiziba’s volunteer security force. Just before the main road of the camp, a small 
building houses the guards who manage the main gate. Here, refugee security volunteers inspect all 
official paperwork granting entry; in a logbook, they record the names, phone numbers, and license plates 
of everyone entering the camp. For all its formality, however, as researchers we were struck by the 
responsibility bestowed upon the guard gatekeepers, who were also residents themselves. At just 16 
years old, one gate guard confirmed, “Yes, it is me who makes decisions about people who enter here in 
the camp” (border guard, personal communication, January 26, 2013). The sense of pride conveyed by 
the border guards illustrates how refugees embrace micro-moments of agency within their encamped 
lives while enacting the will of the state. The young gate guard represents the first level of containment 
within the camp, an arm of the Rwandan government’s attempt to maintain order and preserve domestic 
sovereignty in the context of these recreated international boundaries within its territory. 
My impression of Kiziba Camp is that of a secure, well-run institution where children feel safe to 
play far from the watchful eyes of their parents. When asked what made Kiziba particularly safe, 
MIDIMAR expressed that Kiziba is not any safer than any of the other border camps. “All the camps are 
3 By some accounts, however, the Rwandan government has knowingly allowed recruitment of refugees, 
even children, from Kiziba and Gihembe camps to join armed rebellions in the DRC (Child Soldiers 
International, 2008; Hege et al., 15 November 2012; Mhembu-Salter, 2006). 
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safe. All have the same governance structures” (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal 
communication, January 25, 2013); however, NGO workers with experience in the other camps did not 
feel the same way (Jesuit Refugee Service education director, personal communication, 14 March, 2011). 
Given that the refugees do not have experience in the other camps and MIDIMAR’s official stance was 
that all the camps were the same, the measure of difference and reason for those potential differences 
was not possible to ascertain. One thing that was very clear during the interviews is that security 
volunteers take their responsibility seriously. Though it is a volunteer position, these camp leaders 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of personal security for themselves, their families, and their 
neighbors. Executive Council members echoed the sentiments of the security volunteers. One stated, 
“…to have peace in our heart is the most important. Even though you cannot satisfy all your needs, you 
feel safe and in security” (Executive Council, personal communication, January 25, 2013). This pride in 
the level of security within the camp and the role the volunteers play speaks to the agency they feel in 
protecting themselves. In a protracted situation where so much is beyond the residents’ control, camp 
security stood out as one particular instance in which refugees felt pride in their ability to exert control 
over some aspects of their daily life conditions—illustrating a resilient enactment of agency in the face of 
such sharp structural determinants of their overall situation.  
At night, the border takes on a different aspect of state re-creation. Refugee camp activities after 
dark remain an under studied research area (Vogler, 2006). Like many other camps, aid workers leave at 
the end of the day—as we were often encouraged to do by the residents as the sun began to set over 
Kiziba—and the regulation and administration of the camp fall entirely to the refugees themselves. In 
these undocumented hours, the refugees take back their agency for control over governance and daily 
activities. Refugees defer to the organizational structures established by the UNHCR and host state and 
become an instance of internal sovereignty and ‘citizen obedience’ played out at the camp level. 
Volunteer patrols organized by the villages within the camp monitor security throughout the night. The 
refugee security force consists of 62 elected members representing each of the neighborhoods in the 
camp, as well as a higher level Security Council that oversees the volunteers. They do not have 
guaranteed access to phones or radio communication. If something happens during the nightly patrols, 
they call out to one another and whoever is nearby will come running to help.  
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In Kiziba, the security volunteers, with a lack of reliable communication mechanisms, utilize the 
spatial arrangement of the main walkways of the camp to ensure other security officers are nearby to call 
out to if one should need assistance. This instance serves as a specific example of utilizing the camp 
layout as a Foucaultian milieu. It also shows the camp residents adopting control mechanisms of the state 
to manage the population in the absence of INGO and state representatives. Orderliness of nighttime 
operations in Kiziba shows the durable reach of the state in this protracted context. Despite no access to 
actual citizenship and incorporation into the Rwandan state, Kiziba residents embrace state structures 
enough to re-enact them at night without state supervision. This is a true performance of the obedient 
self-governing citizen at the camp/individual level, indicating that state structures are so pervasive as to 
have become the norm even without supervision.  
The refugee camp administration disseminates security through the trodden arteries of the camp, 
radiating from the central square. This replicates the disciplinary mechanism of the Rwandan 
government’s focus on security even when the presence of state representatives dissipates for the night. 
It also represents a lens into the milieu’s inability to meet the needs of all residents, particularly those that 
reside in the remotest parts of the camp away from the main thoroughfares (Hyndman, 2000). Around 
7:30 pm, the security volunteers from each neighborhood begin to assemble for the night’s duties 
(Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). MIDIMAR claims that the police have 
provided training on security management to the refugees in Kiziba Camp (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp 
Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013); but, this conflicts with the information provided by 
the Kiziba Security Council that claims they do not receive support or training for their security initiatives 
(Kiziba Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). Regardless of the source of 
security training, the volunteers clearly enforce a functioning security plan that involves close integration 
with Rwandan security forces.  
Though it is unclear who instituted them originally, curfews are a prominent feature of nightlife in 
Kiziba and represent yet another layer of the disciplinary arm of the host state and UNHCR. We know 
from conversations with the refugee-elected head of camp security that security volunteers enforce 
curfews, first at 9:00 pm as a general call to move homeward and then again at 11:00 pm when everyone 
should be inside until 4:00 am when the curfew ends (Executive Council members, personal 
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communication, 25 January 2013). These guidelines, they assured us, are to facilitate control over 
security in the camp by getting everyone home at a reasonable hour. After 11:00 pm, unless there are 
ongoing activities such as televised soccer games in the community hall, the security volunteers patrol to 
ensure everyone has returned home and to address any delinquency (Security volunteer, personal 
communication, 26 January 2013). From sundown, Rwandese soldiers come to protect the camp borders 
(border guard, personal communication, January 26, 2013). Security members that we interviewed were 
reluctant to reveal whether this was to keep outsiders out or insiders in, but a member of the Executive 
Council reported that “there is always Rwandan security around our camp” (Kiziba Executive Council, 
personal communication, January 25, 2013). The Executive Council’s report of regular border guards 
from the Rwandan government provides a window into the ever-present host-state security norms. 
According to the members of the Security Council, Rwandese soldiers arrive every night but never enter 
the camp unless the refugees need them to assist with an incident (personal communication, January 26, 
2013). In this way, the curfews serve as one of Foucault’s sovereign state disciplinary mechanisms, 
where residents are forced to return home and exist in predetermined spaces of control. The security 
volunteers enact this disciplinary protocol. The Rwandese soldiers, then, serve as both a support and 
containment mechanism: they provide logistical support to enforce Foucaultian control and disciplinary 
mechanisms, while standing by to ensure separation from the general population. 
During interviews with the Executive Council in 2013, elected leaders regularly expressed 
gratitude to the Rwandan government with statements like, “We are thankful to the country of Rwanda” 
and “What we appreciate is that this country of Rwanda gives us a place to stay and we thank you 
because this country ensures the security of all refugees we have here in the camp” (Executive council 
member, personal communication, 26 January 2013). This politically-driven sentiment conveyed a sense 
of gratefulness to the host nation, but also a plea to the international community to end the protraction. 
Kiziba elected leadership and security volunteers perform willingly as arms of the state to ensure the 
functioning—and perhaps even the sovereign-like qualities—of their community. Expressions of gratitude 
when Rwandan surveillance was not overtly present during the interviews speak to their performance as 
obedient citizen-subjects and their deep integration with state systems of governance and control.  
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Members of the Executive Council followed these platitudes with a pause before continuing to 
describe the ailments of life in the camp. This conversational pause offered insight beyond the mere 
gratitude that nuanced the sentences with a sense of “thank you, but…” From this and the subsequent 
conversations about the need for “durable solutions,” I concluded that the government does provide a 
strong foundation for security and order within the camp, so much so that the camp residents felt reluctant 
to ask for change that might secure a future beyond the camp. In some ways, this monitored autonomy 
within the operations of the camp serves to further entrench Kiziba residents in displacement. Their 
ongoing rehearsal as obedient citizen-subjects enculturates them into a particular classification of human 
existence. Though performing as such, they are not Rwandan citizens; but, as time passes and they 
become practiced at Rwandan or even INGO citizenry, they also become increasingly removed from their 
former place in the DRC. Kiziba refugees then find themselves in a structured form of limbo where they 
have some forms of constrained agency and the camp becomes a form of sovereign entity disembodied 
from any particular state. This contradictory relationship between the camp and the host state conveyed 
through the words of the Executive Council and Security Council hint at systemic forms of displacement. 
In fact, through the act of caring for the refugees and managing their state of displacement, the refugees 
entrench themselves in systems of host nation governance and citizenry that further distance them from 
the culture and norms of their communities of origin.  
Again, this is not necessarily to portray a nefarious scheme by NGOs or the government to 
control or subjugate the population. The relationship goes both ways, with refugees participating in 
securitization, containment, and resource distribution as faux-citizen-subjects. The voices of the refugees 
show these entrenching aspects of meso-/state-level institutions recreated within the camp. Throughout 
our discussions with the Security Council in 2013, security volunteers repeatedly referred to the pride with 
which they performed these duties, even though they received no pay, because they felt they were 
protecting their family and their community. They reinforced the idea of the camp as outsiders kept 
separate from the surrounding Rwandan nationals. One security member said, “to become a security 
here, people have faith and confidence towards me but also it is a voluntary job so I do it by my own to 
protect people in the camp from enemies who can try to disturb our security” (personal communication, 27 
January 2013). This narrative account provides the most overt framing of Rwandese as potential 
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“enemies” of the camp residents, speaking less to neighborly tensions and more to the clear delineation 
between “us” and “them.” Insider/outsider framing as an entrenching factor in durable displacement 
features more prominently in the analysis of refugee voices in the next chapter. For now, it is important to 
note that the residents perform as obedient citizen-subjects and yet reject and are denied full access to 
citizenship in Rwanda. This enactment of security juxtaposed with outsiderness contributes to the 
durability of their situation.  
MICRO EXPRESSIONS OF SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Like Holzer’s (2013) study, refugees in Kiziba did not express a felt sense of insecurity within the 
camp. The Security Council members came across as forgiving and even dismissive of the petty crimes 
committed within the camp as they attributed them to larger issues of idleness, boredom, and the 
hopelessness of protracted displacement. The camp president in 2013 noted,  
Another problem about security is about people who have nothing to do; they’re always 
here in the village missing what to do. In that case they start doing bad things and create 
bad behaviors, like those young people who finish their senior three secondary. After 
school they have nothing to do…So that’s a big problem, people don’t have activities or 
occupations (Personal communication, January 25, 2013). 
Most incidents revolve around public drunkenness or activities that the Security Council attributes to 
teenagers having nothing to do to occupy their time. Idle youth causing problems with drugs, violence, 
and early pregnancy constituted the main security concern within the camp. In fact, the elected leaders 
and security volunteers seemed to have a very good working relationship with the Rwandese security 
forces. The refugees had confidence in their own security team’s ability to monitor the interior of the camp 
and felt the general state of security in Kiziba was very good. Claims of discontent about life in the camp 
focused more broadly on the international community rather than the relationship with the host 
government. In various interviews with Kiziba elected representatives, youth, and even casual 
conversations with residents, they repeatedly expressed frustration with the larger overall protracted 
situation that defined the camp living conditions and relegated such a large community to a prolonged 
contained existence. In expressing their concerns, refugee participants comfortably used the words 
“durable solutions”—INGO-speak for the theoretical long-term solutions of repatriation, local integration, 
and resettlement, in order of international preference. Shifting focus away from the host state/camp 
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relationship, participants in our interviews seemed to accept the governance structures of Rwanda 
superimposed onto camp life but question the work that international actors were doing to end their exile 
from the DRC. 
Kiziba residents we spoke with engaged a wider international audience by framing camp security 
issues as being the result of limited schooling and the inability to return home. Solutions for these 
grievances speak directly to the role of INGOs and the broader international community, rather than 
qualms with the host nation. They asked for the international community to stabilize the DRC or else 
provide resettlement options because “living as refugees, it’s like living without living” (Village leader, 
personal communication, 5 June 2014). The asked us, as researchers, to be ambassadors for them to the 
international community. Their requests focused on more variety in food aid, more extensive healthcare, 
more access to education, and a long-term solution so they would not have to remain in the camp—all 
aspects of life under the management of INGOs. One village leader simply stated, “We’ve been in this 
camp for eighteen years now. We are really tired of this camp. If we could leave this camp one day, we’ll 
be happy” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). Along this theme, when asked about his hopes for the 
residents of Kiziba, a quartier (neighborhood) leader said, “To leave this life, this is the message. To 
leave. To go somewhere else, if they [the international community] can. Maybe we can have security. We 
can have a good life in terms of health” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). This plea 
to the international community is not just about resettlement, but also political stability in the DRC. Youth 
and village leaders alike asked for “peace in our country so that we can go back home” (youth 
representative, personal communication 6 June 2014). These are calls for solutions at the international 
level, demonstrating refugees’ place as supra-political actors. The refugees therefore occupy a space at 
the very local, camp level, but are also involved in the international dialog of long-term solutions, peace-
building, and conflict. Overall they felt abandoned by international peacemaking processes and 
humanitarian assistance policies, robbed of the autonomy to make choices about their own futures, even 
as they simultaneously served as actors to uphold the international and national levels of camp structure, 
organization, and daily operations. 
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SECURITY AS AN INSTITUTION BETWEEN THE CAMP AND THE STATE 
The Security Council members’ repeated expressions of gratitude to the state of Rwanda, 
commitment to voluntarily monitoring the camp for security issues, and pride in the relative safety of 
Kiziba Camp all communicate a broader identity of a community within the larger Rwandan state 
(personal communication, 26 January 2013). They behave in accordance and in harmony with the 
Rwandan state and their Rwandese neighbors, embracing the identity of good, obedient, self-governing 
citizens. At the same time, however, residents repeatedly reinforced the idea that they do not belong in 
Rwanda. The security and surveillance of the Rwandan state at once envelops them in the compliant and 
participatory nature of citizenship while reinforcing, through careful isolation, the outsider status of these 
Banyarwanda communities within its borders. They share a commitment to orderliness and security, in 
addition to other cultural and linguistic similarities; but carefully managed police and military presence 
draws a clear line designating the insiders and outsiders in this context. While the refugees have 
essentially assimilated within the Rwandan state and become increasingly self-sustaining in the security 
sector, they remain outsiders. As residents become practiced in Rwandan security protocols, they 
integrate in some ways into Rwandan society, which nurtures a sense of permanence in the country and 
community. On the other hand, the clear demarcations between Rwandan citizen and refugee non-citizen 
contribute to the frustration that Lischer (2006) identifies as a seed of conflict, which could destabilize the 
region and also prolong their displaced status.  
These opposing forces—of assimilation juxtaposed with clear delineation between 
insider/outsider and citizen/non-citizen—situate the Banyarwanda as a different category of human 
existence in a world of territorial sovereign states. Performing as a Rwandan citizen, yet excluded from 
the legal path to full integration and citizenship makes it clear they do not belong in the country where 
they have lived for decades. Conformation to this faux-citizen life, particularly for youth who have never 
been to the DRC or do not remember it, further excludes them from the enculturation into Congolese 
citizenship discussed in the next section. As a noncitizen of the world, they are entitled to no place in a 
system of territorial sovereign states. By adopting the norms and culture of the host government and 
INGOs over increasingly long periods of protracted displacement, they entrench themselves in a 
classification of refugee global noncitizen and therefore distance themselves from the realities of at least 
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the first two durable solutions: repatriation or local integration. The next section discusses enculturation 
as citizen-subjects through both formal and informal camp education. 
EDUCATION 
Considerations of refugees’ long-term human potential and the possibility to exercise agency 
within severe structural barriers place education as a central consideration of understanding refugees as 
a noncitizen other. Not only supporting the notion of the host state’s internal sovereignty by defining who 
a citizen is not, refugees participate in citizen-building mechanisms supervised by the host state and 
INGOs that indoctrinate them as members of a community while emphasizing their outsider, non-citizen 
status. The opposing actions of citizen formation and rejection comprise one aspect of the system of 
durability that underlies the relationship between states, INGOs, and refugees. Again, this section blurs 
the line between state and refugee voices to show the ways in which state institutions affect the lives of 
refugees. Through these mixed voices, we see an entangled narrative of citizenship and adherence to 
state and INGO value systems that create durability through their contradictory messages and 
applications.  
At the intersection of Foucault’s disciplinary and biopower mechanisms of the state, education 
features as a central topic of conversation among residents of Kiziba. All refugee camps in Rwanda follow 
the national educational system, arguably an instrument of the country’s internal sovereignty to 
indoctrinate citizens to national norms and values. The standard trajectory for Rwandan citizens is six 
years of primary, three years of lower secondary, and three years of advanced secondary school before 
graduating and becoming eligible for study at university. Students take exams at the end of the junior 
secondary level (US ninth-grade equivalent) to determine eligibility for advanced secondary school 
(Embassy of the United States - Rwanda, 2014). The camp can provide only nine years of education 
based on available UNHCR funding in the country (UNHCR, 2014a).  Students may apply for 
documentation that allows pursuit of advanced secondary school outside of the camp, but without 
scholarships to support tuition, room, and board, the majority of students cannot pursue this opportunity 
(Moscoe, Rogers, Kyarislima, & Umunyana, 2012). By some reports, the lack of available funds to pay for 
completion of school has resulted in problems with prostitution to make enough money for the necessary 
fees (Moscoe et al., 2012). As a result, within this microcosm camp situation, education features 
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prominently as a core institution that embodies the limited opportunity structures of Kiziba, while 
impacting so many other social conditions of the larger community.  
As an interesting twist on gender equity in education, global economic recession has reportedly 
led to a decline in the number of scholarship/sponsorship opportunities for refugee students. Those 
resources that remain are generally available to girls specifically, leading to some resentment toward 
female students (Moscoe et al., 2012). One elder leader, reflecting on these inequities for male education 
opportunities, proclaimed himself “l’ambassador des garcons,” or ambassador of the men (Kiziba Elder 
Councilman, personal communication, 14 March 2011). His expression encapsulates a sentiment in the 
camp that men need an ambassador to ensure equal access to opportunities as women. In 2011, the 
school principal explained to us that because of these scholarships, girls will often return to school in the 
event that they become pregnant and must drop out. Boys, however, will often not return if they fail a 
class or encounter life obstacles because they lose all hope of potentially leaving the camp to study 
(personal communication, 6 June 2014). We live in a world where women still fight for gender equality in 
many aspects of life, but this phenomenon in the camp illustrates how international and host state norms 
and values are imposed onto the refugee camp in what might otherwise seem untraditional—or even 
unfair— way to the refugees themselves.  
During the last visit in 2014, a new school building was under construction to accommodate the 
addition of one grade level to the school curriculum. This will not allow refugees to finish secondary 
school in the camp, but does offer the opportunity to study longer, in which many residents expressed 
interest (Kiziba high school curriculum director, personal communication, 6 June 2014). In this section, I 
discuss the complexity of the education system within Kiziba Camp. This manifests as both the formal 
Rwandese education as well as the extended INGO education that exists though informational billboards. 
By analyzing each in turn, I find instances of the host state and service-providing INGOs deriving 
opportunities for resources, recognition, and power critical to the preservation of sovereignty and point to 
underlying systems that make displacement durable.  
CITIZEN CREATION 
This section examines the camp education structure established, maintained, and monitored by 
the host state in order to understand state-imposed structures that affect refugees’ lives and perceptions 
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of permanence. To begin, I look at the idea of education as a state-run institution for creating citizens. 
Then, I turn to individual refugees’ perspectives to reveal the institutional power of state structures within 
the camp. These voices help to support the discussion of citizenship by illustrating the role of education in 
refugees’ lives through their own accounts. Revealing the power of educational norms and values, 
refugees’ testimonies about education frame the discussion of citizenship and international influences in 
the particular context of Kiziba’s residents.   
EDUCATION AND THE STATE 
The MIDIMAR Minister emphasized in our interview that it is important for refugees to access 
education and develop skills that will help them when they arrive home. This will eventually help them be 
competitive in the job market when they return home to the DRC (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal 
communication, 13 June 2014). In this way, education can be understood through the lens of external 
sovereignty in that, by educating the youth of its troublesome neighbor, Rwanda can potentially shape the 
economy and politics of a future, reintegrated DRC. By supporting a strong education system, with the 
help of UNHCR and other INGOs, Rwanda potentially creates international advocates upon the refugees’ 
return to the DRC; however, since the education system abruptly ends, leaving the refugees “stuck” 
without a high school diploma, they remain entirely dependent on the aid system and unable to seek out 
meaningful futures on their own. This separation from the fully participatory citizen experience maintains 
the refugees at an outsider-like distance and contributes to denying them the agency to end their own 
protracted displacement. If Milner (2011) is correct, failure to promote the participation of educated 
refugees to the international conversation about the fate of the DRC will impede progress to a lasting 
peace in the region. In its current state, camp education keeps refugees engaged in the politics and 
citizenship formation processes of the host nation while entrenching their displacement by not providing 
the means for involvement in peacemaking/building.  
The educational system is a potential beacon of hope for future life plans in the refugees’ eyes as 
well as a frustrating limitation as a result of being a non-citizen. Given its basis in the national education 
system, the camp education provision can also be seen in the intersections of Foucault’s disciplinary and 
biopower concepts. As an element of biopower, the government indoctrinates, in some ways, refugees’ 
minds into the national consciousness. They perform citizenship without external force or coercion by 
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learning the Rwandan order of things at an early age. In effect, as Behdad (2005) argues about American 
culture, education is a tool to create citizens. He explains that education teaches people how to be 
citizens and how to “internalize rational state policies effectively and efficiently [perform] their civil and 
political duties without feeling the exorbitant power of the state” (Behdad, 2005, p. 70). The education 
system is therefore also a disciplinary tool of the state that ensures conformation to government 
expectations by educating on the rules and values of society; essentially it is then a mechanism for 
creating and enforcing internal sovereignty. Through the values instilled during mandatory public 
education, students become knowledgeable about and amenable to state institutions without forceful 
coercion, as imagined by Foucault’s ideas on biopower. In The Making of Citizens, Hughes (1902) speaks 
of global (economic North) school systems as a varied but predicable producer of citizens by saying:  
The fact is, the school is a political institution maintained by the State for the cultivation 
and propagation of national ideals…Every school is a machine deliberately contrived for 
the manufacture of citizens. The die of the machine varies. (p. 4) 
He goes on to say that schools are a selfish attempt of political control by indoctrinating citizens, which is 
“much cheaper than prisons” (Hughes, 1902, p. 5), further emphasizing the role that education plays in 
Foucaultian biopower. It represents state coercion without the use of force, instead using bodies—or 
minds in this instance—as a mechanism of control and indoctrination into the role of a national citizen.  
It is not state control or power here that ensures durable displacement; rather, it is the false 
indoctrination into Rwandan society through the national education system that contributes to a sense of 
permanence. This is of course a complex realization. By operating in a responsible capacity as a host 
nation and supervising the educational system to the best of its ability, the government implicates itself in 
a system of containment. I do not believe this is intentional or driven by ulterior motives, but instead the 
result of necessary repeated interactions over long periods of displacement between the hosts and 
hosted.   
REMINISCING ON OPPORTUNITIES PAST 
In the repetitive cycle of life events that define the rhythm of the camp (e.g. resource distribution, 
curfews, and basic health care), education stands foremost as a symbol of hope for the future. A 24-year-
old Kiziba resident told us, “So, the only thing which can give me hope for the future is to finish my 
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studies. For now, I can’t really tell what I can do because it’s like I’m stuck in life. I can’t finish my studies” 
(personal communication, 6 June 2014). Education represented the most common unprompted topic of 
conversation in all of the individual interviews and focus groups that we held over the course of three 
research visits to Kiziba; in particular, they reflected on the finality of the education track and frustration of 
being “stuck” due to limited opportunities to finish school. The administrative director in 2014 informed me 
that Kiziba schoolchildren perform among the top of regional schools in their area. These results created 
both a source of pride and frustration given the lack of options to finish secondary school and pursue 
university studies (personal communication, 6 June 2014). As one village leader explained, “My wish for 
my children is for them if I have means is to give them good life, good education” (personal 
communication, 5 June 2014). Her statement draws a direct relationship between education and 
happiness, or a “good life” which echoes the sentiment of nearly every resident with whom we spoke.  
Among the youth we interviewed, the correlation between hope and education was stark, with 
one resident explaining, “My future? As long as I’m living in the camp, I don’t have any future. Because I 
don’t have an opportunity to finish my secondary school” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). A 
fifteen-year-old girl in the camp expressed this hope by telling us, “If I got a chance to finish my study, 
maybe it can be a good opportunity to find a nice job” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). Frustration 
over an unfinished education was more than about youth idleness in the camp setting, it was also about 
nostalgia for a past in which education was available to the Banyarwanda in the DRC. Education was a 
marker of progress and the normal cycle of life, as an elected village leader in the camp from North Kivu 
explained:  
In the past when we are living in our country, we are sending our children to school with 
the hope that they finish studies and one day become a teacher or a doctor or a driver, 
but here the only chance you have to send your children is to get to the third level in 
secondary school and that level doesn’t really give any hope for the children. (personal 
communication, 6 June 2014) 
Nostalgia for a past in which the full spectrum of education presented possibilities of secure futures 
speaks broadly to the interviews conducted with older residents in the camp. Hope for their children 
revolved almost entirely around a sense of loss that comes with an incomplete education.  
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One youth leader explained that the refugees’ education is a critical component of future peace-
building, noting that the Congo will need them and their education to rebuild when they return (personal 
communication, 5 June 2014). Another youth leader philosophized on the detriment endured by camp 
youth with no advanced educational opportunities: 
Their minds becomes somehow…stolen. It’s like lighting a candle. A light? Then it’s 
getting kind of dim, because their mind becomes somehow nothing to think about. Their 
thoughts become gone. Because if you live in the same life like this you haven’t an open 
mind to think about many things. You’re still being like some kinds broken. Like 
something which are closed—stuck. You have a closed mind. You can’t think about many 
thing, strongest thing. Your experience is what you show others. You can’t have biggest 
experience to think [and use] your mind…You haven’t many plans. It’s very hard for us. 
(personal communication, 5 June 2014)  
His analogy of a mind without access to education as being like the light of a candle that grows dimmer 
provides an apt visualization of the distress many interviewees expressed about their hopes for the future 
without a complete education. It illustrates a psychological entrenching of refugee status “because if you 
live in the same life like this you haven’t an open mind to think about many things.” Subsequent 
generations of protracted cases, best illustrated through the narratives of these youth, have increasingly 
weak ties to ‘home’ and no delusions about their outsider status in the host state.  
This youth’s narrative sheds light on the way the “refugee” idea is socially constructed in the 
camp when he says “you can’t have biggest experience to think [and use] your mind.” He was getting at 
the limitations of life and experience in the camp, and how this affects his peers’ perceptions of what they 
are able to accomplish in their futures. He felt frustration at their inability to see beyond the camp and 
imagine a different life—a non-refugee life. The word “stuck” in reference to life came up regularly in 
conversation with the youth. Some explained that only those with family connections in Rwanda outside 
of the camp had the opportunity to finish secondary school and potentially go on to college; but without 
education outlets, they saw little hope for their futures (camp youth representatives, personal 
communication, 6 June 2014). This idea of being “stuck” extends beyond the camp, however, into spatial 
and political dimensions. It speaks to some acknowledgement that their situation is enduring and 
somehow made durable by the lack of educational opportunities and ability to engage in regional peace-
building, instead forgotten on this distant mountaintop overlooking their former home.  
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As evidenced by some of the less optimistic refugee youth with whom we spoke, the link between 
education and hope for the future reinforces the insider/outsider dynamic between refugees and the host 
country. More pessimistic voices generally represented the youth who had travelled outside of the camp 
in search of work at some point. A young man in the camp expressed frustration about opportunity by 
pointing out the barriers to work even with a high school diploma:  
It’s still a big issue because as you see, I’m a refugee, and I’m limited by the Rwandan 
law. It’s still a big problem. It’s still a big issue. Because even if I finish my studies and 
have a good level of education, if I don’t have my relative who can go and try to go not in 
the official way to get me documents [to work]. It’s still a problem. It’s still a problem. So 
I’m not seeing any hope. (personal communication, 6 June 2014) 
His testament speaks to a reality that even with the opportunity to finish school, job prospects outside the 
camp are slim. Refugees can get documentation to work legally within the country, but most residents we 
spoke with felt this was only available to those with personal connections in Rwanda who could navigate 
the system. This affected youth in a particularly salient way since they had experienced their entire 
education within the camp. More than the elder participants, they articulated an acute frustration with the 
fact that they could not pursue future opportunities because of incomplete education, lack of 
documentation to work legally, and no real hope of integration locally. Frustration with limitations on 
access to jobs, opportunities, and further education arises from the contrast between the indoctrination 
processes refugee youth engage in through the host state-administered education system and the 
realities of their non-citizen status. Contradictions such as these contribute to the feeling of being ‘stuck’ 
that encapsulates the durability of their situation. At the end of school, they indeed find themselves with 
“no return and no road forward” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77), an everyday testament to the durable nature of 
their displacement. 
Ultimately, the top performing Kiziba students are met with an almost certain end to their 
prospective futures. Participation in the national economy is reserved for citizens and exceptional others. 
For the vast majority of those refugees trained to be good, assimilated, citizens for nine years in the 
Rwandan educational system, “graduating” from the camp school forces one to confront the false nature 
of that sense of belonging. They are able to perform as citizens in the country, thus promoting 
harmonious relationships with Rwandan neighbors and the host government institutions. However, the 
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reality of a very unlikely productive economic future in the labor market reinforces the non-citizen nature 
of their status in the country. In this way, the refugees’ contained experience reinforces internal 
sovereignty by serving as a living definition of what a citizen is not. As refugees in Rwanda, the 
Banyarwanda’s story may also function as a reminder for Rwandese citizens about the consequences of 
a government in shambles—harking back to the country’s own history of governmental catastrophes. 
From this perspective, conflict refugees may be a warning or reminder of what happens when citizens do 
not conform to government rules and regulations—when they ‘disobey.’ The refugees, through their very 
existence, help to socially construct the internal sovereignty of the state as non-citizen others and 
representatives of sovereignty gone wrong somewhere else. Indoctrination into the national 
consciousness reinforces permanence, in essence making the youth who have never seen or do not 
remember the DRC more Rwandan than Congolese; keeping their economic prospects at bay, on the 
other hand, draws a line between insider/citizen and outsider/refugee/non-citizen. This cycle of citizen 
creation and exclusion ultimately produces a protracted displacement in which refugees are dependent 
on a system for which they cannot be a part. 
VALUES AND NORMS 
Beyond the formal Rwandan education system, opportunities for indoctrination to international 
norms through the use of informational billboards persist throughout Kiziba Camp. S. Turner (2010) 
frames the value-creation strategy of INGOs as state-like, noting, “Although the UNHCR is not a state, it 
can act like a modern liberal state in its everyday practices of governing the camp through norms as it 
attempts to foster life in the camp” (p. 8). Seen throughout the country and Africa more generally, 
billboards convey norms by providing instruction for matters of health, safety, and agriculture; in a sense, 
these are a form of continued public education and indoctrination into the values of the host government 
and the INGOs that oversee the refugee camps. They also represent a means of Foucaultian biopower, 
whereby the state-like INGOs govern the refugee population with messaging that facilitates non-forceful 
coercion through acquiescence to international norms and values. Billboards displaying INGO messages 
also visually reinforce the presence of these organizations as overseers and providers within the camp. 
The messages of these billboards, each sponsored by UNHCR and African Humanitarian Action (AHA), 
align directly with the UN Millennium Development Goals, which represent the highest priority areas for 
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social development according to the United Nations (i.e. international norms and values). Specifically, the 
three billboards presented here encompass UN Millennium Development Goal one to “eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger”; goals four and five to “reduce child mortality” and “improve maternal health”; and 
goal six to “combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases” (United Nations, 2015). Like the assimilation of 
Kiziba residents as faux-citizens of Rwanda through the formal Rwandan education system, these 
billboards integrate the refugees into a larger global community by indoctrinating them to the goals, 
values, and rhetoric of INGO-speak. This plays out in other ways when, for example, refugees asked 
about hope for their futures respond using words like “durable solution” which represents part of the 
UNHCR’s public affairs image of long-term solutions.  
 
 
Figure 10: Agriculture/ Malnutrition Billboard 
Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish 
 
Using a visual example of the assimilatory power of ongoing billboard education, one can 
interpret the value systems conveyed to Kiziba residents. In Figure 10, the UNHCR and AHA message 
reads, “For the fight against malnutrition, be proactive to develop a home garden for everyone.” Seen in 
development initiatives led by the Rwanda Red Cross (field observation notes, 17 March 2011), the 
kitchen garden is a critical tool for addressing malnutrition throughout the country. The Rwandan 
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government included its refugee camps in the recent “1,000-Days in the Thousands Hills” campaign to 
integrate refugees and local communities in the fight against malnutrition (MIDIMAR, 2014a). However, 
the message is contrary to the realities of camp life. WFP & UNHCR (2014) note that access to land 
outside the camp is scarce in Rwanda, leaving little room for gardening. The existing kitchen gardens in 
Rwanda’s refugee camps are mainly initiatives for “particularly vulnerable groups” such as widows and 
HIV positive refugees (WFP & UNHCR, 2014).  
Across all refugee camps in Rwanda, WFP & UNHCR (2014) estimate only 3% of the refugees’ 
food supply comes from their own agriculture efforts. There are approximately 315 kitchen gardens and 
151 family rabbit husbandry units in Kiziba Camp for the 16,461 residents (MIDIMAR, 2014a). Refugees 
instead sell portions of their food rations to diversify their diets or provide money to cover other basic 
needs. Since food rations provide the 2,104 kilocalories required for basic adult human life (WFP & 
UNHCR, 2014), selling portions leads to reduced available staple calories. Kiziba measures in at the 
lowest Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate (1.6%) among the refugee camps in Rwanda, so by 
comparison to the other camps, it is faring well. The WFP & UNHCR (2014) reports that malnutrition is 
connected to rates of infectious disease and therefore access to clean water. Kiziba alone provides both 
the recommended rate of clean water as well as prioritized systems for providing food rations to 
vulnerable subgroups, which may explain its comparatively low malnutrition rate (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). 
Even with these advantages over the other camps, WFP & UNHCR (2014) estimate that 43% of Kiziba’s 
population has “inadequate food consumption” (p. 7). Refugees’ ability to supplement inadequate diets is 
severely limited in Kiziba due to market inaccessibility. Prices in the market in Kiziba and the closest town 
market are high compared to national averages. In a 2014 assessment, cassava prices in the Kiziba 
market were double that in a nearby local market, which is a two-hour journey by foot (WFP & UNHCR, 
2014, p. 12). Price differences may have something to do with the remoteness and relatively low 
agricultural production in the region. These prices, and the lack of economic opportunity discussed more 
at length in the next section, condemn Kiziba residents to nearly complete dependency on humanitarian 
aid for survival.  
Despite interest expressed by the residents in expanding their diets and improving malnutrition as 
the billboard encourages, the reality is that access to market purchases or space for gardening is 
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extremely limited. The billboard conveys contradictory messaging by urging residents to conform to 
INGO-inspired kitchen gardens that are effective for resident/citizen Rwandan populations; however, the 
realities of lack of food diversity and food security constitute a major point of contention between the 
refugees and their international caretakers. These billboards, then, illustrate the ironies of INGO-speak 
within the camp. “Good” citizen-subjects would abide by the advice distributed by the governing and 
service providing state-like entities; however, camp conditions leave the refugees confined to limited food 
diversity and sustained dependence on aid distributions.  
The monthly food delivery by World Food Programme symbolizes the residents’ dependency on 
this process and their inability to regain control over their health and bodies. Empty warehouses and 
household rationing between deliveries weigh heavily on the minds of Kiziba residents. Speaking as a 
representative of her constituents and conditions within the camp, one young woman leader informed us,  
Most of the families here they are forcing their children to go to be, to sleep, [early] 
because children are hungry and there is no food…Another issue is that there is porridge 
that’s given to children, but at a certain age—at two years old—they cut the porridge to 
them. It’s right at the time when children want to play and want to use much energy. 
(village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
Honing in on the implications of the INGO policies on the everyday lives of residents, she speaks 
specifically to the physical and emotional drain of a life dependent on the food decisions and delivery 
schedule of an institution outside of her control. This woman leader’s perspective provides context for the 
microcosm on which the INGOs impose their often-unrealistic billboard education. Her focus on the 
children and their energy also highlights the problems of long-term food security passed on to the next 
generation. Identifying as pastoralists—mostly cattle herders, but also agricultural produce—interviews 
with the residents of Kiziba conveyed a deep nostalgia for the role food played in their former lives.  
Attention on the consequences of food insecurity for children also draws into focus the lost 
knowledge of generations of farmers and herders. This is a particularly entrenching aspect of the 
refugees’ unwilling dependency on food aid. Not only does it affect their health, but they also cannot 
teach the next generations about the subsistence practices they have cultivated over generations in the 
DRC. Dependency reigns over their futures as children born into a world of porridge and WFP-supplied 
corn, beans, and oil do not have the opportunities to learn the skills of their elders. The tragic and 
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frustrating message of the agricultural sign is an everyday reminder of knowledge lost, skillsets gone to 
waste, and a food supply chain well out of their control. Durability of displacement in this context derives 
from stunted development of children, constant and repeated reminders that food security is beyond 
control, and the broken processes for accumulated agricultural knowledge transfer to the next 
generations. While durability here is measured at the micro-camp level, these are manifestations of 
systems imposed by the state. They are explicit conditions of life that derive from state and INGO 
imposed norms and values that contribute to moving protraction from meaning “long-staying” to durable 
and permanent.  
 
 
Figure 11: Breastfeeding Billboard 
Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish 
 
Similarly conveying value systems of the international community and INGOs supporting the 
camp, Figure 11 shows a billboard that roughly translates, “Mothers be aware that breastfeeding your 
child is enough [nutrition] during the first six months of your new baby’s life.” The maternal and child 
health education conveyed in the billboard is important; it reflects the maternal and child health areas of 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2015). Contrary to the expectations of the 
INGOs, however, 43% of the population does not have adequate access to food; even if they agree with 
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the terms of the billboard, mothers must heavily rely on clinic malnutrition services to support the first two 
years of their children’s lives (personal communication, AHA Kiziba Clinic Staff, 14 March 2011). Again, 
the billboards serve as a constant visual reference to the international norms and expectations, 
indoctrinating the refugees into languages of INGOs; but perhaps more importantly, the billboards serve 
as a reminder of the loss of agency over personal choices, nutrition for healthy bodies, and general 
wellbeing experienced by the refugees. The INGOs’ billboard messaging demonstrates an inadvertent 
expression of power. This is what Foucault named biopower, where bodies and lives become the 
instruments of control rather than direct governmental interventions.  
Figure 12 shows a message that says, “Work hand in hand with people living with HIV/AIDS. 
Don’t discriminate against them; rather work together for our development.” Refugees told WFP & 
UNHCR (2014) that prior to coming to Rwanda, they had not dealt with HIV/AIDS. The billboards and 
special INGO initiatives have brought this conversation to the forefront. The known HIV/AIDS rate across 
all camps is approximately 0.7% (WFP & UNHCR, 2014, p. 32). The WFP & UNHCR (2014) linked lack of 
economic opportunities across all of the camps to increased rates of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
(SGBV), unwanted pregnancies, and HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted infections. Women and girls 
must occasionally engage in sexual transactions to meet the economic needs of their families; 
additionally, parents send children to stay with other families when space or resources run out, putting 
those children at risk for sexual and/or economic exploitation (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). The spread of 
HIV/AIDS, STIs, and SGBV is not directly the result or consequence of INGO intervention. Rather, the 
billboard reflects the conditions of dependency that deepen as the refugees remain confined to this 
space. Engaging in the rhetoric of an international fight against HIV/AIDS will benefit the refugees in 
whatever long-term solution results from this protracted situation. The billboard itself still symbolizes the 
intertwining relationship between the refugees and the aid-supplying INGOs. It serves as a visual 
reminder about the lack of control of everyday resources and services, thereby allowing INGOs to exert 




Figure 12: HIV/AIDS Billboard 
Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish 
 
In one account of a resident of Kiziba who was given the opportunity to speak with the Rwanda 
Minister of Health, he asked about the limited food options. Minister Dr. Agnes Binagwaho explained that 
the Ministry of Health cannot help these situations “because the refugee camps are an extraterritorial 
issue” embedded in global politics (Dushime, 2015). Refugee health as an “extraterritorial issue” places 
the conversation squarely in the international arena; it hyper-politicizes the refugees by catapulting them 
into the international conversation on food security, placelessness, and caregiving. These become the 
problems of INGOs such as UNHCR and its host institution partners, such as MIDIMAR and Rwanda Red 
Cross. This pushes local, individual level (private-sphere) experiences of refugees into the public, 
international sphere of politics, economics, and advocacy. All of these billboard-advertised health issues 
are linked to containment and deprived agency to make personal choices about nutrition and bodily care. 
They directly link the refugees’ experiences in a dependency relationship with the international 
community. An entire global refugee regime complex revolves around solving problems, including health 
issues, which requires access to power, resources, and recognition reinforce the internal and external 
sovereignty of both host states and the state-like UNHCR. The contrast between the value-laden 
billboards and the realities of camp life highlight the intractability of the refugees’ status, thereby 
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contributing in constructing forced migration as a durable institution. As they maintain the camps in a 
contained and governed way, INGOs and host states reap benefits of donor resources, recognition as 
relevant international actors, and power to manipulate diplomatic relations based on continued hospitality 
to long-staying refugees.  
Kiziba residents that we interviewed expressed frustration with the limited agency they feel about 
the disconnect between international and host-state expectations and the realities of camp live. Though 
these voices represent micro-level factors of durability, they illustrate the manifestation of state and 
institutional policies at the camp level. These sentiments also emerged in the WFP & UNHCR (2014) 
report, which indicates that the feelings are shared across all Banyarwanda camps in Rwanda. One 
village leader pointedly summarized, “If someone gets sick here, even if it’s not a big issue, it is like he is 
condemned to die. Because even the food we are eating doesn’t make our body protect our system” 
(personal communication, village leader, 6 June 2014). This comment about the lack of refugees’ abilities 
to make their own choices about food and the consequences on their bodies speaks directly to Foucault’s 
ideas about biopower where control over biological features and bodies become a strategy of power 
(2007, p. 16). At the same time that camp residents depend upon aid deliveries for their livelihood and 
bodily wellbeing, they also confer upon international organizations a legitimacy necessary for their own 
survival. By controlling the bodies—health, wellbeing, and livelihood—of refugees, the UNHCR validates 
itself as a necessary international governmental body. The metrics of “populations of concern” over which 
the UNHCR “governs” substantiates international pleas for additional funding from participating nations 
and private donors. Hyndman (2000) ties UNHCR to Foucault’s ideas about “governmentality” by 
observing that the “UNHCR meticulously orders the field through exercises of counting, calculating, and 
coding refugees” (p. 123). Though she is speaking here of the UNHCR’s desire to quantify all aspects of 
refugee life as a management technique of governance, even subjugation or colonialism, it extends to the 
value of these numbers in terms of burden-sharing and external sovereignty. Quantitative metrics 
constitute organizational validity and proof of need of international funding. To gain funding, the refugee 
regime complex draws upon states’ desires to manage interdependent relationships that form the basis of 
external sovereignty.   
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While the UNHCR is concerned about aid-dependency, it has also built an international economy 
dependent upon aid-dependency. A network of contractors, staff, warehouses, suppliers, and logistics 
professionals as well as subcontracted NGOs and global programs support the massive humanitarian 
operations that UNHCR oversees. It is, by its very nature, a manifestation of international cooperation and 
states’ quest to manage external sovereignty, or states’ attempt to govern the processes that connect 
them to other states. In 2013, the UNHCR budget reached US$5.3 billion, up from just US$1.8 billion in 
2008; that’s a 194% increase in funding to support a 31% increase in the population of concern. The 
funding supports a diverse and changing environment of displacement, adapting to complex and wide-
scale emergency response needs. Nonetheless, it illustrates the economic validity of the UNHCR in the 
eyes of international public and private donors. This is not a criticism. I take the Foucaultian approach to 
power that it does not necessarily represent something negative. Rather, I suggest here that the 
educational billboards indoctrinate the camp residents into value systems relevant to the larger 
humanitarian aid regime. The billboards provide windows into the INGO priorities—international and host 
government priorities—that convey power over bodies and personal agency. These priorities also 
translate to the international arena as solicitations for funding and increased international cooperation. 
Despite the fact that these educational messages are mostly irrelevant to the vast majority of camp 
residents, the metrics gathered from these initiatives provide evidence to the international community 
about the relevance and necessity of INGO work. It binds the UNHCR and subcontracting INGOs in 
relationships, both economic and policy driven, with the host country as well as the broader international 
community. These relationships rely on the aid-dependency of refugees and ultimately derive some 
benefit from their protracted length of stay in terms of ongoing interactions with international actors and 
global public awareness of their humanitarian efforts. In this way, INGOs become (perhaps inadvertently) 
complicit in the protraction of refugee situations. 
POLITICS 
In the official political sphere of the camp, MIDIMAR encourages and facilitates elections for 
village, quartier, and camp leadership roles. In particular, Rwandan government representatives visit the 
camp before each election cycle to identify and encourage women to run for leadership positions. With 
48.8% representation of women in the Rwandan Parliament in the first post-genocide election, gender 
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equality in the political sphere of the country is a model for the rest of the world. By enforcing quotas 
where certain seats in parliament are reserved for women and voted on only by women, Rwanda 
encourages women’s political participation as a central feature of its post-genocide construction of a new 
nation (Powley, 2005). This value system carries over into the camps as well, with MIDIMAR-led 
workshops that encourage women to identify and train potential elected leaders.  
Relaying the transference of gender equity values from the state to the camp-based refugee, one 
woman quartier leader explained,  
MIDIMAR always teaches women [in the camp] to have the confidence to be leaders. 
The problem is that many of us, as women, we are shy; we are not interested. But 
MIDIMAR always comes to us and gives us a course to become, to give ourselves self-
confidence to become leaders. We don’t really have [a women’s committee]. I can’t say a 
meeting of women, but when it is election time, MIDIMAR calls the women and tries to 
push them to see if there are some confident women who can go up for election. So then, 
[during those workshops] we meet with the leaders to see who is confident. Most of the 
time they call a [woman] chief of village or chief of quartier to come teach them how to be 
leaders. They give them like a training of leaders—how to become a leader. (Quartier 
leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014) 
As indicated in the testimony above, while Congolese women may be reluctant to pursue elected 
positions, the values of the host government pervade. During our first visit to the camp, male 
representatives explained women’s quotas for participation in elected leadership to be a UNHCR 
mandate of 50% (refugee NGO volunteer overseeing wood distribution, personal communication, 15 
March 2011). Later we found out from the camp manager that it is actually MIDIMAR conveying the 
values of the Rwandan state that encourages at least 30% political participation of women (G. Karagire, 
Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). This miscommunication reveals the 
general acceptance of INGO and state norms and values by the refugees without much consideration for 
the origin of the policies. It is not that the refugees are uninterested, but that they have been participating 
in this system for so long, these imposed norms and values have become their reality. Even through this 
annual expression of democratic processes, the refugees experience political structures that reinforce the 
durability of their time in the camp and their status as exiles from the DRC.  
Elected community resident representation is an INGO-encouraged institution in the design of 
refugee camps, with one handbook stating that “for every chairman and/or male camp leader being 
elected, it should be ensured that there is a female counterpart with equal responsibilities/powers” 
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(Birkeland et al., 2004). UNHCR guidelines suggest that “at least 50% [of members of the Grievance 
Committee and Council of Elders] should be women, with representation from all the major tribes” (DIPS, 
2006). The exact structure of leadership required of each camp, however, is adapted to the context of the 
refugee group and quotas set by the UNHCR are not enforceable. Kiziba exceeds the MIDIMAR quota 
with approximately 42% of elected positions held by women (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, 
personal communication, January 25, 2013). This intervention by MIDIMAR to encourage even “shy” 
women to become leaders is a direct reflection of Rwandan values.  
While this aspect of camp life does not necessarily entrench refugees in continued 
displacement—rather it may ultimately help with political activism upon return to their country of origin—it 
does speak to the ways in which the host government reinforces its own identity as a sovereign state 
within the “international” borders of the camp. Though not mandated to become so actively involved in the 
political life of camp residents, MIDIMAR takes a serious interest in the ways women view themselves as 
potential elected leaders. This transmission of value system from host nation to highly functioning camp 
election process stands as a testament to the government’s competence as a refugee host and sovereign 
state. The camp remains an enclave of non-citizens, but it has a structured system of Foucaultian 
accountability that radiates from the center area where the leadership convenes and out through the 
representatives to all reaches of the containment area. It is an orderly replication of community-based 
leadership so common in rural parts of Rwanda. Like the education process, it engages refugees in 
citizenship processes that reaffirm their faux-citizen status and indoctrinate them into host nation norms 
and values; and yet, without the possibility of local integration, camp elections remain the domain of the 
refugee non-citizens.  
ECONOMY 
Much of the documentation about Kiziba in this section comes from the WFP & UNHCR (2014) 
report that summarizes the situation of each refugee camp in Rwanda. Refugee voices from the camp 
then help to contextualize the durability of economic conditions inscribed on life in Kiziba. One of the most 
resonant aspects of the report is the level of detail included about the health and economic lives of 
refugees in Rwanda. By this report alone, the refugees are engaged as a tool in internal and external 
sovereignty justification on the part of states and state-like INGOs. The report brings voices of Congolese 
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refugees, through focus group summaries, into the international arena to address questions about 
adequate funding and resource provision. Implied in its findings are assessments of host government and 
INGO competencies in caring for this vulnerable population. Simply by existing, the refugees play a part 
in international policy and funding decisions that link donors, such as the top UNHCR donors—the US 
and Japan—with migration issues located in remote areas of the DRC/Rwanda border. The report itself, 
then, serves as an instance of entrenching displacement factors. It demonstrates the need for additional 
funding to support the international refugee complex. The report also documents the host country’s 
successes and failures, serving as a testament to its ability to perform as a competent domestic entity 
and international actor. States and INGOs therefore document refugees’ experiences in ways that confer 
additional resources in the form of donations, recognition through an assessment of the refugees’ quality 
of life, and power though international public acknowledgement of the care work provided.  
Food security and food diversity constitute serious grievances among the refugees, but the food 
aid is also the main source of economic income for most families. In Kiziba Camp specifically, an 
estimated 70% of family income comes from selling portions of monthly food aid (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). 
Aid dependency is perversely connected with economic agency among residents. It is also a source of 
vulnerability, exposing refugees to indebtedness, violence, and exploitation as undocumented workers 
outside the camp. The WFP & UNHCR (2014) report:  
When there is not enough food or money to buy food the refugees employ a number of 
different strategies to cope with the situation. The most common negative coping 
strategies mentioned were: girls engaging in transactional sex to cover their basic needs; 
taking loans to cover domestic needs instead of investments; theft/robbery; underfeeding; 
and high-risk casual labour. All of these strategies potentially result in serious 
consequences.  
Over the years, refugees in Rwanda have not had the opportunity to significantly expand 
their livelihoods and sources of income. The most common source of income is to sell 
part of the food ration. The money from selling food aid is used to buy additional, 
preferred types of food and to cover other basic needs. (pp. 3-4) 
The refugees in our interviews across all years regularly commented that often, for the poorest camp 
residents, the food aid does not stretch for the whole month so some families struggle near the end. 
Speaking of her constituents and more broadly of camp conditions, one village leader in our interviews 
confirmed the WFP & UNHCR report findings, 
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So for the people who don’t have means to go out and buy rice, and meats, it’s hard for 
them. So this is the food they get from UNHCR4 [pointing to USAID bags of maize and 
beans]. Imagine to eat that kind of food, morning as a breakfast, as supper, as dinner, 
from Monday to Sunday. And sometimes the food we get from UNHCR, it doesn’t even 
cover enough, so we have to struggle to cover the remaining days. (village leader, 
personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
Many participants in our field research expressed concerns along the themes of food monotony, daily 
monotony, food insecurity, leaving children to go hungry, and frustration with the inability to change the 
situation. Denying agency to engage in the larger process, particularly through economic self-sufficiency 
opportunities, is one way in which INGOs participate in the protraction of refugees. As the Minister of 
MIDIMAR and the refugee youth explained, without skills training and a sense of personal empowerment, 
the refugees will have little to fall back on in the event durable solutions become available (Séraphine 
Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014; camp youth representative, 6 June 2014). By 
understanding the economic context of the camp, this section provides insight into how employment 
opportunities and livelihood initiatives entrench refugees in protracted displacement through containment 
policies that benefit the host government and livelihood initiatives that benefit INGOs. In the following 
sections, refugee elected leaders provide generalizations about camp life that help to situate economic 
opportunities and policies within the context of life in Kiziba. Though not directly a voice of the state, their 
testimonies speak to the interplay between state-level and camp-level forces that embed durability in the 
refugees’ protracted status.  
IDLENESS AND WORK 
Economic opportunities are nearly as limited as food diversity in the camp. While residents and 
outside Rwandan community members can come and go from the camp, refugees experience strict 
restrictions on employment options. The MIDIMAR minister politically reiterated that regional peace was 
the only long-term solution, but she also noted “right now, we must facilitate them living here” through 
provision of skills and vocational training that will allow them to be competitive in the job market upon their 
return “home” (to the DRC) (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). To this, 
however, she added, “In reality, we can’t consider to transform them into Rwandan citizens” because “we 
4 She says “UNHCR” here as a blanket statement for the aid provider in the camp, but food rations come 
from World Food Programme.  
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have not enough soil” and “we must be realistic” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 
June 2014). She did mention a forthcoming law that would provide a path to naturalization for refugees if 
they applied and met the criteria, though she did not elaborate on those criteria or estimate how many 
refugees it might affect.  
The camp Executive Committee and Security Committee each turned repeatedly to the 
persistence of idleness in the camp as the root of all problems—namely alcohol abuse, staying out past 
curfew, and violence against other residents (personal communication, 26 and 27 January 2013). One 
village leader conveyed the frustration with idleness and lack of agency by summarizing the economic 
opportunities available to camp residents,  
Life is really hard because you know we don’t have jobs. We can’t have a firm way to 
work. We don’t have enough food. You know, it’s really hard. We wake up in the morning 
and then, the whole day [we spend] without doing anything. We don’t have a job. We 
don’t have any purpose, working like men. (personal communication, village leader, 5 
June 2014) 
While this is an individual assessment, his role as village leader allows him to represent the general 
economic conditions of the camp, a sentiment that many other interviewees confirmed. The MIDIMAR 
Minister emphasized the importance of preventing young men from being idle as well as introducing 
vocational training to refugees so they would be competitive in the job market upon return to the DRC 
(Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). As a former refugee herself, this is a 
substantial point to make about the future of the Congolese refugees in Rwanda. This speaks to the fact 
that they belong back in the DRC and local integration is not under consideration by the Rwandan 
government. Minister Mukantabana emphasized several times during our interview that there is no room 
in Rwanda to give the refugees land to farm; local integration would sentence them to a life of poverty 




Figure 13: Kiziba residents loading portions of WFP food aid onto bus to trade in town 
Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish 
 
Some trade happens, mostly with refugees trading portions of their rations in the town below and 
neighboring Rwandans coming in to sell goods at the Kiziba market. In 2011, shortly after a distribution of 
World Food Programme (WFP) aid in the camp, we witnessed refugees loading bags of corn and beans 
onto the public bus to sell in town. A member of the Kiziba Executive Council explained that spare maize 
is often sold for 100 or 200 Rwandan Francs to get phone credit to use mobile phones for communication 
(Executive Council, personal communication, 14 March 2011). Although the individual food aid allotment 
meets the baseline caloric requirements to sustain a human life for one month, the refugees pool 
resources in order to access other necessary goods not included in the monthly rations—communication 
carrying obvious weight in this case to warrant corn rations. Some refugees find jobs with NGOs 
operating within the camp, though as one resident pharmacy employee of African Humanitarian Action 
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explained, “We are so many here, we cannot find at the same time a job” (AHA employee, personal 
communication, 5 June 2014). At some point, there was a micro-lending women’s cooperative in the 
camp, but this failed when members were unable to make “enough contribution to make the business 
going on” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Those who are not lucky enough to 
secure the handful of NGO jobs available to the refugees must turn to the informal economy outside the 
camp borders. The humanitarian agency employee and quartier leader, while both refugees in Kiziba 
themselves, portray instances of state-level policies manifesting in the lives of refugees. Restrictive 
economic—and ultimately local integration—policies keep the refugees from pursuing worthwhile and 
safe employment opportunities outside the camp. These policies condemn the refugees to idleness and 
nearly complete dependency on food rations as a means to meet their everyday needs. This cycle of 
dependency entrenches the refugees in durable forms of displacement as they languish without many 
opportunities to develop skills that could help them if they were ever released from limbo. It also provides 
a constant need for the refugee regime complex that allows conference of international recognition that 
the INGOs are necessary and require donor resources. In this way, restrictive economic policies heavily 
influence the durable nature of protracted situations.  
Residents were reluctant to relay stories of those who had pursued work outside the camp. 
Without papers, they risk exploitation by those in the outside world who know they have no legal rights to 
work. One refugee youth explained, based on his experience seeking work outside the camp, “No, [the 
Rwandan government] has no papers for them [the refugees]. The salaries they get paid [outside the 
camp], because we have no ID is not a good life” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). 
Without citizenship, or at the bare minimum official work papers, refugees are relatively powerless to 
engage formally in the local economy. Some residents have little choice than to pursue illicit work without 
other sources of income. As one youth representative explained,  
My friends, Rwandese, they knew that I am a refugee. It’s a hard situation…and they say 
you are not a man. You have no intellect to [them] there. You can’t feel safe there. Before 
I had some causal works outside the camp. But because I had no identity [papers] it was 
really amazing situation to work outside the camp without having the identity. You don’t 
work safely. The salary, they pay you as they want (youth representative, personal 
communication, 5 June 2014).  
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He left the camp to wait tables in a restaurant in order to get money to buy his nephew food. The child 
had a serious illness and could not digest the corn and beans supplied by WFP. Unable to access 
alternative means to get a job or find resources, he felt he needed to make money to buy more nutritious 
food. Ultimately, treatment and employment conditions outside the camp were so unpredictable and cruel 
that he returned to Kiziba. He speculated of others that leave the camp for work saying, “They don’t want 
to tell you about everything, but I think it’s the same…thing which happened to me” (youth representative, 
personal communication, 5 June 2014). A similar situation happened with one of the younger youth 
representatives that we interviewed. Several months after the initial interview, he contacted me to say that 
he was leaving the camp to pursue a job promised to him through an acquaintance. Just a few days after 
leaving, however, he returned and informed me that, “there’s someone who lie [to] me [about] that job I 
was going to” (personal communication, 4 November 2014).  
The refugee youth’s intuition these stories are far more common than what surfaced in the 
interviews is likely correct; the MIDIMAR camp manager informed us that “There are not as many 
working-age men in the camp; many leave to find jobs” (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal 
communication, January 25, 2013). The ability to attain proper work papers was generally attributed to 
those who had connections to get a full education and those who had “a rich family abroad [that] can try 
to find them papers…that’s the problem of why many of us, we are suffering, because we don’t have the 
connections” (youth representative, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Here, youth voices contribute 
to the dialog on economic opportunity as well as exclusion from society. They illuminate the state 
structures within which they must operate for survival. Without “connections” there are no opportunities. 
Unless one can work the system, there is no way to get official (or unofficial) documentation to pursue 
outside work, and thus no opportunities or hope for the future. This is an important aspect of camp life 
that again reinforces the insider/outsider nature of this border within a border. As the state exerts control 
over who can and cannot participate in the economy—an arguably critical component of the refugees’ 
expression of agency and even humanity—the line between citizen and noncitizen is firmly reinforced at 
the borders of the camp. This level of control and reiteration of the line between insider/outsider 
transcends the relationship between the host state and the refugees; it also applies to the relationship 
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Figure 14: World Vision Rabbit Husbandry Program 
Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish 
 
LIVELIHOOD INITIATIVES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Providing vocational training generally falls to the realm of INGOs. The priority, length, and quality 
of training speak to INGO values rather than the reality of the camps. Through participation in these 
economic programs, refugees engage in INGOs’ own quests for resources, recognition, and power. As 
with state actors, these three powerful motivators serve as entrenching factors of displacement. By 
examining the programs available to refugees in Kiziba, we see that they more accurately serve the 
broader interests of INGOs and international values, while providing opportunities that are misaligned with 
the realities of the camp. These priorities reveal ways in which INGOs participate in protracting 
displacement.  
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Several INGOs, including the American Refugee Committee (ARC) and World Vision, facilitate 
livelihood initiatives intended to provide economic support for certain groups of refugees. These activities 
promote skills and often provide resources to support small business enterprises, though they generally 
focus only on the most vulnerable camp subpopulations, such as widows and HIV positive residents. 
According to a World Vision Rwanda (2013) annual report, 300 people from Kiziba, Gihembe, and 
Kigeme refugee camps participated in skills training for “tailoring, cooking, hairdressing, mechanics, 
knitting, welding, and carpentry” (p. 15). Across those three camps, 92 families also received a pair of 
rabbits to begin rabbit husbandry projects and start kitchen gardens. Error! Reference source not 
found. shows one such rabbit hutch. The rabbits can be sold for meat, while their manure provides 
fertilizer for the gardens (World Vision Rwanda, 2013). The limited access to such opportunities again 
speaks to the difficulty of attaining economic sufficiency—or even partial sufficiency—within the camp. As 
shown in Figure 15, other economic opportunities inside the camp include tailoring, power charging 
stations, and mobile phone minutes (“airtime”) shops. In a camp of over 16,000, however, the availability 
of economic opportunity leaves the vast majority of residents without any supplemental income and 
results in refugees needing to sell parts of food rations to provide other necessities. The knitting room, 
shown in Figure 15, provides one specific instance of how INGO initiatives that garner international 
support, funding from donors, and legitimacy for the organization itself, contrast with the realities of the 
camp. The individual-level experience conveyed support a concrete example of INGO policies and values 
playing out at the camp level.  
During the third year of my fieldwork in Kiziba, my mother led a two-day knitting and crochet 
workshop for two groups of women identified by the ARC. From her professional expertise, she observed 
that the knitting center, established by an INGO and stocked by a faith-based organization, did not have 
the necessary lighting or equipment to be of any use to the refugees. Many of the donated knitting 
machines were broken, and the knitting groups had not learned how to repair or properly use the 
machines. There were no raw materials with which to make any tradable or sellable goods. No plan 
existed to propel this studio forward into an economic resource for the women in the knitting group. By 
plan here I mean that we observed no raw materials, no transport mechanisms to take the goods to the 
market, and no patterns or project ideas tailored to the local economic markets that would make any 
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business venture viable. Any items produced by the group would have a difficult time elevating the 
economic circumstances of any of the members because of these limitations. Here, “livelihood” initiative is 
donor-speak for applied projects that legitimate the INGOs’ efforts for their spatially distant contributors 
from the global North. In many instances, such projects build upon notions of helping 
poor/underprivileged women of the global South. Yet this “help” very often frames refugee women as 
among the most vulnerable, while simultaneously reinforcing their Third World Woman status (Mohanty, 
1984) and reproducing the notion of the West as the prescribing agent of development for the world’s 
poor. In the case of Kiziba Camp’s former applied development initiatives, inactivity is evident in the 
broken knitting machines, empty supply stations, and abandoned work spaces that fail to provide any 
material change in economic opportunities or daily livelihoods. Rather than upholding a development 
vision as a charity (often mercy) project with the potential to change refugee women’s lives, these inactive 
initiatives more accurately represent hopelessness and donor disinvestment. These realities are distinctly 
evident by the visual imagery that both stands out in colorful billboard signage among the clay backwash 
of all of Kiziba Camp’s habitat infrastructures, as well as symbolizes the sharp contradictions of such 
projects’ closed operations and the international community’s abandonment.   
This illustrates an instance of INGO priorities and values mapped onto refugee lives. Good will 
through donations did not translate to actual economic livelihoods. Like the microloan women’s group that 
once existed in the camp but ran out of momentum (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 
2014), the knitting supplies were dropped in the camp to check an INGO funding box somewhere that 
‘something’ had been done to boost economic livelihood. In reality, those knitting groups could eke very 
little out of those broken machines. The lack of thought-investment in this livelihood initiative instantiates 
a larger cycle of durable displacement. Though perhaps not intentional, the INGO benefits by legitimating 
itself to funders through programs such as the knitting room. In reality, however, it does nothing to uplift 
the economic standing of the participating women. The room sits filled with mostly broken machines and 
no supplies. No new influx of knitting skills training supports entrepreneurship or helps residents learn to 
repair and care for the machines. No one taught marketing or business techniques in conjunction with the 






Figure 15: Economic Opportunities in Kiziba Camp 
(Top to bottom) Tailoring/Knitting Studio, Mobile Phone Recharging Kiosk, and Mobile Phone Minutes 
Shop in Kiziba Camp 
Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish 
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machines) into economic opportunities. This phenomenon within Kiziba Camp is transferrable to the 
playground and the scantily stocked handicraft store that generally remain locked. INGO initiatives 
generate funding and international support for the institutions, thereby feeding the sense of legitimacy; 
and yet very little translates into value-added initiatives in the remote protracted camp context. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I drew upon field notes from Kiziba Camp and INGO reports to illustrate the ways 
in which host states and NGOs derive access to legitimate their internal and external sovereignty from 
refugee hosting and service-provision. Refugee voices from the camp contextualized imposed state and 
INGO value structures on the everyday lives of camp residents. These relationships came through in the 
areas of camp security, education, politics, and economics. Foucault’s ideas of discipline and biopower, 
as well as his conceptualization of a milieu though which these notions of power spread, helped to situate 
Kiziba as a microcosm of the larger interaction between states, INGOs, and refugees. I see refugee 
camps, specifically Kiziba, as representing a border within a border; that is to say, the camp represents 
the relationship between Rwanda and the DRC, between citizen/non-citizen other and insider/outsider. 
The protraction of the situation in Kiziba is important because it is through repetitive interactions that the 
relationships between host state, INGOs, and refugees become even more entrenched in protraction. 
Refugees in protracted cases become durably displaced as INGOs and host states find iterative value in 
encamped populations through opportunities for legitimacy and resources tied to their own pursuits of 
sovereignty. This chapter explored in particular the motivations for states and NGOs to protract 
displacement, namely in the pursuit of resources, recognition, and power to preserve sovereignty. It also 
touched on the role that refugees play in the factors that convert temporary camp situations into durable 
displacement.  
In the realm of security, refugees perform the will of the host nation by enforcing security 
protocols at the camp border. Documentation and access restriction represent the character of the 
Rwandan state and reinforce the complex idea of refugees as faux-citizens, compliant in the ways of 
Rwandan security; but these systems also reiterate the outsider status of the refugees, thereby bolstering 
internal sovereignty by defining the boundaries of citizenship and participation in the state. Unlike other 
global camp scenarios, the Rwandan government actively engages in security within the camp, thus 
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conveying its own values and norms to the population. At night, however, the refugees adopt some 
agency through the administration of volunteer security patrols that ensure the safety of residents and 
instantiate the way that the camp takes on its own sovereign-like qualities. These groups work in 
collaboration with the Rwandese police and soldiers who patrol the camp perimeter every night; this 
relationship along the camp border again serves to reinforce the complex inclusive and exclusive 
relationship between refugees and the host state. From this relationship, the state derives relevance 
domestically for the ability to maintain security within its borders; it also gains international recognition for 
proper management of the population and the international border relationship the camp represents. 
Refugees were proud of their autonomy in daily camp security activities and found a sense of identity 
from the responsibilities allotted to them by the host government and INGOs. Their pride and sense of 
autonomy points to their roles as “obedient citizen-subjects” despite their exclusion from true citizenship. 
Implied in this relationship is a durability to displacement in the constructed identities of refugees, the 
topic of the next chapter.  
Looking at the education of camp residents, we saw that the state administers a formal national 
curriculum that indoctrinates refugees into a false sense of citizenship. Education may represent an 
investment in the preservation of external sovereignty. By providing the full education and citizenship 
training of the eastern DRC’s youth, Rwanda can potentially shape the future of eastern DRC’s economy 
and politics. This speaks to the rumors of Rwanda’s interest in expanding into eastern DRC and is 
perhaps a motivator for the comprehensive response the country has provided the Congolese refugees. 
By not engaging refugees in the full spectrum of educational opportunities, however, the host state and 
INGOs are stunting the potential for cross-border and regional conflict resolution and peacemaking. The 
Banyarwanda refugees play a critical role in the conflict in eastern DRC; without fully training them in the 
process of peace-building and engaging them in the process, it is unlikely that any long-term resolution 
will allow them to return home. In this way, the limitations of the education system further entrench the 
refugees in a state of durable displacement.  
Aspects of Kiziba residents’ economic life also speak to cementing factors of durability in 
displacement. These predominantly stem from refugees’ inability to access more reliable economic 
opportunities. Additionally, livelihood initiatives provided by the INGOs reflect international norms and 
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values rather than the realities of the camp. Faced with these inconsistencies, the refugees have very 
little agency to control their own food security and access to employment or trade relationships. By 
engaging in these programs, refugees become acclimated to the values and norms of the humanitarian 
and international community. INGOs encourage them to engage in internationally determined values that 
contradict their living environments, thereby reinforcing the notion of outsider/other. They also become 
practiced at the economic livelihood development projects that reflect INGO and international priorities 
without necessarily considering long-term viability of those avenues. While these serve a certain purpose 
within the camp, they result in a cycle where INGO funding focuses on (and grows from) developing 
norms and programs, and refugees become involved in purposefully apolitical activities that prevent them 
from actively engaging the larger peacemaking discussion (Milner, 2011).   
Collectively, these aspects of life in Kiziba speak to both intentional and unintentional processes 
performed by the host state and INGOs that further protract displacement. As S. Turner (2010) contends, 
repeated micro-moments of interaction between refugees, host nation, and INGOs in the form of daily 
caretaking acts in fact contribute to the sense of permanence that pervades life in Kiziba. Additionally, the 
continued lack of agency among refugees to change the fate of their lives related to food, health, and 
occupation contribute to an overwhelming sense of frustration combined with protraction that Lischer 
(2006) warns can lead to refugee militarization. If this were to occur, it would cause local and regional 
insecurity and likely prolong the protracted state of displacement. The cumulative result of these many 
interactions reveal a system of dependency on the part of refugees, states, and INGOs that creates a 
state of durable displacement.  
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DURABILITY IN AGENCY AND IDENTITY 
 
I don’t have a hope of returning to Congo, even if they are one 
day [at] peace. It’s like, I’m fed up [with] Congo, the country 
who killed my husband, the country who killed my relatives, my 
brother, and sisters. To be honest with you, I can’t go back to 
Congo. I would never in my life. 





As a microcosm of the broader politics, history, and demography of the Great Lakes Region, 
Kiziba Camp refugees’ interactions at the local level also contribute to protracted displacement. Refugee 
scholars often focus on the local reproductions of identity, citizenship, and agency (Bezabeh, 2011; 
Malkki, 1992; Redclift, 2011; S. Turner, 2010); but, my intent here is to expand this type of ethnographic 
analysis to demonstrate the ways in which refugees contribute to a system that leads to a durable form of 
displacement. Why would refugees themselves protract displacement? This question brings up 
complicated considerations and difficult dimensions of the relationship between transnational structures 
and individual agency. I do not claim their contribution to the system of displacement is intentional—
though in militarizing camp cases, protraction may be an obvious outcome. Rather, by exploring the 
themes that emerge from the interview data with Kiziba elected leadership, youth representatives, and 
MIDIMAR officials, I intend to show how refugees engage in identity construction that further entrenches 
them in the “liminal drift” of placelessness (Bauman, 2004, p. 76).    
Zygmunt Bauman (2004) philosophized on the hopelessness of the refugee situation, implying 
that protraction is the natural outcome of global processes. He laments,  
Refugees are human waste, with no useful function to play in the land of their arrival and 
temporary stay and no intention or realistic prospect of being assimilated and 
incorporated into the new social body; from their present place, the dumping site, there is 
no return and no road forward. (Bauman, 2004, p. 77) 
The frustration and hopelessness in Bauman’s words deeply convey in the interviews with Kiziba’s 
refugees. One resident stated simply, “In this refugee camp, there is no hope for me” (refugee youth, 
personal communication, 6 June 2014). Overall, the participants in our study felt acted upon by 
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humanitarian and host government agencies with little power to evoke lasting change. The interview 
excerpts to follow certainly speak to this sense of wasted human life—of a yearning for any kind of 
change. More subtly, however, the interviews expose the contradictory ways the refugees confront limits 
to their agency within the camp, as well as their relationship to the host government and international 
community. A close analysis of these narratives reveals the processes by which Kiziba Camp residents 
formulate their identities in terms of citizenship, “home,” and hope for the future, as they navigate agency 
within the larger structural determinants of their lives on the border of such contested terrains. The 
ongoing regional conflict and citizenship crisis adds a layer of complexity that draws parallels with the 
Rwanda/DRC border and larger conversations on refugee identity (Koko, 2013; Mamdani, 2002; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2007). These structural factors contribute to the nearly unanimous sense among camp 
residents that there is indeed “no return and no road forward” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77). In this context of 
conflict, contested identities, and liminal drift, I draw upon interviews with Kiziba residents to show how 
their own imaginings contribute to the cycle of displacement.  
AGENCY 
A focus on agency within Kiziba Camp facilitates an investigation of how refugees situate 
themselves in reference to the host state, sending state, and state-like INGOs. I use the sociological idea 
of ‘agency’ to analyze interview data and reveal these underlying relationships. Here, I adopt the feminist 
poststructuralist understanding of ‘agency’ to reflect the authority one has to determine and shape the 
discourses that define one’s identity (Davies, 1991). More widely adopted versions of agency link its 
definition to the specific power or capacity of individuals to perform an action (Giddens, 1984). The idea of 
power as agency relies heavily on one’s subjectivity and access to that power. Subsequent theorists have 
adapted these definitions in response to more nuanced understanding of social processes by adding the 
idea that agency is “a temporally embedded process of social engagement” and should include “a 
capacity to imagine alternative possibilities” rather than relying only on past experiences (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998, p. 963). From a feminist poststructuralist approach, “fragmentation, contradiction, and 
discontinuity, rather than continuity of identity are the focus” (Davies, 1991, p. 43). As contradiction often 
emerges in the narratives of this study’s participants, this approach to agency provides a lens to view the 
complex ways refugees exercise and understand agency. In this light, “Agency is never freedom from 
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discursive constitution of self but the capacity to recognize that constitution and to resist, subvert, and 
change the discourses themselves through which one is being constituted” (Davies, 1991, p. 51). It is not 
power per se, but the “capacity to recognize” and challenge the identity and experience-shaping forces 
around them that constitutes agency.  
The close relationship between agency and identity construction, explained in the feminist 
poststructuralist understanding of agency, forms a central theoretical underpinning of this chapter. In 
particular, noting the difference between Humanist and Feminist Poststructuralist conceptualizations of 
‘agency,’ Davies (1991) explains that in the latter, human stories are not just “versions of events that 
occur in the real world,” but instead “are the means by which events are interpreted, made tellable, or 
even livable.” She continues, “All stories are understood as fictions, such fictions providing the substance 
of lived reality” (Davies, 1991, p. 43). Here, storytelling constructs identity, an iterative phenomenon of 
building “mythico-histories” that shape collective identities (Malkki, 1995). In the case of Kiziba residents, 
agency and identity formation go hand-in-hand as the refugees reflect on home, hope, and their place in 
the larger international refugee regime and political system in often contradictory and fragmented ways. 
Together, this agency to “resist, subvert, and change the discourses” (Davies, 1991, p. 51) that shape 
their encamped experiences emerge as a collective understanding that they occupy a particular ‘outsider 
within’ socio-political space. The refugees share resources with Rwandan host communities and therefore 
inhabit a very local, albeit spatially distinct, space. At the same time, they demonstrate an understanding 
that their governance structures and personal narratives carry weight in the international realm, placing 
them in a supra-political space inaccessible by non-refugee locals. The refugees shape the discourse of 
their protracted situation by framing themselves in the non-citizen, international actor category. This 
chapter describes this expression of agency and identity formation as a factor contributing to the durability 
of their displacement.   
REFUGEES AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
While the ideas of agency and identity formation are conceptually abstract, the role of these 
forces in defining refugees’ interactions with states and INGOs constitutes a major part of the cycle of 
durable displacement. Zetter (1991) asserts that without recognizing the importance of these two major 
considerations—agency and identity formation—it is impossible to truly address the crisis of increasingly 
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long protracted situations, or even displacement more broadly. During the interview process, Kiziba 
refugees clearly identified relationships with states/INGOs at both a local and international level. In 
particular, they demonstrated mastery of diplomatic and INGO-speak by regularly calling upon the terms 
“ambassador,” “durable solutions,” and “guarantee.” The previous chapter explored these relationships 
through structural aspects of camp life. This chapter expands that discussion by examining how refugees 
manipulate discourses of humanitarian relief and forced displacement and form identities in camp 
contexts in ways that add durability to their situation.  
Through some of these expressions of agency and identity, refugees rebel against Bauman’s 
(2004) claim that their lives are wasted or that they have “no useful function” (p. 77). S. Turner (2010) 
describes the motivations that lead refugees in camps to participate in identity formation and seek ways 
to enact agency,  
What the refugees found the most threatening about the camp was the fact that life no 
longer was in their own hands and they were at the mercy of powerful external forces in 
the shape of relief agencies, local Tanzanians and Rwanda refugees. They sensed that 
their previous knowledge was no longer of much use for navigating everyday life in the 
camp. (p. 82)  
He goes on to describe how the refugees of that camp actively engaged the identities and agency 
limitations established by the INGOs. They did not passively accept the apolitical identities imposed on 
them by UNHCR. The refugees in his study, much like those in Kiziba, found ways to gain control over 
the discourses that defined certain aspects of their own lives and identities by adopting an understand of 
themselves as actors in the larger international refugee regime. Seeing us, researchers from the global 
North, as having power to change their circumstances, a woman quartier1 leader proposed, “Maybe a 
hope can be, if you are a good ambassador for us, to tell the international community [we want] to leave 
this camp because we are tired of it” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). An elder 
man requested, “We are asking you who have power…not only for me, but all the refugees around the 
world or the refugees here, to return [us] back home because it’s where we feel happy” (village leader, 
1 Quartier, or neighborhood, leaders supervise several villages and thus represent the mid-level tier of 
governance within the camp. Above the quartier leaders are the Executive Council and Elected Camp 
President who communicate directly with MIDIMAR and INGO representatives.  
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personal communication, 5 June 2014). These leaders were expressing more than frustration with their 
situation; they were calling upon us as Northern representatives in the larger international system to make 
changes that would secure their return home or resettlement abroad. They made no requests to the host 
state that granted us access to the camp, but rather placed their concerns in the context of the larger 
enduring regional conflict and the political processes that keep them contained in camps.  
In her analysis of refugees’ interactions with the law, Holzer (2013) points to this larger 
engagement beyond the local to the international. She observes of camp-based refugee women 
protesting UNHCR migration policies, “The protesters anchored their claims to rights in a special 
relationship to the international community rather than host obligations. The placards that protesters 
carried offered a particularly clear window into this global (not local) approach” (Holzer, 2013, p. 863). 
Holzer (2013) notes that the long-staying Liberian refugees her study “develop an understanding of 
themselves as a distinctive group of rights holders with a special relationship to the international 
community—as refugees rather than simply Liberians or migrants” (p. 865) This distinction, as I 
demonstrate in this chapter, conveys in multiple realms of refugee life beyond the law. Malkki (1992) 
captures this best when she explains,  
Far from being a “spoiled identity,” refugee status was valued and protected as a sign of 
the ultimate temporariness of exile and of the refusal to become naturalized, to put down 
roots in a place to which one did not belong. Insisting on one’s liminality and 
displacement as a refugee was also to have a legitimate claim to the attention of 
“international opinion” and to international assistance. (p. 35)  
‘Legitimate claim to…attention’ is encapsulated by Zetter’s (1991) idea of ‘political currency.’ Though he 
talks about this in reference to the gains for states hosting refugees, it transfers conceptually to refugees 
themselves. As they maneuver through a system of durable displacement, they exercise agency in order 
to access resources, recognition, and power in parallel ways to those of states and state-like INGOs in 
the previous chapter. In this sense, I contend that through their very role as international actors, refugees 
express a distinct form of agency.  
In the Rwandan refugee context, Kiziba residents expressed a definite sense of conscious image-
shaping as ethnolinguistically and socially compatible with host population at the local level and yet 
distinctly outsider non-citizens. Playing to the sense of outsider within, the refugees independently 
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expressed gratitude to the Rwandan host state. The Executive Council voiced appreciation to Rwanda 
several times during our focus group meeting (personal communication, 25 January 2013). Specifically, 
one member of the council took a moment to say to no one in particular, “We are thankful to the country 
of Rwanda” (personal communication, 25 January 2013). Another later elaborated, “What we appreciate 
is that this country of Rwanda gives us where to stay and we say thank you because this country ensures 
the security of all refugees we have here in the camp” (personal communication, 25 January 2013). They 
also reported good relations with their local Rwandan neighbors, even sharing clinic services and access 
to water wells. One elder village leader commented, “Yeah, we are living in good relationships. 
Sometimes, or most of the time, they even bring their crops—their sweet potatoes—and we buy them” 
(village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Though others had slightly more nuanced “good” 
relations. One refugee youth hinted at the idea that as an outsider he must be on his best behavior 
outside the camp, and that is why he had no problems. He recounted,  
After I reached there at school [outside the camp], I decide…I live in good relationship 
with Rwandese. I didn’t have any problems. Yes, because after reaching outside, 
because I’m a Congolese and a refugee, I can’t do the mistake while I’m not Rwandese. I 
have a good behavior there outside with the other student of Rwandese. (Kiziba youth, 
personal communication, 5 June 2014)  
Linguistic and cultural ties with the surrounding communities—markers of the residents’ insider status—
reportedly lent themselves to very few problems between refugees and local Rwandese. The WFP & 
UNHCR (2014) focus groups confirm this feeling of maintaining good relationships with Rwandan 
neighbors across all Congolese camps in the country.  
For the long-tem, however, the refugees conveyed a deep sense of ‘thank you, but no thank you.’ 
In other words, they were diplomatically grateful to the host community and country for support, but would 
much prefer to go home. A woman quartier leader expressed best this when she said,  
If I can’t be asked to go back to Congo [for security reasons], if I can’t ask to stay in 
Rwanda—because even if I’m in a refugee camp, it’s in Rwanda, I’ll be happy to go 
somewhere in peace, which is not Rwanda because I’m in Rwanda already. (quartier 
leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)  
This idea of going somewhere else “which is not Rwanda because I’m in Rwanda already” came up in 
several interviews. It speaks directly to the Congolese refugees’ framing themselves as distinctly separate 
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from Rwandans, despite their similarities; in other words acknowledging their outsider within status. Her 
narrative captures the essence of how Kiziba residents expressed a form of agency by taking control of 
the discourses surrounding their situation; this relatively powerful elected leader reiterates her subjectivity 
as a refugee deserving of international solutions, namely resettlement.  
The MIDIMAR Minister, Séraphine Mukantabana, a former refugee herself, also made this 
distinction. During a personal interview, as she commented on the potential for local integration, she 
made it clear that “that is a one-by-one solution” and not a solution for the entire population. Her stance 
acknowledges the potential for refugees to occupy an ‘insider’ space, but with the caveat that these 
opportunities are available for exceptional ‘others’ rather than all refugees. As one of the most densely 
populated countries in Africa, the Minister articulated clearly that local integration is simply not viable in 
Rwanda because of the lack of available land to support the refugees. As she shared her process of 
considering the “best interest of the population” she posed the question, “What will be gained by being 
transformed into Rwandan citizens?” This, she argued, is only a short-term solution. The Minister offered 
that “the main assistance [MIDIMAR can offer] is to provide security and peace in the region…The most 
important commitment is to advocate for peace for refugees” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal 
communication, 13 June 2014). Ultimately, while Rwanda commits to hosting refugees and advocating 
regionally for peace, the Congolese refugees are outsiders there, with no real claims to a life beyond the 
refugee label.   
The quartier leader’s statement above makes it clear that she also has no intention of staying in 
the host country. In this way, she reinforces the durability of Kiziba refugees’ displacement. Her statement 
eliminates the possibility of the first two of UNHCR’s rank-ordered ‘durable solutions,’ specifically 
repatriation and local integration. The realities of the third option, resettlement abroad, for the millions of 
refugees experiencing protracted displacement like those in Kiziba, leave her and her fellow refugees in a 
state of continued ‘liminal drift’ with no sense of a long-term solution. Impossibility of a future solution 
emerged as a theme in the refugees’ interviews, but some shared a more concrete way of expressing the 
unending displacement they experienced. An elder village leader reasoned,  
I’m a Congolese refugee because…we are here temporarily. We still have hope that we’ll 
go back home. This is a story of a whole history of refugees in Africa or [a] developing 
country. When you are born as a refugee, you are condemned to die as a refugee. It’s 
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not like in your country. I can come to America as a refugee and maybe in two or five 
years I can get citizenship. In Africa, no. Even if temporary can be a hundred years, it’s 
still temporary. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
Unlike the quartier leader, this elder village leader is unwilling to give up hope of one day returning to his 
ancestral soil. He later confided that his deepest wish is to be buried on his land in the DRC when he 
dies. And yet, he seemed to grasp the durability of his situation. In his heart, even for “a hundred years” 
he will always be an outsider/foreigner in this host location. This stands as yet another testament to the 
way that the refugees accept, in some ways, their circumstances as perpetually placeless persons. It also 
shows how their identity construction as forever Congolese, and therefore outsider/other in the land of 
asylum, shapes a narrative of durable temporariness. In this way, he exhibits a kind of agency to resist 
local integration though it does not manifest directly as power to change his actions or circumstances.  
Moving forward from this acceptance, refugees use their position to participate in some forms of 
broader international dialog. Holzer (2013) observed that refugees pass over local engagement to project 
their voices into the international arena. Kiziba Camp, for instance, regularly hosts INGO representative, 
political, and celebrity guests, giving the residents an opportunity to more fully connect with international 
actors. As one member of the Executive Council explained,  
When we see American visitors or other visitors, we ask them if possible they can be our 
‘spokesman’ to tell to other people around the world that we are Congolese and also our 
country of DRC accepts that we are Congolese. If you say that, then everyone knows the 
truth; it could help us so we could go back to our country. (Executive Council, personal 
communication, 25 January 2014) 
Likewise, members of the Executive Council and other interviewees suggested that we, as researchers, 
“go ask your government” for more resettlement options, including increased resettlement quotas or 
political intervention in the DRC to restore peace. The refugees directly engaged us, as white researchers 
representing an educational institution from the global North, as part of the peace-building process. Their 
perception of our power to evoke change regularly drew out requests during the interview process to be 
“good ambassadors” of their stories, which they understood to carry weight in the international political 
arena. The refugees thanked Rwanda for its hospitality, but did not ask for intervention or to serve as a 
spokesperson (even though it does both of these things); instead, they focused on the visitors to convey 
their messages to a larger international audience.  
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As discussed in the Methodology chapter, the refugees also enacted agency by calling our data 
collection team to a higher purpose in our research process. They pointedly questioned,  
As you came to talk to us as leaders, what is the guarantee you are giving to us that you 
are going to be a good ambassador? What is the guarantee? How will we know that you 
transferred our message we are giving you? (Quartier leader, personal communication, 6 
June 2014) 
The last question about how they will know that we pass along their “message” is important for 
understanding how Kiziba refugees perceive their reality as durable displacement. I have interviewed 
Rwandese in other contexts as well as participated in focus groups of Banyarwanda forcibly relocated 
from Tanzania into eastern Rwanda. The term “ambassador” and the idea of a “guarantee” never came 
up in the other interviews. These words surfaced in nearly every interview conducted in Kiziba over each 
of the three years. The immediate association between our research teams’ presence and residents’ 
requests that we serve as a conduit of their message shows the embeddedness of international 
processes in the psychological, intellectual, and socio-political reference bases of refugees there. Well 
versed in INGO-speak, the refugees frequently use the words “ambassador,” “guarantee,” and “durable 
solutions” in English even when speaking French or Kinyarwanda. One refugee youth, using INGO-
speak, told us, “I would like to go where I can find a durable solution” (refugee youth, personal 
communication, 5 June 2014). His use of the ‘durable solution’ buzzword places his plight outside the 
realm of Rwanda alone and into the global conversation on lasting solutions for increasingly long-staying 
refugee situations. In this way, refugees position themselves as international actors. Rather than 
engaging the host community, they understood a sense of their larger situation in the international context 
and encouraged us, as visiting outsiders, to carry their stories into the international realm in search of 
“durable solutions.” The specific vocabulary carries with it a power to engage in international dialog about 
access, privilege, and the weight of their stories as forced migrants. Furthermore, refugees’ knowledge of 
INGO and humanitarian/development machinery language articulated a form of agency, as they identified 
themselves within this larger system while using the language of the “master’s tools” in their hopes that 
the larger context of protraction would eventually be dismantled (Lorde, 1983). 
Residents of Kiziba Camp repeatedly demonstrated a familiarity with muzunga (foreigners from 
the global North) outsiders through their easy interactions with us and by articulating awareness of the 
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wider global system that connotes our placement as Westerners. This idea of our ability to offer a 
“guarantee” and provide longer-term “ambassadorship” came up in most of the leadership interviews. 
One participant plainly asked,  
What can you do? We are happy that you came to see us, to visit us, to hear our stories, 
to share our stories. What can you do to change this life for us? Because we are always 
complaining that we live hard life, that we live in [a] bad situation…If you could be our 
good ambassador to the international community to come and move us from this 
situation, we’ll be thankful for you and we’ll ask blessing from God for you. (village leader, 
personal communication, 6 June 2014) 
By requesting a reciprocal value for their time and interview, refugees immediately placed themselves 
within a system of international processes, most reliably through INGOs. Furthermore, they exhibited 
agency in their expression of a core knowledge that their story carried some weight, and that we would be 
better positioned in our reporting of this global crisis by including their actual stories. They were not 
disillusioned about their request, however. One young woman explained,  
What I can tell the American people or the international community is that we don’t live a 
really good life. We are living a hard life. Of course I know even people who are outside 
who are not living in the camp also it doesn’t mean that they live the best life; but at least 
it is different to life here in the camp. (refugee youth representative, personal 
communication, 6 June 2014) 
Her message to the “international community” shows that she certainly understands that leaving the camp 
does not guarantee anyone a “good life,” but her request is one of agency to change daily processes. The 
refugees balance a complicated expression of agency where they know they have some voice in the 
international arena, but very little control over the ability to affect change in their daily circumstances.  
This constrained agency stance came across in one particularly poignant statement by a woman 
village leader who expressed frustration with her children’s future opportunities. She stated, “Just tell [the 
international community] that we are dying. We are not living. We are just there. If they can do something, 
they can help us and change our life” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Her 
summary of the exasperation felt among camp residents demonstrates a connection with the broader 
international community and frustration with the daily monotony and unending displacement that 
characterizes life in Kiziba. It also speaks to her understanding that the problems of unending 
displacement are international, not local, and thus places her in the larger conversation of global forced 
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migration. These expressions of defining the discourses that convey her experience to the international 
political community demonstrate a kind of agency, constrained by local and global circumstances and yet 
powerful among international actors. The following sections build on this idea by describing in turn the 
refugees’ narratives along the themes of home, identity, and hope for the future.  
SPACE AND PLACE 
Given the refugees’ relationship with the international community beyond that of the local host 
community, how does this shape and define identity, citizenship, and even state sovereignty in a way that 
perpetuates a durable form of displacement? Speaking philosophically to the ways humans as a species 
assign social meaning to spaces to make them our own, Sundstrom (2003) observes,  
There is the force from below, the uptake of the label by those who are labeled. People 
forced to live in distinct places come to recognize, and even love, those places. As was 
the case with pre-war Jewish ghettos, the African American reaction to segregation has 
been one of struggle and resistance, but also appreciation and investment in their 
communities…While all involved want an end to social ills and distributive injustice, they 
do not want an end to their neighborhoods and communities. (Sundstrom, 2003, p. 86)  
His words ring true for the refugee context as well. While refugees repeatedly sought a solution that 
would dismantle Kiziba, they simultaneously recognized their own sense of community in the proximity 
they share with so many others who experienced parallel circumstances and identify in similar borderland 
forms. They were unwilling to give up their home in Kiziba unless they could return to the DRC or resettle 
abroad. Kiziba held a special symbolism of security and stability that neither the host country nor the DRC 
in its current state could replace. Sundstrom (2003) goes on to discuss how place, “in a looping effect,” 
comes to “inhabit” the human identity (Sundstrom, 2003, p. 91). This theory broadly describes the 
cognitive processes that contribute to refugees’ sense of identity, hope, and home. The Kiziba residents 
demonstrated this in their own narratives, for instance when a village leader explained, “I am a 
Congolese, but here I’m a refugee. But, I’m Congolese” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 
2014). This this case, the contradictory answer of being Congolese but a refugee speaks to the influence 
of place and encampment on identity in Kiziba. Over decades of isolation in the camp, which identity 
presides, Congolese, refugee, or both? According to Sundstrom’s (2003) theory, refugees’ forced 
presence creates the camp environment in which they socially construct their world. As with the refugee 
youth, “home” and the camp become one in the same. The refugees’ imaginings—the social construction 
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of who they are and where they belong—in turn shapes the space by externally reinforcing them as 
foreigner/non-citizen/outsider/other. Sundstrom’s (2003) insistence that we see the process as cyclical, 
rather than one-way, illuminates a potential mechanism by which refugees inadvertently entrench their 
displacement into a more durable form.  
The previous section placed refugees’ agency in the realm of the international community. This 
section follows the narratives of refugees to illustrate that while Kiziba residents find their protracted 
placelessness frustrating, they hold a deep sense of pride in their abilities to maintain a functional and 
orderly community, another instance of constrained agency. They have shaped this space into a 
community of their own—a separate extra-political space inside the territorial boundaries and internal 
sovereignty of the host state. This section explores the themes of home, identity, and hope to illustrate 
more abstractly the phenomenon Zetter (1991) described when he observed refugees choosing to retain 
the label ‘refugee’ as a conscious strategy. Refugee labeling and collective imaginings of identity, home, 
and hope further situate Kiziba’s residents outside of the context of citizenship in a traditional sovereign 
state, namely DRC or Rwanda, and therefore contribute to a sense that there are no realistic long-term 
solutions for their situation. These imaginings therefore contribute to the permanence and durability of 
their forced displacement.   
HOME 
The Banyarwanda have lived in camps in Rwanda for nearly two decades. Children in the camp 
now have not known any other life. Those in their early twenties barely remember the DRC. For those 
youth whose families were killed in flight, they do not even know what village they came from, nor have 
they heard stories about ‘home’ in the Congo from their parents or grandparents (youth representatives, 
personal communication, 6 June 2014). For those who are older and remember home, or have 
envisioned it through their families’ stories, the path back to the DRC is elusive and uncertain. Bauman 
(2004) again describes the inter turmoil of being “cast in a condition of ‘liminal drift’”: 
Even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since 
its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a place they could call 
‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. They are never to be free from the gnawing sense of 
the transience, indefiniteness, and provisional nature of any settlement. (p. 76) 
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This study argues, however, that “transience, indefiniteness, and provisional nature” becomes in itself 
more concrete and permanent. As refugees remain in exile, their individually and collectively constructed 
images of ‘home’ deviate from the realities of those places they once called ‘home.’  
By exploring how Kiziba refugees refer to ‘home’ and belonging, we begin to see that this 
divergence places them somewhere in the periphery of belonging. In some conversations, the refugees 
clearly identified as non-Rwandan citizens, even in the future. One participant stated flatly, “Home is still 
Congo” but then continued,  
I never plan to go back to Congo. I can’t even plan because even if I am telling you that 
some of my relatives are there, it doesn’t mean that they [are on] our property. They keep 
moving up and down, up and down because there is still a war. They currently can’t leave 
the country, but they are still displaced in the country. (village leader, personal 
communication, 6 June 2014) 
Some even placed themselves in the ‘refugee’ only category—of neither the Congo nor Rwanda. The 
theme of ‘home’ further materializes this third category of refugee non-citizen other. As the protracted 
state of their displacement endures, the refugees become not only displaced in their citizenship and 
identity, but also spatiotemporally marginalized. They are separated from Rwanda by the borders of the 
camp, and separated from the Congo by physical distance; but they are also separated from ‘home’ by 
the decades that have changed the landscape, altered community structures, and likely removed most 
claims to property.  
Malkki (1992) and S. Turner (2010) each see this particular aspect of protracted displacement as 
an opportunity to better understand the social construction of ‘home.’ Speaking on this importance of 
refugees as an instance of global processes, Malkki (1992) postulates that “trying to understand the 
circumstances of particular groups of refugees illuminates the complexity of the ways in which people 
construct, remember, and lay claim to particular places as ‘homelands’ or ‘nations’” (p. 25). The works of 
Malkki (1992) and S. Turner (2010) engage in a conversation about the role of memory among refugees 
in long-staying circumstances. They each demonstrate how Burundian refugees in Tanzania collectively 
reconstructed a nostalgic imagining of ‘home.’  
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The Kiziba refugees, with nearly two decades in the camp, articulate conflicting ideas of ‘home’ 
that center on a central theme of belonging nowhere. Two village leader interviews held independently 
and hours apart indicate this contradiction:  
For me, I can say that home is here. I can’t say home is Congo when I’m not there. So for 
now, home is here [in the camp]. (young woman village leader, personal communication, 
5 June 2014) 
Of course, my home is there. Here?! No. No way. Home is there [in the Congo], not here. 
Here is just a hard life. (elder man village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
The young woman village leader in the first quote identified in a “refugee” citizenship category, only noting 
that she’s Congolese after additional questions. Her understanding of why she had to leave the DRC was 
that the “other tribes, they were not happy with us who are speaking Kinyarwanda so they forced us to 
leave the country.” With no family remaining in the DRC, no foreseeable resolution to the security crisis in 
the eastern provinces, and an understanding that resettlement abroad is very rare, she expressed a very 
limited capacity to envision life beyond the camp. She places the Banyarwanda as outsiders, even in their 
villages of origin, by acknowledging that this cultural differentiation—that of being Kinyarwanda 
speakers—is what provoked the attacks and forced displacement in the first place. This points to her 
understanding that the solution is not as simple as returning home. Since Kinyarwanda continues to be 
the dominant language in the camp, in this statement she hints at an understanding that the instability in 
eastern Congo runs deeper than just violence and war. The larger conflict contains an ethnolinguistic 
component that frames her as an outsider in her ‘home.’ Combined with the knowledge that the refugees 
are also outsiders in Rwanda, this awareness likely influences her conceptualization of the camp as home 
“for now” and contributes to the collective understanding that home is nowhere for these refugees.   
The elder village leader who felt that “home is there [in the Congo], not here [in Rwanda]” held 
extensive memories of his life in the DRC (elder man village leader, personal communication, 5 June 
2014). Unlike most of the residents we interviewed, he had a son who maintained the family property in 
the DRC with his wife and children. The land is just that; it has no structures and no cows, but it is still 
home to him. Despite this existing connection, however, he did not feel he would ever return in his 
lifetime. He recalled a group who left Kiziba to return home to his village because they were tired of camp 
life. They were again chased out and forced to return and live in a different camp. Stories such as these 
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shaped some of the perceptions of older interviewees. Not only did those who left the camp to return to 
the DRC generally fail, they often ended up back in camps but not in Kiziba. From the elder village 
leader’s veteran vantage point in life, this seemed to confirm for him that he would live out his days in 
Kiziba Camp. He later explained to us,  
I think that I can’t leave this camp. I can’t really leave this camp. First of all, life here is 
hard. So, if you ask me to go to other-outside of this camp, still in Rwanda but outside 
this camp—it will not change anything. Because if I compare my country where I came 
from to this country, it’s totally different…Because there’s [word] like the war ended, even 
now there are some who went back [to my village in the Congo], but the problem is that 
there is no guarantee for security. Anything can happen at any time. When you are living 
a hard life [in the camp], you say, well maybe there is peace now. Let me see if I can 
survive [back home] for just a short time, but others they are staying here because they 
don’t feel they have a guarantee…of security. (village leader, personal communication, 5 
June 2014)  
Notice the contradiction throughout his dialog. When specifically asked about ‘home,’ he felt the only 
answer was the Congo. But through his narrative, he revealed his understanding of the reality that this 
home no longer exists for him—it is just a memory. It is, even with his son’s continued physical claim over 
the land, an imaginary home. Those who have tried to return home failed and were then robbed of their 
life in Kiziba when they were assigned to another camp. As one of the few who still retained some 
presence in his village of origin, he seemed most acutely aware of the fact that his recollection of home 
was vastly different from the realities of a return to that place. He also conveyed a sense of durability in 
that risking an attempt to return home, even having maintained claims to land, could mean losing both the 
DRC and the safety and stability of Kiziba. When he reluctantly concedes that he “can’t really leave this 
camp,” he also alludes to the durability of all the residents’ displacement in this containment zone due to 
the inaccessibility of both return to the DRC and resettlement elsewhere.   
One thing the refugees and the MIDIMAR Minister made clear was that Rwanda was not home. 
As a former refugee, the Minister spoke from her experiences, “The best solution is to have your own 
home in your home, even if it is a bad one because it is home. I think most refugees, even if [the country 
of origin] is a bad one, you feel at home” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 15 June 
2014). A refugee youth corroborated this stance,  
First of all, home is always home. If someone can guarantee me my security, home is 
always home. I can prefer going home [to the DRC] more than anywhere in the world. But 
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for now, I can’t see any stability in my country. Then for my future or my home, I would 
like to go abroad. (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014) 
This idea that “home is always home” came up in several interviews with refugee youth, leaders, and 
even the Minister. Yet, like the elder’s narrative above, the ‘home’ they spoke of represented more of an 
imaginary nostalgic home, or an allegiance to the memory of home, more than the concrete return to a 
physical place.  
This imaginary, nostalgic ‘home’ served as a conceptual demarcation between the host country in 
which they reside “for now” and the longing for a place to belong. Kibreab (1999) sees this as a reflection 
of the refugees’ perceptions that the host communities do not welcome them. He notes of refugees 
globally, 
They make every effort not only to maintain and develop their national collective identities 
and transmit them to their offspring, but also eliminate the factors that prompted their 
displacement in the first place so that they can return to their country in safety and 
dignity. Instead of working to develop roots in the new place, their aim becomes return to 
the country of origin from where they were forcibly uprooted. (Kibreab, 1999, p. 389)  
While his main point is that territory still matters in a globalizing world, he makes clear the generality of 
the Kiziba refugees’ experiences. Regardless of the demographic and historic commonalities between the 
Banyarwanda refugees and their host population, xenophobic sentiments prevent them from seeing the 
host country as a potential long-term home. Thus, refugees face a split consciousness that mirrors the 
entrapment of their physical existence. They are not fully part of either community, and often their 
imagined home exists far from the geographic terrain that contains their daily existence in Kiziba Camp. 
As a result, while residents demonstrate agency in particularly complex ways in connection to the 
international governance structures that shape their daily lives, this defining disconnect from home 
constrains the refugees’ abilities to fully exercise agency or reconcile their placelessness in the region.  
Exclusion from integration in Rwanda as a possible durable solution came across most clearly 
when one village leader said, “Here in Rwanda we are just here because we don’t have a choice. It’s like 
we are forced. We don’t have a choice…Home was Congo. But for now, I don’t have a home” (village 
leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). His statement poignantly illuminates the durability of 
Kiziba refugees’ displacement. For him, this is a forced existence. It is not just a forced displacement from 
the Congo, but also an eviction from the citizen/state/territory relationship that defines modern statehood. 
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In this sense, he acknowledges that Kiziba Camp residents in fact have no home. They are placeless in a 
world where local politics rests within a state-centric and citizen-centered framework, giving the refugees 
no room for a full expression of agency. Refugees submit to the enduring nature of their durable 
displacement in three distinct ways: 1) Identifying home as a nostalgic imagining to which they likely 
cannot return; 2) positioning themselves first as a third category beyond Rwanda or DRC citizen; and 3) 
articulating hope for the future as concretely different from their existence within the camp. The next 
section discusses this vital second dimension by exploring how refugees’ social construction of identity 
and belonging contributes to the durability of their displacement. To frame this abstract idea more 
concretely in the lives of Kiziba residents, the next section focuses on the particular articulation of 
responsibility as an identity construction mechanism within the camp setting.  
IDENTITY 
The concept of identity among refugees transcends the personal, community, state, and global 
levels. Encampment, however, complicates refugees’ own sense of identity. Zetter (1991) refers to this as 
a “crisis-based identity” that is derived from “institutionalized perceptions” (p. 60). But Bauman (2004) 
takes his idea a step further by dramatically describing the identity crisis faced by refugees:  
On the way to the camps, their future inmates are stripped of every single element of 
their identities except one: that of stateless, placeless, functionless refugees. Inside the 
fences of the camp, they are pulped into a faceless mass, having been denied access to 
the elementary amenities from which identities are drawn and the usual yarns of which 
identities are woven. (pp. 76-77)  
His vivid picture fosters a feeling of hopelessness and identity lost. The last phrase, however, about “the 
usual yarns of which identities are woven” hints at the construction of alternative, unusual, identities in a 
refugee camp. Malkki’s (1992) analysis of identity picks up here when she observes of the increasingly 
“chronically mobile and routinely displaced” global population of migrants that,  
…identity is always mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly categorization 
by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories, et 
cetera. It is a creolized aggregate composed through bricolage. (p. 37) 
Bauman essentially claims that refugee identities are wiped clean by the processes of forced migration. 
Malkki’s (1992) theory allows us to see beyond the initial stripping of identity by showing that camp 
identities are formed and re-formed through internal and external forces that shape the collective “fund of 
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memories.” The refugees’ active shaping of these memories, stories, and imaginings are an expression of 
their constrained agency within the camp setting. From the combination of these two theorists we can see 
how refugees may construct complex senses of self and belonging that are at times in conflict with one 
another and may even contribute to a sense of permanence in the identity of displacement.  
Complex identities formed within the liminal drift of Kiziba demonstrate a clear consensus among 
the refugees and host communities that the residents do not belong in Rwanda. The MIDIMAR Minister 
made this point very clear in our interview by stating, “In reality, we can’t consider to transform them into 
Rwandan citizens…This implies being able to provide them with all the capacity to be a good citizen…We 
have not enough soil. We must be realistic” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 
2014). Even despite Rwanda’s Vision 2020 plans that would carry it forward as a technology-driven, 
rather than agriculturally-based, economy, the Minister articulated a cultural ideal that to be a “good 
citizen” one must have “enough soil.” Since available terrain is not something Rwanda can offer so many 
Congolese, government leaders do not see local integration as a durable solution. Kibreab (1999) 
provides theoretical insight into the long-term prospects of local integration for the Banyarwanda 
refugees. He explains, “Cosmopolitan identity cannot be wished into existence in societies where 
identities are determined and rights are apportioned on the basis of territorially anchored identities” 
(Kibreab, 1999, p. 399). Here we see the predicament of these forced migrants in terms of the regional 
context, one which is based on autochthony and ties to the land. With no available land to distribute in 
Rwanda, the Minister asserts that refugees’ local integration is not a durable solution as it would sentence 
them to poverty and struggles. With no rights to their lands in the Congo, based on systems of local 
autochthony and administration of citizenship, they also have no territorial ties to their country of origin 
(Jackson, 2006). As a result, Kiziba Camp holds a very symbolic geographic and political space as one of 
the most enduring consequences of the larger conflicts that remain embedded in the soils of the Great 
Lakes region. 
Closing the door to the second best durable solution (local integration) in the organizational 
rhetoric of UNHCR and the global refugee regime complex adds to the enduring sense of the 
Banyarwanda’s displacement. The majority of residents insisted that despite everything, they still consider 
the DRC as their home. A woman quartier leader explained, “Even if they don’t like us, even if they kill 
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some of our relatives, we don’t have any other country. Our home is Congo” (quartier leader, personal 
communication, 6 June 2014). Hovil (2011) found a similar distinction that frames the refugees as 
outsiders in their temporary camps. In her study of potential repatriation of the Banyarwanda to North 
Kivu, she found that most of her interviewees preferred to return home to the DRC if the security 
problems resolved. This idea of a secure Congo also came up in our interviews, with an Executive 
Council member saying, “Now it’s been long time that we are refugees. We are here since 1996, so it is 
17 years that we are refugees and we wish that we could go back in our country if there is peace” 
(personal communication, 25 January 2013). Some of Hovil’s (2011) interviewees indicated that a 
possible alternative solution would be to allow dual nationality between Rwanda and DRC. While this 
particular solution did not emerge in my interview data, it does speak to the broader sense that the 
refugees were unwilling to give up completely on the DRC.  
Older Kiziba residents carried distinct memories that clearly centered their sense of self in relation 
to the DRC. When asked about who he was and where he considers home, an elder village leader’s 
explanation really stuck with me throughout the study. During the data collection process, his narrative 
formed a defining moment in my own understanding of the complexities of this group’s particular 
experience. He simply stated, “When they put us in their books here, they say that we are Congolese 
refugees” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). He was among the first village leaders 
we interviewed and by far the most resigned to the fact that he would never belong anywhere. He felt he 
was “too old” to make a fresh start anywhere—Rwanda, the DRC, or abroad—and his candid portrayal of 
his identity as an institutional formality set forth by UNHCR really spoke to the way Kiziba refugees are 
byproducts of a regional conflict with very little prospect of resolution. The elder village leader’s 
acceptance of this fate embodied Bauman’s (2004) theories of “wasted lives.” By subscribing to the 
UNHCR’s definition of his place in this world, the elder village leader affirms the complicated situation in 
which these refugees find themselves. His existence as a Congolese Banyarwanda is both a byproduct 
and cause of the ongoing regional instability. The idea that he is defined simply by an entry in the 
logbooks of the overseers of the global refugee regime complex yields much agency in defining the 
discourses of the refugees’ protracted case. He defines himself in the durability of this ‘temporary’ 
situation—not as a Congolese citizen entitled to a future back in the homeland, and not as a 
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Banyarwanda at home in the ethnolinguistically related host state of Rwanda. He is of the growing global 
non-citizen “refugee” category, a notion that adds a sense of permanence, and hopelessness for a 
‘durable solution,’ to the situation in Kiziba. This non-citizen/other acceptance emerged as a broader 
theme during interviews with the camp youth. As the next section describes, most of the youth had never 
experienced or could not remember the DRC. This shaped their identity construction and understanding 
of agency in different ways than that of the adults with whom we spoke.  
KIZIBA YOUTH 
The refugee youth we interviewed had left the DRC very young or had been born in Rwanda. 
Some with living older family members had heard stories of their former villages and life before the 
conflict. Others were born in transit (one in the transit camp outside Goma) or had lost family members 
who could convey those stories. Their lives were more definitively shaped by the constraints of the camp, 
and this in turn affected their identity construction. A hopeful youth told us, “we are the future of [the] 
Congolese. Maybe [we] would like to go ahead with our study, then anytime we shall return to our Congo 
country, our own country” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Another refugee youth 
explained to me, “Home is Congo. Here I’m just like a visitor. I’m a Congolese because my parents were 
Congolese” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). His default to accept the identity of 
his parents as Congolese points to the more salient understanding among youth that they were outsiders 
in Rwanda. In this case, their own identities were constructed through an understanding of who they are 
not, namely Rwandan citizens. Though they had no memory or first-hand knowledge of the DRC, many 
identified with the homeland of their parents. His word choice also emphasizes the outsiderness of this 
population. Communities such as Kiziba that have resided in Rwanda for nearly two decades described 
as “visitors” encapsulates  a distinctly prolonged form of the insider/outsider, citizen/non-citizen 
relationship between the refugees and the host communities, where identities are formed based upon 
entire generations’ existence within the camp context.  
Not all youth readily accepted the idea of returning to the Congo. One youth who had been told 
by his parents about the DRC he left when he was just four years old told us, “The only place I don’t wish 
to go is to go back to Congo or to stay in Rwanda” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 
2014). They are all enculturated into the national citizenship of Rwanda through the camp educational 
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system, as described in the previous chapter. The youngest resident we interviewed, at just 15 years old, 
had the most idyllic hope of assimilation, informing us, “My wish can be to go live in Kigali if I can, 
because it’s a nice place” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). That she expressed 
this without ever having been to Kigali speaks to a younger generation’s mental assimilation with the host 
state. Unlike the adult camp residents, their interest in the DRC centered more on curiosity than a 
particular loyalty or nostalgia for a past “good” life. One refugee youth participant exemplified this internal 
contradiction when he explained,  
For me, how I heard the information—how they killed our families—and now still. No, 
Congo, they don’t accept us as Congolese. Me, I have no plans for returning there…Even 
if I never lived in the Congo, I’m curious to know where my parents were from, to see our 
property, to see what the landscape looked like in my village where I come from. (refugee 
youth, personal communication, June 2014) 
The youth we interviewed most often revealed this contradiction. They felt a similar draw of curiosity to 
see the land to which they feel they belong, and yet carried a sense that a future in the DRC is not a 
reality. Generations into this protracted displacement, many youth did not carry a strong connection to the 
Congo and thus embodied the permanence of a temporary camp life. The youth’s interest in his family’s 
property draws upon a cultural emphasis on the land and territorial nature of citizenship and belonging. 
Malkki (1992) explains these connections more fully in her work where she weaves earth-based 
terminology with human conceptualizations of identity and belonging, including people’s use of the word 
“roots” to describe where they came from and “land” as a synonym of country. The breech in this 
refugees’ connection between the land of origin they identify with and the realities of returning there 
provides insight into how identity formation further entrenches their displacement as durable. While they 
have no emotional attachments to home, they have an understanding that their identity and entitlement to 
future opportunities rests in the “property” and “landscape” of a territorial home in the DRC. They were 
also acutely aware that neither the DRC nor Rwanda held long-term opportunities for them, and instead 
envisioned themselves as needing more global solutions to end the durability of their situation.  
While the adult refugees most often conceptualized their identities as Congolese citizen, youth 
participants often uniquely placed themselves in a separate category, that of “Congolese refugee.” This 
identity is one that does not see the DRC or Rwanda as a viable future option. One refugee youth 
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explained, “Yeah, my identity, I’m Congolese; but now I’m just a refugee. Because I don’t have any right 
to be Congolese or Rwandese” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Ideas such as 
these presented more readily in the refugee youth. This was presumably because many had never 
actually been to the DRC or left very young. As youth who may have ventured out of the camp for 
education or to pursue employment, they also carried a more concrete understanding that they were 
outsiders in Rwanda. Another youth told us, “Because I’m a refugee. I’m here. I’m a Congolese refugee. 
My home is the camp” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). His story had particular 
salience because he had worked outside the camp and been exploited by employers. He opened up 
about these experiences and told us that while others are reluctant to share how Rwandese exclude them 
from life outside the camp, he believes it is a very common occurrence. From this participant’s 
perspective, the border between the camp and Rwandan society, even though permeable, marked a very 
concrete barrier and identity boundary. Again, this speaks to the refugees’ perceptions that they are 
outsiders within. They can blend in with neighbors only on a cursory level, but their foreignness and 
perceived outsider status would prevent full integration in Rwanda. This borderland reality leads to an 
internalized sense of entrapment that parallels the geographic and structural barriers to Kiziba residents’ 
abilities to reach beyond the containment of camp life.  
While Kiziba interviewees expressed their ideas about identity and belonging in different forms—
from being only Congolese to an institutional ‘refugee’ outsider—overall, participants conveyed feelings of 
hopelessness for the future. They shared a sense that “my life is only in this camp” (refugee youth, 
personal communication, 6 June 2014). In some ways, they embraced the outsider/non-citizen/other 
identity as a survival mechanism to access the resources of camp life until their preferred solution—return 
to the Congo they remember—presents itself. Consciously separating themselves from the 
ethnolinguistically similar host community adds to the durability of this particular context of displacement. 
It eliminates the potential for local integration, the second-best durable solution according to UNHCR. 
MIDIMAR representatives’ and Congolese refugees’ consensus that local integration sentences them to 
an even harder life than they already experience in the camp reinforces the permanent temporariness of 
their situation and perpetuates the belief that the only long-term solutions are to successfully return home 
or resettle abroad. The following section examines the identity of elected camp leaders in relation to 
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responsibility to show how sovereign-like governance mechanisms enforced by camp residents 
contributes to the durability of their encampment.    
RESPONSIBILITY 
The previous chapter discussed how Rwanda recreates its own political expectations inside the 
camp by administering elections and coaching women to run for representative positions within the camp. 
Through these elected posts, refugees create a collective sense of autonomy from the host state and 
INGOs. They do not refuse interaction with these entities, but rather negotiate the internal order of the 
camp on their own terms and manage the relationship with host government police and justice institutions 
and INGO representatives. In a sense, they embrace the spatial isolation of the camp to establish a 
sovereign-like state of autonomy in the form of internal governance. One elder village leader explained 
the role of elected representatives in the camp,  
So, being a leader, first of all you need to be wise, and you need to be open to everyone. 
You need to be like an Ombudsman. You need to share with [the families in your village], 
and you need to make sure that between the people you are leading there is no jealousy 
because of those cheap things—food or whatever. You just need to be wise and prevent 
any conflict without any need of going to the local government or authorities. (village 
leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
Given Rwanda’s active involvement in responding to major crimes within the camp, the village 
leaders’ attempts to prevent issues from needing local government or authorities’ intervention speaks 
more to the camp’s sense of autonomy than to an aversion to host government institutions. This village 
leader’s statement echoes the pride of the camp Security Committee that the community in Kiziba can 
take care of its own security problems with very little intervention from outside forces, specifically the host 
government and INGOs (Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). These ideas of 
autonomy, internal governance, and managing its own daily security needs frames Kiziba as a sovereign-
like entity and reaffirms the idea presented in the previous chapter that its borders actually represent 
international borders within the host state. The elected leaders’ roles as governance providers within the 
camp illustrate a particular identity and understanding of agency within a subset of the population. Their 
identity is shaped by the pride they feel in demonstrating agency to shape the camp environment. 
Autonomy as a spatially distinct community further entrenches the idea that Kiziba’s residents are not 
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citizens of the DRC or Rwandan states, but rather a separate non-citizen refugee category of human 
existence.  
The governance system relies very heavily on elected leadership serving as advisors and 
ambassadors. Leadership roles carry with them a commitment to the community and a strong sense of 
working on behalf of the good of the entire camp. A woman village leader described her role,  
Being a leader is to be wise, to be an advisor to the people you’re leading. And of course 
as we always face many issues of life, on our level we don’t have a solution; we just 
transfer their issues to the next level. Then, if there is a good answer to bring back, we 
bring back a good answer to them. So that’s how we live and survive. (village leader, 
personal communication, 6 June 2014) 
This idea of leadership hierarchy as a way to communicate individual issues to the authority—host state 
or INGO—in order to “survive” illuminates the weight of these roles in the community. In a world where 
one has very little control over employment opportunities, food diversity and security, and healthcare, 
Kiziba refugees enact a sense of agency by conveying the local-level concerns of residents to the state 
and INGOs though established mechanisms of leadership. In many ways, they both work within the 
existing structural dependence on outside forces and express very distinct individual and group models of 
agency. For example, conversion of the camp’s roofs from canvas to tin affirms the leadership’s ability to 
affect change (however slowly) in the residents’ everyday lives. At the same time, individuals’ ability to 
articulate these demands relies upon their individual leadership skills and role model status within the 
camp.  
Observations in the camp over the three years of fieldwork speak to the high priority residents 
place on ensuring and sustaining a clean living environment, with the monitoring responsibilities falling 
elected leadership. Expectations for individual accountability to maintain this standard demonstrate 
another level of agency in operation. While some garbage is visible near the walkways of the camp, the 
majority of streets, side streets, and alleyways are free from debris. Residents upheld this environmental 
standard as a reflection of UNHCR standards. Leaders are expected to interface with UNHCR to ensure 
maintenance of the houses within the camp. A woman village leader explained,  
To be a leader is to be a good ambassador; to look at the house[s of] the people you are 
leading…we always have issues [with] the roof [leaking]. We are the ones who give 
reports to the next step. And we teach them how they need to live; to be clean, to make 
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sure that their neighborhoods are clean; to avoid any diseases. (village leader, personal 
communication, 5 June 2014) 
 This responsibility for the maintenance of daily life appeared as both a core value system within Kiziba 
and a reflection of the larger structure of governance in operation. While residents live in individual mud 
houses, with typically two small rooms, their extreme close proximity and shared public toilets, wash 
stations, water access, and walkways impose a heightened expectation for collective accountability, 
which requires oversight and layers of hierarchy. The leadership structure in the camp works as a chain 
of command, with each village leader reporting to the quartier leader who in turn communicates with the 
camp president to report to the INGOs. At each of these levels, care for house roofs constituted a major 
concern of the leadership. During the final field visit, the leaders explained that the camp was slowly 
being converted from canvas roofs to tin. They felt accomplished that they could serve the needs of their 
constituents and neighbors; however, the tin roofs spreading throughout the camp are also visually 
symbolic of the permanence of this “temporary” camp space. This structural housing development 
therefore captured the complexities of leaders’ associations to the likelihood that Kiziba may remain their 
lifetime residence. 
Autonomy as a functioning camp community extends to the camp leadership’s management of 
housing and disease. As an expression of agency, leaders took on responsibility for the physical 
wellbeing of their fellow residents—a task they identified as a literal lifesaving duty. A male village leader 
summarized his responsibilities,  
I, as a leader, make sure that we are…even if we don’t live a good life…are at least 
liv[ing] in a clean area to prevent any disease; because, as I told you, our bodies they are 
weak because of the type of food we are eating all the time. We have to make sure that 
we are living in a clean area to prevent any disease which can kill a lot of people in a 
short time. (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014).  
His qualification that “even if we don’t live a good life,” the residents can strive to keep the environment 
clean and disease-free, speaks to some expression of agency over the condition of their lives, and an 
abiding human leaning toward sustaining livelihood at the most fundamental grassroots level. While they 
cannot control the food that would make their bodies stronger, they can manage other aspects of daily 
existence to make the camp life more tolerable and seem more secure and stable for residents. In this 
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way, they alter the discourses of their temporary encampment to reflect more permanent, reliable, state-
like systems.  
During the first year of fieldwork, a man wearing a plastic container on his back walked around 
spraying the public latrines and washroom run-off channels that form as rain drains through the camp 
down the mountain. He sprayed disinfectant around until even the latrines emitted no smell. In the third 
year of camp fieldwork, attendants worked around new latrines along the outer camp perimeter to ensure 
the areas stayed clean. They gathered water from a nearby cistern to manually “flush” the toilets. This 
resident-management of the fundamental aspects of human existence illustrates the refugees’ adoption 
and adaption of INGO-inspired maintenance processes that support a claim and direct influence over the 
daily cycles of life. By regulating and participating in these habitual exercises, the refugees exercise 
agency in the traditional sense of power over actions; but they also engage a sense of agency that 
shapes the discourse of autonomy versus dependency. By demonstrating and practicing autonomy, the 
refugees challenge the limits of their aid dependency in ways that replicate states’ maintenance of 
internal and external sovereignty. Thus, the extensive labor involved in flushing the public toilets 
represents a larger collective investment in self-managed sustainability, even though they are dependent 
upon larger structures for basic needs. In the case of Kiziba, leaders also self-identified with these 
practices as part of a larger incentive to maintain health standards and cleanliness within the resources 
distributed by larger state and global institutions to sustain daily life. The INGO operating the camp clinic 
confirmed the MIDIMAR camp manager’s claim that Kiziba experiences very few disease outbreaks due 
to its high level of sanitation. Conscientious actions by residents to clean the communal areas reinforce 
the pride with which the interviewed leaders and council members explained how well Kiziba is managed, 
and thus portrayed a collective identity as a cohesive community unit. This one instance of Kiziba 
functioning as autonomous and state-like, despite its dependency on food and medical aid, captures the 
ongoing dialectic relationship between structural resource distribution and community agency and 
identity. 
Pride in serving in elected positions—as a conduit of Kiziba residents’ wider voices that could 
reach the state and INGO levels and impact the daily circumstances of camp life—conveyed strongly in 
many of the leaders’ interviews. Participants repeatedly assured us that they lead “not by power but by 
220 
wisdom,” a technique that maintains the orderliness of the camp. In this role, another woman village 
leader explained, “To be a leader here in this neighborhood is to be the messenger of the people you are 
leading. We do that freely; we don’t have any salary. We just do it because we like it and we like to help 
the people we are leading” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Beyond the standard 
representation of governance that would report within a national structure, Kiziba Camp leaders identified 
their role as in direct relationship to the international system of governance, thereby increasing their own 
sense of responsibility. These voluntary roles for the good of the community also serve as a reminder of 
the permanence of their situation. The orderliness, obedience to the leadership hierarchy, and the 
effectiveness of the camp governance structure to affect some change frames the camp as a kind of city. 
This autonomous entity, through its routinized system of participatory citizenship on the part of refugees, 
gives the impression that it could continue on in this state of displacement indefinitely so long as the aid 
deliveries arrive. Durability here comes from the ease with which refugees embrace local governance and 
the relationship with INGOs and host state institutions. As we explore the residents’ hopes for their future 
and the futures of their children, in the next section, the narratives rearticulate the social construction of 
identity and belonging as well as the durability of their displacement.  
HOPE 
The concept of hope became a focus of these interviews because it provides an avenue to 
explore the relationship between this enduring structural circumstance of protraction and individuals’ core 
agency and ability to grasp a future existence outside of Kiziba Camp. We often ended interviews by 
asking participants to share their hopes and visions for their future. In many instances, participants 
expressed no hope for the future. One village leader explained,  
If you look at how hard life is here in the camp, I personally can’t see any hope for my 
children. If you say, okay go to Congo, there is not any hope for my children because 
there is no security. So for now, to be honest, I don’t see any hope. I just live daily. 
(village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
When she says she “just live[s] daily,” this elected leader reinforces the permanence of their temporary 
situation. She felt that there is no future for her or her children in Congo, and no future in Rwanda. Rather 
than frustration bubbling to the surface and inciting possibilities of militarization, her statement speaks to 
a level of acceptance of this liminal space as her permanent reality. The peace-building process is out of 
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Kiziba refugees’ control and, instead of rallying for a revolution (Lischer, 2006), they resign to the 
durability of this forced displacement. As Milner (2011) asserts, refugees must participate in peace-
building efforts in order to assure lasting solutions to the conflict and forced migration that perpetuate 
regional instability and eliminate possibilities to repatriate. As Kiziba residents submit to the enduring 
nature of their displacement, they assume a collective position outside of the conversation on peace-
building. Noncitizens with no claim to territory have no investment in land-based conflict such as that in 
eastern DRC. In this liminal camp space, they exist outside of the political (conflict and peace) dialog in 
the Great Lakes Region. Collectively, the Banyarwanda are involved in the political turmoil of the DRC 
and Great Lakes Region. As the context chapter showed, they are part of the broader affected 
ethnolinguistic group. Autochthonous local leaders in the Kivu provinces continue to question the 
Banyarwanda’s eligibility for land rights and citizenship, adding fuel to a fiery past of colonialism, 
migration, and conflict over resources. In this sense, they belong in the regional peace-building dialog. 
But within the camp, their framing as apolitical INGO wards silences their voices in regional dialog and 
peace-building, thus limiting the potential for lasting repatriation solutions (Milner, 2000, 2011). 
The participants of this study did not locate themselves as part of the solution, and thus saw 
virtually no hope for the future. One leader asked,  
So here is my question. I personally came from Katanga. My father died in Katanga. My 
mother passed away here. Here we are in a refugee camp. What do you think about my 
hope for the future? Where do you think I would live if today they say ‘we are closing this 
camp’? Because I don’t have any relatives in Congo. Here [in Rwanda] I don’t have any 
relatives. So if for example today you are asking about my hope for my future, if they say 
they are closing this camp, where do I have to move according to you? (village leader, 
personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
Posing questions to us, as foreigner outsiders with a perceived level of relative power, emphasized the 
impossibility of Kiziba refugees’ situations and the core attachment to outsiders who represent the West 
and/or international humanitarian aid programs as the only avenue of hope. As we responded to the 
above participant’s core query, she went on to say, “UNHCR is the one who is giving us hope of living 
and surviving,” further placing her own future into the hands of refugee assistance institutions (village 
leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). These narratives of refugees’ perceptions of hope 
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continually reflected the relinquishment of agency in relation to the longer-term possibilities to alter the 
daily circumstances of their lives and find another means of existence outside of Kiziba.  
Others framed this sentiment of hopelessness in a more positive way by articulating their own 
fantasized notions of an alternative existence. They dreamed of an unknown imagined location abroad—
not in the DRC or Rwanda—where security is a guaranteed part of life. One leader speculated, “I can live 
anywhere around the world where I live in peace; where I have security. And, you know, when you have 
security all the time, you have hope of living” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). 
Others included all potential countries, stressing the importance of security, such as this village leader:  
What I only need is a place around the world where I can have hope that [my children] 
can have a good life. It doesn’t matter if it’s in Rwanda, Uganda, Congo, or abroad. What 
I need is a good life, a good standard of life for my kids. (village leader, personal 
communication, 5 June 2014) 
This “good standard of life” for most of the participants referred to both physical security and food 
security. Namely, participants identified common foundations of sustenance as core dimensions of these 
aspirations’ standards: the pursuit of alternative food choices, further education, employment 
opportunities and the ability to live free of fear from perpetrators of violence. This identification of the 
particular dimensions of a perceived “good life” illustrates another form of agency expressed by 
participants. In their imagined other existence, they articulated core dimensions of daily life that would 
allow for greater choices, opportunities, and material resources, all prioritizing the focus on an 
overarching climate of security and peace.  
 This idea of living in an idealized foreign land is perpetuated by the myths propagated by those 
who have resettled abroad, as well as the interconnectedness of globalization, which allows refugees to 
have immediate contact through phone, email, and social media avenues with former Kiziba Camp 
residents who gained asylum. Before leaving for resettlement abroad, refugees most often hold idealized 
views of the country to which they are traveling (Fanjoy, Ingraham, Khoury, & Osman, 2005). Those 
participants we interviewed in Kiziba who knew someone who had resettled abroad invariably smiled and 
conveyed a firm belief that life was much better in that new country. Such imagined, albeit inaccurate, 
perceptions situate hope for the future outside the immediate reach of refugee agency. In a contradictory 
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way, the thoughts of life in a distant and “better” land inspired hope, and yet the realities of quota 
restrictions on resettlement options added weight to the permanence of life in Kiziba.  
My own experiences working with a U.S.-based local resettlement agency provide insight into the 
realities of refugees’ financial, emotional, and mental struggles, as they adjust to life in their new country 
of residence. Shedding light on the obligations and reasons for perpetuating myths of a good life, by 
studying remittances from resettled refugees, Akuei (2004) found that financial promises to those left 
behind often became so burdensome that refugees faced severe financial and psychological challenges 
in the new country. These obligations complicated their attempts to establish independence while 
remaining tied to financial obligations of their wider community within the camps. In her study, resettled 
refugees struggled to convey to relatives back home the financial hardships associated with acclimating 
to life in the new country because “in local thought, it is perceived as distasteful and undignified to 
complain about one’s problems” (Akuei, 2004, p. 6). In a casual conversation I shared with a young male 
refugee in Kiziba, he expressed his wish to go abroad somewhere like the U.S. Despite knowing people 
who had resettled abroad from the camp, he was very surprised to learn that even water costs money in 
the U.S.  
These informal conversations shared with youth in more casual settings throughout the camp 
provide insight into the way hardships in the new country often do not convey to those left behind. The 
myth of a ‘great life’ stems from relocated refugees’ desires to save face and hide the real struggles of 
adjustment, as well as to help those left behind maintain hope for their future. Expressions of envy and 
joy by participants in this study indicated that this myth does in fact help to nurture a sense of hope for a 
potential new life abroad. Yet this hope is somewhat tainted by the intense and extremely lengthy process 
of attaining approvals for resettlement, which are offered to only a very small fraction of the population. In 
the meantime, Kiziba Camp residents’ sense of hope hinges upon the extremely unlikely chance that the 
outside international system of refugee management will deem them worthy of relocation. With less than 
224 
3 percent likelihood of relocation from Kiziba2, such embedded hope fractures refugees’ agency and 
reproduces the sense of dependency on Western-operated donors and international systems. 
Though Kiziba residents dream of a nostalgic home in the DRC or a highly glamorized life 
resettled abroad, an overall sense that their existence would be lived out in the camp repeatedly emerged 
as their dominant reality. As Bauman (2004) philosophized, their lives are indeed wasted by sitting in that 
camp, excluded from a permanent home with “no return and no road forward” (p. 77). Conversations with 
several youth reflected a prevailing expression of no sense of hope for the future. This predominant 
narrative script demonstrated how the process of protraction moves from forced displacement in the first 
generation to durable displacement in subsequent generations. One youth explained to us,  
Teenagers haven’t hope of studying, haven’t hope of their future…You can [find a wife 
here], but if you think to begin having children, you can’t be leading to that kind of mind. 
Because we would have children without giving them schools and their future can’t be 
good. We don’t need our children to face the kind of life that we face. (refugee youth, 
personal communication, 5 June 2014)  
This participant felt deeply troubled by the cycle of life in the camp without hope for a better future. As 
they continue to exist in a state of idleness, their lives are ‘wasted’ in a human potential sense. They 
currently have limits on economic participation, the ability to pursue educational opportunities to the 
fullest, and participation in local and regional peace-building processes that hold the potential to shape 
their lives. These factors contribute to the lack of hope conveyed by the vast majority of participants. By 
conceding to this idea of the future and essentially relinquishing agency for future change to the UNHCR, 
Kiziba refugees contribute to the sense of permanence that makes their situation durable. These 
constraints on hope, agency, and identity more clearly resonated in the refugees’ discussion of health and 
food. The following section discusses the theme of hope in relation to food and health, one of the most 
common unprompted themes that emerged in the interview data.  
2 The global resettlement rate among refugees and asylum seekers is around 0.763% (12.9 million 
refugees and asylum seekers globally in 2013 with 98,400 actually admitted for resettlement) (UNHCR, 
2015e); UNHCR Rwanda has high goals for 2015, anticipating 2,000 selected for resettlement out of the 
74,151 refugees in the country (UNHCR, 2015d). This lofty goal for UNHCR Rwanda indicates that the 
refugees will be “selected” for resettlement, though actual placement abroad can take several years 
(Kiziba Camp residents, personal communication, 5-6 June 2014).  
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HEALTHCARE, FOOD SECURITY, AND BODIES 
In a contradictory way, the refugees’ framing of food security, bodies, and healthcare reinforced 
the permanent temporariness of the camp situation. While residents espoused a sense of the normalcy of 
life as they spoke about orderliness and local governance, in the realm of healthcare and food security, 
participants in this study framed their experiences on the periphery of society with very little agency to 
create meaningful change in their lives. At this core level of physical wellbeing, residents expressed much 
more dire associations and compromised senses of hope. A woman village leader told us, “But once 
you’re a refugee in the camp, no one cares for your healthcare. Yeah, so it’s like you’re condemned to die 
because you don’t have access to healthcare” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). As 
mentioned earlier, the camp clinic meets basic healthcare needs; in fact, the clinic is such an important 
asset, UNHCR and the Rwandan government opened the clinic up to surrounding locals to improve 
access to rural populations and prevent jealousy between communities. In that light, this leader is not 
speaking to the absolute lack of healthcare available to the refugees. Rather, she is addressing a broader 
sentiment that came up in several interviews about lack of agency to pursue healthcare options, 
particularly those that would sustain life and maximize livelihoods. This also ties in to camp food security 
since the limited rations cannot help their “body system[s] to protect ourselves” (village leader, personal 
communication, 6 June 2014). In these ways, residents felt no agency to change their daily 
circumstances and dependency on humanitarian aid. These sentiments complicate the notion of 
autonomy and managerial pride expressed by the leaders by reinforcing an identity dependent on 
external systems and suffering from marginal allocations from international donors.  
As the Executive Council explained, the camp clinic does not always have enough medicine to 
address the needs of the refugees (personal communication, 25 January 2013). A study across all camps 
in Rwanda similarly found that refugees complained of service delays, medicine shortages, and access to 
more options than basic care and procedures (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). If a refugee presents symptoms 
beyond the expertise or capabilities of the camp clinic staff, he or she would then be transferred to Kibuye 
“after a long period of sickness.” This member of the camp leadership went on to explain, “When they 
arrive there, sometimes they find that they don’t have [the] medicine they need, so they make another 
transfer” (Executive Council, personal communication, 25 January 2013). Kigali is the last stop for 
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medical resolutions. If no solution can be found at the local hospital in Kigali, the refugee is returned to 
the camp. These cases include illnesses for which the doctors could find no cause as well as those for 
which the clinic staff cannot provide adequate care in the camp (e.g. diabetes and cancer). This lends 
itself to the feeling that refugees are “condemned to die,” but also reflects the realities of life in a 
developing country where everyone’s access to full healthcare options is limited.  
As residents of Kiziba situated their health status within a larger context, they exercised agency in 
ways that expand beyond the access of Rwandan citizens in the surrounding rural Kibuye district. 
Although Rwanda has made great strides in improving healthcare indicators throughout the country, 
respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, and malaria are among the top ten causes of death 
in the host country (WHO, 2015). This corresponds with the most common diseases found among camp-
based refugees in Rwanda, namely respiratory tract infections, watery diarrhea, and intestinal worms 
(WFP & UNHCR, 2014). Likewise, the western regions of Rwanda near the border with the DRC suffer 
the highest rates of food insecurity in the country, at around 37% compared with 24% nationally (WFP, 
2013). According to WFP & UNHCR (2014), Kiziba households suffer from approximately 30% food 
insecurity, putting them in line with the context of both the region and the host state. Camp households 
that survive entirely off of the 2,103 kilocalories per day of food aid in the form of maize, beans, oil, and 
salt share a similar diet to those food insecure households in Rwanda (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). These 
host community households, in fact, fare worse as they consume mostly starches with little access to 
beans, vegetables, or oils and no fruits, milk, or meat.  
The similarity of food security and health access between Kiziba residents and the surrounding 
Rwandan communities implies a more abstract construction of identity at play in the refugees’ interviews. 
By expressing concerns about food security and asking us, as researchers, to convey this message to the 
international community, the refugees exercise a kind of agency. They do this because they have a voice 
in the international community through the mouthpiece of INGOs such as UNHCR. As representatives (in 
their eyes) of the power and resources of the global North, they felt comfortable sharing these health and 
food security concerns very openly in conversation. This openness in dialog provided a window into 
Kiziba residents’ understanding of how donors and international governments affect their daily existence 
in the camp. They did not ask for direct handouts or any supplies directly from us. In fact, they often 
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accepted that as academics our contributions would be through writing and sharing their stories. Their 
understanding of the international refugee regime complex, and the role of donor governments and 
international institutions, conveyed in their acceptance that our role was to serve as ‘ambassadors’ for 
their stories, a greater calling beyond a specific, finite donation.   
Unlike the surrounding host communities that have no guaranteed access to an international 
voice, the refugees implored us, “Just to tell [the international community] that we are here in the camp; 
we don’t live a good life. We are struggling to survive…because we don’t eat well. The food is not good 
[for us]” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Reminiscent of the refugees in Zetter’s 
(1991) study, Kiziba residents strategically exercise their collective voice—one that carries weight in the 
international community through INGOs. Though it has taken a long time, these complaints did not fall on 
deaf ears and in fact stimulated change. In May 2014, the World Food Programme conducted a market 
assessment in response to a successful pilot project conducted in Gihembe refugee camp, another 
Congolese camp in Rwanda (WFP, 2014). This project would give vouchers to refugees instead of food 
distributions; the vouchers would allow refuges to access markets and better control their own diets, with 
obvious benefits to the local economy.3 Exploration of this project by the INGO that supplies food aid to 
the camps in Rwanda suggests that indeed the refugees do have a level of agency in terms of shaping 
international issues, such as food aid provision, that is beyond the reach of local communities. In these 
ways, refugees capitalize on their own displacement and political placelessness as an act of agency, 
thereby maximizing the reach of their power within the very system that enforces their prolonged 
containment.  
An option for food vouchers, while greatly improving the diets of some refugees, also provides 
means for agency by more fully integrating refugees economically with the surrounding host communities. 
Economic integration likely results in positive benefits for refugees and host communities alike (Jacobsen, 
2005; Zetter, 2012), but it also confers an economic durability to their state of displacement. The food 
voucher pilot program and plans for expansion illustrate that refugees do have avenues to affect change 
3 It is not likely that this will be a near term solution for Kiziba Camp as the report found limited access to 
markets could prove challenging for residents there. The report suggests establishing a new market 
closer to the camp to ensure success of the program. 
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in local and international processes, specifically through formal and informal economic markets and policy 
changes for aid distribution. Zetter (1991) points to this ‘political currency’ in his study as a reason 
refugees, even after local integration, preserve the label ‘refugee.’ By invoking the deep political meaning 
of placelessness in the ‘refugee label’ in this context, protracted populations exercise agency over aid 
distribution mechanisms and survive in durable displacement. Making the best of the complex and very 
difficult situation of liminal drift, many refugees embrace their outsider status to attain access to 
opportunities not afforded in surrounding host communities. Access to these resources, as seen in the 
clinic use, situates the refugees as outside the host state and in close proximity to the international arena 
in the eyes of the local community as well. Therefore, the foundational aspects of human survival—food 
and medical care—become central dimensions of refugees’ status and agency within a much larger 
national and international political machine where, at times, relatively small perks are bartered within a 
system that reinforces dependency and marginalization.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I illustrated how refugees form an identity in a third space outside of the traditional 
understanding of a citizen as someone who has rights to life in a territorially-based country. As outsiders 
in a state-centric world, they relied on a nostalgic remembrance of the Congo as home but carried a 
sense that they would likely live out their lives in the camp. This institutionalized acceptance of their 
situation itself perpetuates their displacement, putting them outside the realm of participation in peace-
building processes or contributing ideas for a workable durable solution. In this way, the refugees function 
as part of the system that makes this kind of long-term displacement durable.  
In the meantime, a measure of the cumulative impact of lost human potential is beyond the reach 
of even large-scale quantitative assessments of refugee displacement. Yet, this larger consideration 
provides an overarching and critical framework for any analysis of the human crisis contained in refugee 
protraction and ‘wasted lives,’ as we see throughout this study of Kiziba. Bauman (2004), writing on the 
global processes that produced and maintain forced migration, saw no end to the human waste 
accumulating in refugee camps. He notes,  
The act of assigning to waste puts an end to differences, individualities, idiosyncrasies. 
Waste has no need of fine distinctions and subtle nuances, unless it is earmarked for 
recycling; but the refugees’ prospects of being recycled into legitimated and 
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acknowledged members of human society are, to say the least, dim and infinitely remote. 
All measures have been taken to assure the permanence of exclusion. (Bauman, 2004, 
p. 78) 
As I illustrated in this chapter, through the narratives from Kiziba, refugees become absorbed in these 
“measures…to assure permanence of exclusion” and contribute to the system of displacement by 
identifying as non-citizen, outsider others. At the same time, this population exercises agency by 
constructing and participating in a governance structure that gives them voice in the international 
community and situates them as a sovereign-like entity within the host country. Conflicting identities, 
visions of ‘home,’ and hope for the future all point to a similar theme that places Kiziba refugees in a very 
distinct marginal location—they don’t see themselves as strictly Congolese or future Rwandese. And 
while their dreams attach to the limited potential for relocation, camp residents reluctantly accept the 
likelihood that they will forever exist in an enduring cycle of displacement. This sentiment, combined with 
the lack of opportunities to participate in peace-building initiatives in the DRC, illuminates refugees’ roles 
in perpetuating a system of displacement that becomes increasingly durable over time.  
Yet, liminal drift is not exactly the end of this story. Life does go on. One young woman village 
leader explained,  
Even if we are in a refugee camp, you know we are human beings. Life has to go the way 
it must go. So it means that for young people, boy or girl, you know sometimes they fall in 
love with each other. And one night of course, because they don’t have means, they can’t 
organize weddings. But one day they just decide to…in the evening, they just decide to 
take each other’s hands and leave and start a new life [in another part of the camp]. 
(village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014) 
This narrative shows that their lives cannot remain indefinitely paused while waiting for a lasting solution. 
Life moves forward, future generations come into the camp knowing no other life, and the past life in the 
DRC becomes increasingly distant. The refugees articulated the repetitive life cycle in the camp, with one 
woman asking, “Can you imagine getting pregnant in this camp, then you have a baby in the camp, then 
the children start school in the camp. We are tired of living this life” (young village leader, personal 
communication, 5 June 2014). Factors of everyday life and human existence, when applied to the camp 
context, reflect a distinct life force and perhaps human survival spirit that exists simultaneously within the 
larger context of durable displacement. Spatially and sociologically isolated, the Kiziba population has 
become like its own country, complete with governance, collective identity, and sovereign-like borders. 
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While it may not be conscious or motivated by a particular set of long-term desires, durability emerges 
from the everyday activities of life. Within the contained space and limited opportunities afforded by the 
camp context, Kiziba refugees transform these daily activities into feelings of permanence and intractable 
solutions. Even as they internalize the larger limitations of their particular circumstance, in day-to-day life, 
residents also construct their own sense of community, shape the systems of governance within the 
camp, maximize access to basic needs such as sanitation and medical care, and clearly capitalize on 
their opportunities to exercise agency as vital players within the international systems that shape their 
existence. From this distinct dialectic relationship Kiziba refugees expressed, I posit their overall 





You, as an American who came a long way from America to 
here, who had this heart of listening to us, what kind of 
guarantee are you giving to us that you’ll be a good 
ambassador and the message you’ll give to the international 
community will change the life of the refugees here in this 
camp. 




Banyarwanda in eastern DRC have experienced decades of vacillation between inclusion and 
exclusion at both the local and national levels. In a land where people’s identities are still so connected to 
the land and local land-based politics, citizenship is more than a link between the sovereign state and its 
people. Land in the eastern DRC, and the region more broadly, signifies a right to belong, to participate, 
and to thrive in this world. Without it, one is lost, placeless, and often without the ability to imagine a 
future. Separated from their land, and homeland, for nearly two decades, the Congolese residents of 
Kiziba Camp in Rwanda represent the byproduct of ongoing conflict in the DRC resulting from post-
colonialism, political instability, and the revocation of citizenship and rights at the local and national levels. 
In this sense, the Banyarwanda’s spatial isolation on a mountaintop overlooking their former home 
embodies the larger political climate of the regional and even the international system that fails to make 
any interventions that substantively address the war in the Congo. Kiziba, in particular, with its split 
demographic representation across the war-affected areas of South Kivu, North Kivu, an Katanga 
provinces serves as a window into the dynamics of displacement in the region.  
Using qualitative analysis of interview data collected in Kiziba Camp over the course of three 
years, this study examined narratives of elected members of refugee councils, elected community 
leaders, and youth residents to begin to build theories about forced displacement in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa. Using a grounded theory approach, I extracted themes that emerged in conversations 
with residents to better understand their experience in this protracted context. Chapter 3 positioned this 
study in terms of existing literature by asking why anyone would want to protract displacement. The 
answers to this question fall into five broad themes at varying levels of analysis. At the macro-level, state 
sovereignty and international burden-sharing for refugee assistance provide insight into why state and 
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state-like INGOs would contribute in ways that prolong instead of end displacement. At the regional level, 
remnants of a post-colonial past reveal state-building motivations for extending the length of time 
refugees spend in exile. Finally, the literature review looks at how micro-level, local processes such as 
social stratification and social construction contribute to extended periods of displacement. These 
systems together, I contend, move protracted refugee cases into a form of durable displacement. Rather 
than maintaining the temporary nature of these settlements, then, camps become state-like and 
permanent through the passage of time. This process then makes long-term prospects for ‘durable 
solutions’ even more unlikely.  
The study then looked at the structure and narratives of the refugee camp to better understand 
these durability-increasing forces. Chapter 5 looks at institutions of camp life, namely security, education, 
politics, and economy to underscore the way host nations and INGO recreated their structures and values 
at the local level in ways that enforce a sense of permanence, and even autonomy, in this spatially 
marginalized community. These forces may not be intentional. The host government of Rwanda regulated 
education in the camp, for instance, and though it sees no prospects for local integration of the refugees, 
it indoctrinates them into the citizenship structures of the host country through formalized learning. As 
subsequent generations are born into the camp knowing nothing other than the information provided by 
the Rwandan education system, they exist as faux-citizens, uneducated in the ways of their country of 
origin and excluded from participation in their land of exile. Though unintentional, processes such as 
these reinforce the borders of the camp as international borders within Rwanda. Erected imaginary 
borderlands separate the refugees as outsider/foreigner/non-citizen others in contrast to the national 
citizens with full rights and belonging. Motivation to maintain displacement is rooted in the resources, 
recognition, and power that states and state-like INGOs derive from operating in the refugee regime 
complex.  
Chapter 6 takes that idea of outsider/non-citizen/other and looks at refugees’ expressions of 
home, identity, and hope to understand the local forces that prolong and even add durability to their 
displacement. These themes reveal complex ways in which refugees feel they have the power to express 
agency and change their circumstances as well as when they relinquish agency to meet their needs for 
resources and support. Aid organizations bring all of the goods and services necessary for survival, yet 
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also serve as channels to voice concerns to the international refugee regime complex. It is through these 
complicated expressions of agency that refugees formulate their relationship with the state and state-like 
INGOs. Repetitive and iterative interactions with INGOs and other representatives of the international 
community are a conduit for refugees’ expression of agency. By demonstrating adeptness at navigating 
these waters through requests and vocabulary, Kiziba’s residents frame themselves as global citizens. 
They are living in a local context, but are also separated spatially and manage a form of autonomy that 
gives the camp a state-like quality. These factors contribute to a sense of durability of their situation that 
most clearly surfaces in their expressions of identity, home, and hope. I proposed that the refugees, after 
years contained in this camp, see themselves as a different classification of being outside of the 
citizen/state/territory relationship. Ironically occupying a physical space, these placeless persons identify 
with a nostalgic past in the Congo that likely no longer exists, or as a global citizen in some idealized 
resettlement setting. Rather than a citizen of any country, the refugees’ imaginings reveal a solidarity with 
broader humanity, situating themselves more in the international arena than in the local or regional 
political context. In this global setting, the refugees see the potential for agency to make requests and 
instigate change in their daily circumstances. In other ways, however, Kiziba residents are rooted firmly in 
the local host community. Sharing ethnolinguistic and cultural similarities, their interactions with local 
communities reinforce the refugees’ outsider status and lack of agency to improve their lives. It is through 
these processes and exhibited mechanisms of constrained agency, then, that the very micro-level camp 
life instances illustrate local, state, regional, and international forces that reinforce the permanence of this 
particular displacement case. The self-reinforcing and iterative nature of these daily processes add 
durability to this protracted case and move it from a temporary flight from conflict to a permanent, semi-
autonomous, state-like entity.  
A THEORY OF DURABLE DISPLACEMENT 
By looking across state/INGO level and individual/camp levels of analysis, we can see that the 
interactions between global, state, and local-level actors entrench refugees in a more lasting and 
permanent form of displacement than is often encompassed in the temporariness of the word “refugee.” 
From the grounded theory approach of this study, I contend that encampment of refugees creates social, 
economic, political, and security conditions that together form mutually reinforcing spatial and institutional 
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systems of durable displacement, further distancing the realities of lasting solutions. Further research in 
different camp contexts would help to substantiate such claims as generalizable to the African Great 
Lakes Region more broadly, or even global cases of protracted refugee situations.  
In the case of Kiziba, the refugees situate themselves—particularly over longer stretches of time 
and through generations—as a kind of citizen outside the traditional understanding of that word. They 
belong to neither the Congo, nor Rwanda, nor can they all access some idealized resettlement in a third 
country of asylum. At the state-level, the host nation derives resources, recognition, and power as an 
international actor through hosting refugees. These aspects support their claims of internal and external 
sovereignty as they manage their citizens and engage in the larger international arena. Host nations 
negotiate power relationship with the UNHCR, receive an influx of aid resources into the economy, and 
reap political capital at the international level for the role they play in diplomacy regarding refugees and 
hosting. These aspects confer legitimacy to claims of external sovereignty, while practices of exclusion 
toward the noncitizen, refugee ‘other’ reinforce internal sovereignty for the host state’s citizens. 
Additionally, the UNHCR and INGOs operating within the refugee regime complex are legitimated by the 
continued caretaking role of refugees, as the swelling UNHCR budget attests. Even humanitarian aid 
mechanisms, then, lead to durability of displacement in the hearts, minds, and daily operations of the 
refugees, thereby diminishing the likelihood of finding lasting solutions. Together, these complex and 
interacting forces create a system where durability is the outcome, and lasting solutions for refugees in 
long-staying situations become increasingly less feasible.  
EXTENSION INTO THE FIELD 
Simply identifying the forces of durability in a system of displacement is not enough to initiate 
change in the protracted cases of refugee exile. The Kiziba residents in this study asked that I carry their 
message out into the world and be a good ambassador so they can leave that place. One village leader 
asked,  
As you’re coming from America, why don’t you go…okay, is there any space for us, 
where we can live instead of living in this camp? Or if you don’t know, then go ask…your 
government if there is a space where you can put us? (village leader, personal 
communication, 6 June 2014) 
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Knowing that this is not a reality and that resettlement is dictated by quotas and international negotiations 
beyond my reach, what is it that I can do? How can the time spent with these refugees become 
something more systemically powerful? We repeatedly grappled with these questions as we recorded 
narratives in the camp over the course of three years. I am inspired by the work of Pittaway et al. (2010) 
who gave back to the communities in which they conducted research by teaching advocacy and policy 
skills to give refugees the tools they needed to shape their own futures. Limited access to this camp 
population and the sensitive political situation in the host country and region make this option relatively 
impractical for Kiziba. Despite this, I still remained deeply committed to use this research in the way that I 
promised.  
So, outside of the theoretical contribution, how does this work fit into the larger policy world that 
dictates the global refugee regime complex? I think the answer to this is two-fold. First, by understanding 
state and INGO policies and practices that contribute to displacement, we can begin to explore more fully 
the ways of regulating and ameliorating the impacts, particularly on those who experience long-term 
displacement. Knowing that there are forces that lead to a durability of displacement, states and INGOs 
can work towards alternative solutions. Rejecting the assumptions of temporariness that embody the 
word ‘refugee’ alone helps us move toward more active policy implications for assuring refugee lives are 
not wasted in protraction. Until all refugees have a future beyond the camp with the ability to make their 
own choices about their lives, this research must continue.  
Part of the ethical burden of research is finding ways to ensure that the results of a study do not 
contribute in a negative way to the lives of those who shared their stories with me. While the use of the 
contents of this study of Kiziba Camp can never be fully fortified against the possibility of negative use, I 
propose some policy applications here to emphasize the good that I believe can come from identifying 
durability of displacement here. It is vital to look at the scholarship from an applied policy, as well as 
scholarly, perspective. The reason I pursued this work is connected directly to my interest in influencing 
some form of change and ultimately improving the livelihoods of people who exist in durably displaced 
situations. Of course, all of these applications would hinge upon INGO, host nation, and international 
community responsibility and willingness to make lasting and context-sensitive changes to management 
systems for protracted cases. The point of these policy ideas is to confront the durability of displacement 
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and attempt to find ways to avoid wasting lives. It may not be possible to prevent protraction, but there 
may be ways to avoid durability. In some cases, by embracing the durability of displacement, alternative 
aid strategies could enhance the quality of life or potential for success should durable solutions arise.  
In the area of education, perhaps the national education system could be melded with 
educational priorities of the country of origin in order to prevent fully indoctrinated host state faux-citizens 
such as those in Kiziba. As this study showed, support systems built for refugees that assume a 
temporary stay can have complex consequences as generations are born into the camp context. Studying 
through online degree programs (e.g. Khan Academy or online university programs) through more 
efficient and available Internet services could allow refugees to expand skillsets that they could utilize in 
any of the three UNHCR proposed durable solutions. If we were to accept the durable nature of certain 
kinds of displacement, perhaps refugees could be trained to undertake the majority of humanitarian 
services provided by outside employees. Rather than university programs alone, refugees should have 
opportunities for trainings that would allow them to take over the medical support roles, fulfill the 
psychological counseling void, or even assume camp administration leadership so that humanitarian aid 
finds its way directly—rather than indirectly or not at all—into the camp economy to allow more self-
sufficiency. Additionally, following the model of Pittaway et al. (2010) and the suggestion of Milner (2011), 
refugees could be prepared to participate in peacemaking, peace-building, and post-conflict rebuilding 
through diplomacy and lobbying education and training. As Milner (2011) suggests, without including 
massively displaced populations in the peace and conflict-resolution processes, displacement often 
becomes a chronic condition. All parties must be involved in the resolution of forced migration and the 
factors that led to the flight, and to do this, refugees must be trained to effectively use their voices in the 
diplomatic and international political arena.  
In the realm of economics, the aforementioned options would likely help to redirect money into 
the local refugee economy, with benefits to the surrounding communities (World Bank, 2012). Livelihood 
initiatives could focus on culturally-tuned and regionally-tailored projects that prepare refugees to engage 
in either the local economy, the economy of their communities of origin, or even in a potential third 
country of asylum. Generalizable skillsets might include learning to build living roofs, establish vertical 
gardens that allow all residents to participate, or even exploring agricultural initiatives such as beekeeping 
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that occupy a small spatial area. These kinds of initiatives could have more wide-spread accessibility and 
appeal for all residents—rather than just a select few vulnerable groups—and allow practice and 
maintenance of skills that can be passed on to younger generations such as land cultivation. Embracing 
the notion of durability in this context would allow the refugees to adopt strategies that both boost 
economic and/or health conditions in the interim and support skills that could be carried with them 
anywhere in the future.  
Second, by understanding the durability that builds at the local level—in the identity and 
imaginings of the refugees—we can anticipate problems that arise with disrupting the state-like camp 
situation that has been home for such long periods of time. This work rests in the realm of psychologists 
and peace and reconciliation experts, but identifying the durability of these contexts serves as a useful 
starting point for truly understanding the potential consequences of ‘durable solutions.’ While the 
UNHCR’s goals for durable solutions provides an overarching framework, understanding the durability of 
certain protracted cases may shed light on the realistic success of certain options, including repatriation 
or resettlement. I hope that this work can contribute to political, social, and psychological strategies than 
can inspire new alternatives to existing long-term solutions and ease the transition of durably displaced 
refugees into those future options. Ultimately, by understanding durability as a concept of certain types of 
forced migration, and knowing where to draw the line between permanence and temporariness, we can 
begin to reimagine what a refugee camp stay looks like. Through the process of formulating new ways to 
exist in exile, we can gradually dismantle the notion of durability and convert the refugee experience into 
one without so much wasted human potential.  
FUTURE WORK 
This research identified processes at the macro, meso, and micro levels that contribute to a 
system of displacement where once temporary situations become increasingly permanent and durable. 
As the previous section discussed, three areas of further research include capturing the most likely 
avenues for advancing the questions raised in this study. First, an investigation of alternative hosting 
mechanisms for institutions in the camps, such as security, education, and healthcare, would reduce 
durability and reinforce the temporary nature of camp settings. Second, research into the psychological 
effects of removing refugees’ from durable displacement into mainstream society is necessary to ensure 
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the success of these populations in the future. It is not a matter of dropping them into a new context and 
expecting everyone to thrive. How do refugees from protracted situations that began to take on durable 
qualities adjust to resettlement or repatriation? If they repatriate, how do they reconcile with the host 
country after years of separation? Who will facilitate such a dramatic psychological transition? Third, 
Having identified durability in displacement and the cyclic effects of these factors, an important next step 
is to develop research on how we dismantle the durability, protraction, and displacement. This would help 
move towards a future where exiled human beings can be released from their encampment and allowed 
to lead lives where their agency is not confined to the imprisonment of physical warehousing that defines 
the lives of refugees today. Until this level of the world’s conflict and power displacement spillovers are 
integrated into the international community’s approach to forced migration, humanitarian aid will remain 
an isolated response to the collective human tragedies of refugees. Kiziba Refugee Camp, and many 
others like it, has existed for nearly twenty years, hosting the same population while new generations are 
born into it. Under no context within the bounds of a human life can 20 years be deemed ‘temporary.’ At 
what point do we, as scholars and members of the global community, reject the assumptions of 
temporary refugeehood? By recognizing durability in displacement, we can begin to improve the 
livelihoods of those stuck in limbo in meaningful ways and reduce the human potential wasted in camps 
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TIMELINE OF BANYARWANDA CITIZENSHIP 
The following table outlines the major legislative actions that revoked or bestowed citizenship on the 
Banyarwanda population of eastern DRC. In some cases, these actions provided citizenship to some 
Banyarwanda while revoking it from others. The most recent changes reportedly give citizenship to all 
Banyarwanda who can demonstrate presence in the country prior to the 1960 independence, but the 
ambiguous wording reflects earlier legislation that provided loopholes for exclusion.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Citizenship Legislation for Congolese Banyarwanda 
Year/Legislation Citizen? Description 
1920 – Congolese roundtable 
convenes in Brussels 
Ambiguous The talk was focused on Independence and it 
was agreed that Banyarwanda who had lived in 
Congo for at least 10 years could vote like all 
Congolese (Deng, 2001, p. 197)The talk was 
focused on Independence and it was agreed that 
Banyarwanda who had lived in Congo for at least 
10 years could vote like all Congolese (Deng, 
2001, p. 197) 
1959 – Legislative decree for 
Banyarwandas’ right to run 
for office 
Ambiguous Continuation of the 1920 talk (Deng, 2001, p. 
197)Continuation of the 1920 talk (Deng, 2001, p. 
197) 
1960 – “Electoral Law 13” Yes Reaffirms residency of ten years or more = right 
to vote. Many did so in the first municipal 
elections and many Banyarwanda were elected to 
office. (Deng, 2001, p. 197)Reaffirms residency of 
ten years or more = right to vote. Many did so in 
the first municipal elections and many 
Banyarwanda were elected to office. (Deng, 
2001, p. 197) 
1960 – “The Fundamental 
Law of 1960” 
No Newly independent Republic of Congo 
determines citizenship is only applicable to those 
tribal groups documented to exist within DRC 
prior to the definition of its national borders on 1 
August 1885. Makombo notes (in the notes 
section), “…the former Zairian Government 
reaffirmed that Banyamulenge were not either a 
tribe of Zairians or Rwandan origin or 
Kinyarwanda-speaking Zairians” (p. 55) 
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Year/Legislation Citizen? Description 
1964 – Luluabourg 
Constitution, Article 6 
No This is in slight conflict with Makombo’s account 
above, but Deng claims that the 1920 resolution 
was in force until 1964. He quotes article 6 of the 
new constitutions (p. 197): “Congolese citizenship 
is recognized [for] every person, one of whose 
parents was or had been a member of one of the 
tribes established within the territory of the 
Republic of the Congo in its borders as defined 
on 18 October 1908.” – this was written 30 June 
1960, which may be why it’s confusing. Deng 
asserts that this should’ve included Rwandan 
groups as well. The Banyarwanda were allowed 
to vote in subsequent elections, but couldn’t’ run 
for office.  
1971—“The Decree Law No. 
71-020 of 26 March 1971, 
Signed January 1972 by 
Pres. Mobutu 
Yes Citizenship to all natives of Rwanda and Burundi 
arriving in DRC (Zaire) before 1950. Mobutu was 
allegedly under pressure from Tutsi leader 
Bisengimana Rwema. This law gave 
Banyarwanda political rights (voting and entering 
elections) 
Note: Deng quotes his translation of another text 
as “[A]ll persons of Rwanda-Burundi origins 
established in the Congo by June 30, 1960, are 
Zairian from this date” – which makes sense 
because that’s the date the constitution was 
drafted. (p. 198) Makombo was citing the text 
actually written into the nationality act written in 
1972 that gives the cutoff date as January 1, 
1950.  
1981—Amendment to 1971 
law 
Some Limited citizenship again to those groups existing 
prior to 1885, but allowed for naturalization on an 
individual basis. Banyarwanda effectively lose the 
right to citizenship. The possibility for 
naturalization caused confusion because no 
administrative instruments were emplaced to 
enforce it. No previous Banyarwanda national 
identity cards were revoked (pp. 55-56) 
1991-  Ambiguous “When, despite the 1981 Law, the Zairian 
National Conferences, established in 1991, 
decided that the transitional Government of Zaire 
should respect Banyarwanda’s acquired rights to 
protect them from statelessness, the Hunde and 
Nyanga indigenous ethnic groups protested.” (P. 
56). Deng (p. 200) cites an Amnesty International 
report that says the results of the conferences 
upheld the 1981 law.  
1994-Interim Constitution of 
9 April 1994 
No Similar to the Fundamental Law of 1960 
1995—Resolution of 28 April 
1995 
No Aimed to examine the conflict in eastern DRC in 
order to exclude Banyarwanda from citizenship. 
Treated the Banyamulenge as “recent refugees” 
(p. 56) 
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Year/Legislation Citizen? Description 
September 1996 No Governor of S. Kivu threatens to intern and 
exterminate all Banyarwanda who refuse to leave. 
The Banyarwanda join in rebellion backed by 
Rwanda and Uganda and ultimately overthrow 
Mobutu and put Laurent Kabila in power—the 
DRC is born.  
1996 – letter to the UN 
Security Council dated 23 
Oct 
No Deng states, “…the Zairean government wrote 
that it did not consider that the Banyarwanda in 
general and the Banyamulenge in particular 
belonged to a Zairean ethnic group. They were 
therefore not entitled to Zairean citizenship unless 
they were to acquire such nationality through 
naturalization procedures. (p. 200) 
1994  No President Kabila annulled the Interim Constitution 
of 9 April 1994. As of 1997, the 1981 citizenship 
law is in effect, where Banyarwanda have no 
citizenship rights.  
1996—2 April 1996 
Government of Rwanda  
No Rwandan Government does not see 
Banyarwanda as citizens (Deng, 2001, p. 201). 
December 2005 referendum Yes/Ambigu
ous 
All ethnic groups present in DRC at the time of 
independence in 1960 are DRC citizens, as well 
as descendants. According to UNHCR: “The 
Constitution thus confirms that Banyarwanda 
populations who were established in Congo prior 
to 1960 are citizens of the DRC” (UNHCR Africa 
Bureau, 2006). Utilizes same wording of earlier 




1. Questions about the past  
1.1. Where are you from?  
1.2. What was life like there?  
1.3. What did you do for a living? 
1.4. How were your relations with your neighbors and community members?  
1.5. Do you still have family back there?  
2. Questions about the present 
2.1. How are your relations with your neighbors and community members here?  
2.2. How do people outside the camp interact with you? 
2.3. What would you say is your national identity?  
3. Questions about the future 
4. Where would you like to live, if you could? 
4.1. If the fighting in the community where you came from ended, what would you do? 
4.2. What do you think life would be like if you could go back? 
4.3. If the fighting does not end, what will you do? 
4.4. How do you see your life in the next 10 years? 20 years? 
4.5. How do you see the life of your children in the future?  
5. Questions about rumors of others leaving the camp: 
5.1. Do you know anyone who has left the camp? 
5.2. Where did they go? 
5.3. Where are they now? How are they now? 
5.4. Did their experience influence your ideas about leaving the camp?  
6. Concluding: 
6.1. What are your hopes for the future of this camp? 
6.2. What would you like the international community to know about this situation here? 
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